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Overall Introduction
The context
In the last years, the Great Recession in 2008 and its devastating impact on youth unemployment
triggered the debate on the long-term effects of economic downturns on the labor market career
of young graduates. Long-term penalties may arise because youth unemployment not only brings
the obvious loss of current income during the period of inactivity, but it may also inflict a longer-
term scar through the increased future incidence of unemployment and lower subsequent earnings
in employment. Moreover, scarring effects of unemployment may not be limited to the people
who experience it. That is, a higher risk of unemployment in economic downswings may force
workers to accept lower-level or lower-paying jobs than the ones they would have aimed to during
better labor market conditions. This may induce long-lasting effects if the specific human capital
acquired in these mismatched jobs is useless to climb the ladder towards higher-level positions
that the worker would have targeted in the first place. Moreover, the opportunity costs of changing
jobs increases with the experience acquired in the mismatched positions, potentially prolonging
the scar. But is this view evidence-based? The first two chapters of this dissertation explore the
long-term impacts of economic downturns on the labor market outcomes of young male graduates
in Flanders, the most prosperous of the three regions in Belgium.
Moreover, the increased unemployment rate and unemployment duration since the Great Re-
cession have fueled the discussion on the efficiency-insurance trade-off of the unemployment in-
surance system - a fundamental safety net that provides for the unemployed. That is, the provision
of unemployment insurance raises moral hazard problems, i.e. the more generous the unemploy-
ment insurance, the lower the search incentives for the unemployed. To cope with this efficiency
loss many European countries have imposed job search requirements on benefit recipients. To
verify compliance, job search effort is monitored and, in the case of non-compliance, benefit re-
cipients are sanctioned. Despite its wide implementation, the implications of this policy measure
are not clear-cut. In the third chapter we evaluate, from a theoretical point of view, the social wel-
fare implications of job search monitoring under a more realistic framework than what is assumed
in the existing literature: first, we allow the unemployed job-seekers to procrastinate in job search
and second, we allow for imperfections in the job search monitoring technology.1
1These assumptions have been explored separately in the literature, but not jointly.
2The Belgian case
The case of Belgium is particularly interesting, because labor market rigidity, as measured by
flows in and out of unemployment, is among the highest in the OECD countries. First, the litera-
ture suggests that the effects of graduating during downswings are much more persistent in a rigid
labor market than in a flexible one. Secondly, in Belgium the sources of this rigidity differ accord-
ing to workers’ skill levels. Hence, we are able to obtain some insights in how distinct sources
of rigidities drive different hysteresis mechanisms. For instance, until the end of 2013, white and
blue collar workers were facing different levels of employment protection legislation (EPL), i.e.
a flexible EPL for the latter while a very rigid EPL for the former.2 For blue collar workers the
sources of rigidity are different. They are supported by a short-time work compensation program
that subsidies temporary reduction of labor force during downturns. This policy introduces rigidity
by tying employers to employees. Moreover, minimum wages - among the highest of the OECD
countries - are likely to be binding for blue collar youth. Thus, minimum wages represent an ad-
ditional source of rigidity for this group together with a quite generous unemployment insurance
system.
The generosity of the Belgian unemployment insurance system is mostly due to the absence
of time limit on the payment of unemployment benefits, as opposed to many other countries.
Moreover, unemployment benefits are provided not only to unemployed workers who are invol-
untary dismissed and with sufficient employment records, but also to unemployed school-leavers
with no employment records, conditional on a waiting period of 12 months.3 Since 2004, a job
search monitoring scheme has been introduced targeting long-term (13 months or more) unem-
ployed. The unemployed who are subject to monitoring are required to collect written proofs of
their search activity, which is evaluated by case-workers in face-to-face interviews. This scheme
is quite lenient compared to many other OECD countries: the frequency of the evaluations is
lower, the search requirement imprecise, and sanctions can be imposed only after a second neg-
ative evaluation. However, sanctions are typically tougher than in many other countries.4 Cockx
and Dejemeppe (2012)5 have shown that this scheme is effective in speeding up the transition into
employment of the long-term unemployed after the notification and before the first evaluation, i.e.
the sanctions are effective threats.
2Since the beginning of 2014 a single employment contract has been introduced in Belgium stipulating the same
EPL for white and blue collar workers.
3Before (Since) 2012 the waiting period is 9 (12) months after registration to the Public Employment Service.
4The first evaluation of job search activity does not take place before 8 months from a notification letter which
communicates to the long-term unemployed that he will be subject to monitoring. No quantitative targets are set on
the number of job applications. No sanction is imposed after a first evaluation. After a second negative evaluation, a
temporary (for 4 months) complete withdrawal of entitlement to unemployment benefits can be imposed. After a third
negative evaluation the withdrawal can be definitive.
5Bart Cockx, Muriel Dejemeppe, “Monitoring job search effort: An evaluation based on a regression discontinuity
design”, Labour Economics, Volume 19, Issue 5, October 2012, Pages 729–737.
3The Structure of the Dissertation
In the first two chapters of this dissertation we use the same data to answer to distinct but re-
lated research questions. In the first chapter we study the scars of experiencing a higher risk of
unemployment at graduation on the labor market outcomes of Flemish male youth. By contrast,
in the second chapter we aim to quantify the long-term effects of experiencing individual non-
employment at the start of the career on the labor market outcomes of these youth. Throughout
the analyses we distinguish between low and high educated school-leavers because, as mentioned
above, labor market institutions in Belgium create different sources of rigidities for the low and the
high educated. The third chapter is distinct from the previous two but still related to the experience
of unemployment. It is a theoretical analysis on the social efficiency of job search monitoring −
a policy measure that has been widely implemented to reduce unemployment − under more real-
istic time-preferences. The contribution of each chapter and the links relating them are outlined
hereafter.
The first chapter studies the short- and long-run impacts of graduating in economic downturns
in Flanders. This research question is estimated with a reduced form model, where the provincial
unemployment rate at graduation, as a measure of the labor market conditions at graduation, is
regressed on subsequent labor market outcomes of the school graduates. By graduating in ad-
verse labor markets, the new graduates incur higher risks of experiencing unemployment. Such
risks may entail long-lasting consequences on the career of the youth which may be not limited
to actual individual unemployment. In this chapter we identify these scars and relate them to
the rigidities characterising the Belgian labor market. Namely, we find that the low and the high
educated undergo different long-term penalties from graduating in downturns: while a downturn
at graduation is found to have a persistent negative effect on earnings for both groups, the high
educated experience a persistent negative effect on the hourly wage and not on the annual hours
worked, and the reverse holds for the low educated. This is explained by the presence of minimum
wages which, at the start of the career, are likely to be binding for the low educated but not for the
high educated, and by the strict EPL for white collar workers, which pushes the high educated to
downgrade towards lower-paying jobs. Moreover, we provide evidence on the hypothesis that the
effects of graduating during downswings are much more persistent in a rigid labor market than in
a flexible one.
In the second chapter instead we narrow the scope of the analysis and focus on the long-term
impacts of experiencing non-employment early in the career. We examine non-employment rather
than unemployment to take into account the period of time that school-leavers may spend out of
the labor market before first entry. We hypothesize that for low educated youth the scars of grad-
uating during downturns arise through the loss of early work experience. We test this by means
of an instrumental variable approach, where the unemployment rate at graduation is used as an
instrument for the proportion of time spent in early non-employment, which in turn is used to
4explain the subsequent labor market career of the low educated, evaluated six and eight years after
graduation. The results of the second chapter corroborate the hypotheses of the first chapter, ac-
cording to which the long-term impacts of graduating in a downturn materialize through the loss
of early work experience for the low educated but not for the high educated.
The first two chapters are related in a number of dimensions. First, both these chapters exploit
a unique employer-employee dataset that matches survey and administrative data on a random
sample of male Flemish youth. The administrative data contain detailed and comprehensive infor-
mation on individual labor market performance up to twelve years since graduation. The survey
data follow closely the educational path of the youth from the beginning of secondary education
and allow us to precisely define the moment of graduation, which is crucial in our analysis and
typically not observed in administrative data. Second, their identification strategies are related. In
the second chapter, the unemployment rate at graduation is used as an instrument to identify the
long-term effects of early non-employment on the labor market career of the low educated evalu-
ated six or eight years after graduation. In the first chapter, the unemployment rate at graduation
(i.e. the instrument) is directly regressed on the outcomes of interest measured in the first twelve
and ten years after graduation for the low and high educated, respectively. Thus, the first chapter
estimates a reduced form version of the equation of interest in the second chapter. However, the
two chapters use different frameworks. The first chapter exploits the panel structure of the data:
namely, the unemployment rate at graduation is interacted with experience dummies so that the
results yield a vector of effects of interest, each representing the effect of the labor market condi-
tions at graduation over potential experience. By contrast, in the second chapter the outcomes are
evaluated at a given point in time (six or eight years after graduation). Hence, the analysis restricts
each time to the cross-section variation. Of course, precision is reduced as a consequence of this
decision. We choose to fix each time the dependent variable for simplicity since we are interested
not only in the scar of early non-employment but also in its persistence: exploring the effect of
early non-employment at different cross-sections seemed to us the easiest way to implement the
instrumental variable approach and at explore the persistence of the scar. The use of Panel instru-
mental variables is left for future research.
While the first two chapters are focused on the long-term penalties of early unemployment
(the risk and the actual experience of unemployment, respectively), in the third chapter we study
how efficiently, from a welfare perspective, job search monitoring scheme shortens unemploy-
ment. This chapter is linked to the previous chapters to the extent that the moral hazard induced
by unemployment insurance can exacerbate the persistence of the scars of experiencing early un-
employment for the school-leavers. Note that in Belgium this is especially relevant because also
school-leavers with no employment records are eligible to unemployment benefits, conditional on
a waiting period of one year.
Job search monitoring has been widely introduced in many countries as a way to cope with
5the moral hazard problem induced by the unemployment insurance scheme. The provision of
unemployment insurance benefits is conditioned to specific requirements. To verify compliance,
the job search of the unemployed is monitored, eventually imposing sanctions in case of non-
compliance. In Belgium job search monitoring has been introduced in 2004 for the long-term
unemployed. Despite the popularity of this measure, the efficiency of job search monitoring is not
yet clear-cut since empirical evaluations have provided mixed results. From the theoretical side,
social welfare evaluations of this measure have yielded contrasting results depending on the type
of time preferences that are assumed to characterize the unemployed job-seekers. Under exponen-
tial time preferences, the expected lifetime utility of the unemployed is negatively affected because
they are forced to search more than optimal by binding requirements. Nevertheless, exponential
preferences provide an unrealistic characterization of search activity since job-seekers do not be-
have consistently over time but rather postpone search. A more realistic assumption is hyperbolic
time-preferences, which allows to depict the behavior of procrastinating agents. This alternative
assumption has offered more positive conclusions on the efficiency of perfect job search moni-
toring since a sophisticated hyperbolic agent is aware of his tendency to procrastinate and may
benefit from a commitment device that forces him to be consistent with an optimal plan. In the
third chapter, we reconcile this positive evaluation with the ambiguous empirical findings on the
effectiveness of job search monitoring. That is, we show that if the unemployed have hyperbolic
time preferences, job search monitoring is efficient only under limited conditions, and that effi-
ciency may not be attainable if we allow (more realistically) for imperfections in the monitoring
technology. We argue that, from a social welfare perspective, other policies such as job search
assistance may be preferable.
1
Scars of Recessions in a Rigid Labor Market
1.1 Introduction
The Great Recession in 2008 and its devastating impact on youth unemployment spurred the de-
bate on the long-term effects of economic downturns on the career prospects of young graduates.
In the current public debate the dominant viewpoint is that the Great Recession creates a lost gen-
eration. But is this view evidence based? Economic research has only relatively recently started
investigating this question, exploring data on past recessions in various countries. Existing ev-
idence broadly confirms the conjecture that a recession1 has persistent impact on labor market
outcomes of young graduates, although the magnitude and persistence of these effects depend
much on the considered outcome (employment, wage, earnings,...), the level of educational at-
tainment, and the institutional environment (see Section 1.2). This study analyses various of these
dimensions in a unique employer-employee dataset that matches survey and administrative data on
a sample of male school graduates in Flanders, the most prosperous of three regions in Belgium.
The case of Belgium is particularly interesting, because labor market rigidity, as measured
by flows in and out of unemployment, is among the highest in OECD. For instance, the average
monthly job destruction rate between 1990 and 1999 was less than 0.5% of the labor force, while
expected unemployment duration exceeded 20 months. These figures are comparable to the Ital-
ian, but contrast with those of the much more flexible US labor market, where 1.25% jobs were
destroyed every month and the mean unemployment duration was as low as five months (Pérez
and Yao, 2012). The research of Genda et al. (2010), and more recently, of Kawaguchi and Murao
1In line with the aforementioned literature, a “recession” refers to a situation of adverse labor market conditions as
measured by a rise in the unemployment rate rather than to a decline of real GDP.
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(2014) suggests that the effects of graduating during a recession are much more persistent in a
rigid labor market than in a flexible one. Our study provides further valuable evidence on this hy-
pothesis. Moreover, since in Belgium the sources of this rigidity differ according to skill level, we
can obtain some insights in how distinct sources of rigidity drive different hysteresis mechanisms.
For high skilled workers the rigidity is predominantly induced by the very strict employment pro-
tection legislation (EPL) for white collar workers. But this does not apply for low skilled workers,
since they are usually employed as blue collar workers for whom, until very recently, EPL was
very loose. For low skilled youth, (sectoral) minimum wages that are among the highest of OECD,
and lenient short-time work compensation (STC) and unemployment insurance (UI) systems are
therefore more relevant sources of rigidity.
In line with the institutional setting, we find that adverse labor market conditions hardly affect
hourly wages of low educated youth and that nearly all the burden of the adjustment runs through
the annual number of hours worked, predominantly induced by more unemployment experience.
The negative impact matters more in the first years after graduation, but it persists up to 12 years
later. This is in line with the ample evidence that experiencing unemployment (early in the career)
inflicts long-term scars on labor market outcomes (e.g.,Arulampalam, 2001; Gregg, 2001; Gregg
and Tominey, 2005; Schmillen and Umkehrer, 2013b).
For high educated youth, minimum wages are in general not binding, STC is not available, and
replacement rates in UI are relatively low, so that a different hysteresis mechanism is operating.
A recession may force high educated youth to downgrade and accept lower quality jobs paying
lower wages. Those who refuse to downgrade become temporarily unemployed. The possibility of
catching-up with a more fortunate generation that did not graduate in a recession is hampered by
a slower pace of human capital accumulation in these lower quality jobs (Gibbons and Waldman,
2006), by rigidities induced by long-term contracting (Baker et al., 1994; Beaudry and DiNardo,
1991), or by search frictions that increase with age or job tenure, inducing workers to stop search-
ing for a better paying job (Oreopoulos et al., 2012). The very strict EPL for white collar workers
in Belgium increases the gradient of search frictions with age or job tenure. Hence, we find much
more persistence in hourly wages and earnings of the high skilled in Belgium than in the more
flexible North American labor markets.
Our study does not only provide insights in how distinct sources of rigidity drive different
hysteresis mechanisms. It also contributes to the literature in other dimensions. First, we iden-
tify the long-run effects of recessions on labor market outcomes by exploiting the variation of
the provincial unemployment rate between five provinces and eight graduation years (1994-2001
for the low educated and 1997-2004 for the high educated). This variation identifies the causal
impact of recessions only to the extent that the provincial unemployment rate does not affect the
composition of graduates in a province, either by changing the timing of graduation or by induc-
ing inter-provincial mobility. We show that the latter is negligible and propose a new method for
testing the former. The test is based on a discrete duration model relating the timing of graduation
since the end of compulsory education to the provincial unemployment rate. We cannot reject the
absence of such relationship.
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Second, we have access to unusually rich data. Survey data are matched to comprehensive
administrative data from the various institutions of the Belgian Social Insurance system. The
survey data provides precise information on the timing of graduation, while the administrative data
contain, up to twelve years after labor market entry, detailed information (hours worked, hourly
wage and earnings) on salaried public and private sector employment, and also on time spent as
self-employed worker. For salaried workers we have also information on the quality of the firm
(as measured by the median wage). Existing research is often less comprehensive by focusing
on particular labor market outcomes,2 either wages or (salaried) employment, or by considering
particular sub-populations (e.g. college graduates).
Third, we propose a new method of inference. Inference is complicated, since the regressor
of interest, the provincial unemployment rate at graduation, is a serially correlated variable that
is measured at a grouped level. Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrate that in such circumstances the
standard error can be severely downwards biased and that this bias can be very severe if the num-
ber of groups (clusters) is small. To address this problem, we propose a novel feasible generalized
least squares (FGLS) method closely related to the efficient Minimum Distance (or Minimum
Chi-square) estimator of Wooldridge (2006, 2010) for cross-section data and the FGLS recently
introduced by Brewer et al. (2013) for difference-in-differences designs. We organize our dis-
cussion as follows. In the next section we briefly review the literature on the scarring effects of
graduating in downturns. Section 1.3 summarizes the institutional setting. In Section 1.4 we de-
scribe the data. In Section 1.5 the estimation strategy is explained, including the way in which we
deal with the problem of inference in the presence of a small number of clusters. We report the
results in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes. We refer the reader to the Supplementary Appendix
in Chapter A for a detailed description of the variables construction, the sample selection, the
complete estimation results, as well as a description and the results of the tests for the endogeneity
of the timing of graduation and of the inter-provincial mobility.
1.2 Literature Review
Researchers studying the long-term effects of graduating during recessions in North-America re-
port different findings for high than for low skilled youth. Graduating from college during a reces-
sion imposes a modest but long-lasting penalty on earnings that gradually fades away in about ten
years (Genda et al., 2010 for US and Oreopoulos et al., 2012 for Canada).3 These earnings losses
are essentially due to a decline in hourly wages, not in employment or hours worked. During a
recession college graduates are forced to accept lower quality jobs paying lower wages and/or of-
fering less career perspectives and less opportunities for promotion and training, since high quality
career jobs are then in reduced supply. Workers can react to this set-back and catch-up with the
more lucky generations that graduated during booms by enhancing investments in human capital
(Mroz and Savage, 2006), or by intensifying their search for higher paying jobs (Topel and Ward,
2Genda et al. (2010) is a notable exception.
3Mansour (2009) and Kahn (2010) found similar but more persistent effects for the US.
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1992). However, the possibility of catching-up is hampered by hysteresis in career progression,
both within and between firms. This can be due to imperfections in downward wage renegotia-
tions of lucky generations that entered in a boom (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991),4 or to information
imperfections (Baker et al., 1994), both shielding the internal labor market from the competitive
forces in the external labor market. But also in the absence of long-term wage contracts, part of
the acquired human capital in these lower quality jobs is task specific, leaving part of a worker’s
human capital unutilized when she gets promoted, and, hence, inducing lower wages many years
later (Gibbons and Waldman, 2004, 2006). Moreover, search frictions that increase with age or
job tenure can induce workers to stop searching for a better paying job (Oreopoulos et al., 2012,
2008).
For low skilled workers, by contrast, the effect of adverse labor market conditions at gradu-
ation has immediate important negative effects on wages and earnings, which fade away quickly
after a couple of years, and a small and only marginally significant, though persistent, effect on
employment. The number of hours worked is not affected (Genda et al., 2010).5 This is because
the labor market for low skilled workers involves less investments in human capital and long-term
career contracts. It operates more like a spot market, in which wages rather than employment react
rapidly to changes in the economic environment (see also e.g. Kilponen and Santavirta (2010) and
Devereux and Hart (2007)).
These findings are specific, however, since, in contrast with many other countries, the US
and Canada have very flexible labor markets. In a rigid labor market more persistent effects of
a recession are expected. Employers then have more incentives to screen job applicants before
hiring, because they are more forced into long-term relationships with their employees. If in an
upturn screening is less costly among the pool of recent graduates than among a pool of job-
seekers, unemployed because they graduated in a recession, then the latter group is more likely to
be set back permanently. Genda et al. (2010) find supporting evidence of this hypothesis. In Japan
the screening of recent graduates is indeed facilitated, both, because high schools are obliged
by law to help firms in matching graduated students to jobs, and because social norm against
dismissal6 and resulting case law make dismissal of regular workers for economic reasons almost
prohibitive. In contrast to their results for the US, these authors find strong and persistent (lasting
more than 12 years) negative effects of a recession on both employment and earnings for low
educated graduates in Japan. For the high educated, similar to the findings in the US, no significant
effect on employment is found, while the effect on earnings also declines, but starts at a lower level
and remains significantly negative after 12 years, rather than gradually fading away, as in the US.
Recently, Kawaguchi and Murao (2014) find in a cross-country study more supporting evidence
that recessions at labor market entry have more persistent adverse effects on the (un)employment
4Recently Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) criticize this interpretation. They argue that wages are still determined
by spot markets and not by long-term implicit contracts. They show that, once the current match quality is taken into
account, past labor market conditions no longer play a role in the wage determination.
5Kondo (2007) reports similar findings for other disadvantaged groups, such as black men and women.
6By the 1970s high long-term unemployment created the perception that firms should be held responsible for their
employees’ job security.
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rate7 in countries with more labor market rigidity as measured by EPL strictness, union coverage,
and benefit duration of UI.8
Evidence from European studies only partially support the conclusions of aforementioned
studies. Within countries with moderate to high labor market rigidity, such as Norway, Sweden,
Austria, and Germany, persistent effects roughly in line with aforementioned theory are found.
Raaum and Røed (2006) find that in Norway a business cycle slump at ages 16 and 19 raises prime
age unemployment rates by as much as one to two percentage points. These authors do not study
the effect on wages. More recently, Liu et al. (2012) report similar persistent negative effects on
employment for college graduates. The effect of graduating in a period of high unemployment on
earnings is only significantly negative during the first three years, but could be underestimated as
a consequence of the positive selection induced by the effect on employment (Heckman, 1974).9
Kwon and Meyersson Milgrom (2007) study the effect of labor market entry conditions on wages
of white collar workers in Sweden. If these workers enter the labor market in a boom they obtain
faster promotions which leads to persistent wage premiums for such cohorts. Brunner and Kuhn
(2014) report that in Austria a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate decreases
the daily wage by 0.9% and persists at least 20 years, but this is again a lower bound of the effect,
since the employment rate is also persistently affected by the business cycle. Similar to high
educated workers in the US, effects for white collar workers are smaller, and fade after five to ten
years. However, in contrast to the US, and possibly related to labor market rigidity, blue collar
workers suffer more importantly and more persistently from a recession. Stevens (2008) studying
the effect for a population of low to medium skilled workers in Germany finds more persistent
effects on employment and wages of a recession than for low educated workers in the US, but less
persistent than in Austria and Japan for lower skilled workers. She reports a negative effect on
employment during the first five years after graduation, which, as in the preceding study, leads to
an underestimation of the effect on the wage in that period. The latter is important in the first four
years after graduation, but fades away after seven years.
Two studies seem to contradict the theory that predicts more persistent effects in countries with
strict labor market regulations. First, despite the high labor market rigidity in France, Gaini et al.
(2012) report in this country lower employment rates for cohorts graduating in a recession only
during the first two years and no wage penalty. The authors advance two potential explanations:
(1) a high minimum wage dampens the effect on wages and (2) a persistently high unemployment
rate, such that employers use unemployment less as a negative signal in the hiring process (Biewen
and Steffes, 2010; Kroft et al., 2013a).
Second, according to Tumino and Taylor (2013b) graduating in a recession in Britain, a coun-
try with relatively limited labor market protection, very negatively affects the probability of em-
7The effect on wages or earnings is not studied.
8Belgium was the most rigid country according to their composite index.
9If among the pool of new graduates only the ones with best unobserved characteristics (e.g. ability, motivation)
find a job in a downturn, the composition of workers is positively selected. Consequently, the effect on earnings for the
subpopulation of workers is biased downwards, since it does not take into account that they represent disproportionately
more productive individuals.
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ployment and the level of wages of young men, and this effect, even if it declines, remains very
negative even after ten years of potential experience. The authors do not discuss why the effects
are more important and persistent in Britain than in North-America, but part of the explanation
could be related to having a more vocational based educational system in the Britain and a more a
more general one in North-America. Hanushek et al. (2011) argue that, although vocational based
education is beneficial for low educated at the start of the career by easing the transition into the
labor market, their skills can very quickly become obsolete. Consequently, in case of a recession
at graduation, the low educated may have more difficulties in integrating into the labor market
once the economy recovers. By contrast, general education provides broad knowledge and basic
skills that makes graduates more adaptable to changes in labor demand and, hence, less vulnerable
to persistent damage in case of a temporary slowdown of economic activity. Nevertheless, this
distinguishing feature of the educational system cannot explain why recessions in Britain lead to
equally or even more persistent adverse labor market outcomes than in other European countries,
since most other European countries share this more vocationally based educational system or
have even developed it more, such as in Germany or Austria. Another explanation is related to the
higher incidence of over-education in the UK. Although there is not yet a clear-cut explanation
of the determinants of scarring for UK, broad evidence has reported wage-penalties due to over-
education in the last three-decades for this country (although it is not related to downturns) (e.g.
Chevalier (2003); Dolton and Silles (2008)). Moreover, it has been shown that students stay longer
in education in downturns (Taylor and Rampino, 2014; Tumino and Taylor, 2013a). Hence, it is
possible that in downturns the mismatch between skills and jobs worsens, so that lower educated
new graduates are left out of the labor force while mismatched higher educated risk long-term
damages if they do not manage to climb the ladder towards higher-paying jobs.
1.3 Institutional Setting
Belgium is a federal state which has decentralized territorial competences to three Regions (Flan-
ders, Brussels and Wallonia) and person-related issues to three language Communities (Flemish/-
Dutch, French and German). Education is organized by the Communities, Unemployment Insur-
ance (UI) and employment legislation by the federal authorities, and Active Labor Market Policies
(ALMP) by the Regional employment offices. We briefly summarize the relevant institutional
environment of the Flemish Region and Community for the period of analysis.
Since the beginning of the eighties education is compulsory up to age 18. At that age pupils
have been six years in primary and six years in secondary school. If they do not repeat a grade,
they complete secondary education at that age, except for those in a vocational track for whom
secondary education ends after seven years. Secondary school is segmented in implicitly hier-
archical tracks: (i) general, (ii) technical, (iii) vocational, and a smaller arts track. In addition,
from age 15, pupils may choose a part-time vocational or apprenticeship track. Downward re-
orientation and grade repetition is used more often as remediation policy than in other countries
(OECD, 2012). The general and technical track directly (without a central entry exam) prepares
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for enrollment in higher education. Those in the vocational track must first complete a seventh
specialization year. Our data refer to the pre-Bologna-reform period. At that time, three kinds
of higher degrees could be obtained: (i) non-university of the short type (lasting three years), (ii)
non-university of the long type, and (iii) university of the long-type (usually four or five years).
According to the PISA studies assessing in a standardized way reading, mathematics and science
skills at age 15 in large group of OECD countries, the Flemish pupils steadily performed at the
very top of European countries. However, at the same time the spread of these scores is much
higher than the OECD average, and the educational performance is highly segmented according
to social background. School drop-out in secondary school is as high as 10% (Cockx (2013a);
http://www.pisa.ugent.be/en/en).
UI in Belgium is very generous, not so much in terms of level, but of length of the entitlement.
It is one of the only countries in the OECD in which no time limit is set to the entitlement and
in which school graduates are entitled to (flat rate) unemployment benefits (UB) if they are still
unemployed nine months after registration. Job search requirements are very loose according to
international standards, and non-participation to active labor market programs (ALMP) is hardly
sanctioned (Cockx and Dejemeppe, 2012a; OECD, 2007). Nevertheless, for youth UI may not be
so large a disincentive for full-time work, since in Belgium the national minimum wage is among
the highest in OECD (Cockx, 2013b). Moreover, in many sectors this national minimum is topped
up, by 17% on average (Rycx and Kampelmann, 2013). Even if the minimum wage is found to
have ambiguous effects on employment, at such high a level it is expected to reduce employment
of low skilled youth, for whom it is most likely binding (Cahuc and Carcillo, 2014; Kramarz and
Philippon, 2001; Neumark and Wascher, 2008).
Among the OECD countries, Belgium has close to the most stringent restrictions overall on
individual and collective dismissals according to the OECD‘s EPL indicators (OECD, 2013). This
is especially a consequence of very restrictive rules for collective dismissals. For individual dis-
missals in regular contracts EPL is less strict than the OECD average, but this conceals consid-
erable heterogeneity in strictness according to the type of labor contract. In Belgium EPL for
open-ended contracts differs between blue- and white-collar workers. For the latter group, it dif-
fers between those earning more than e32,254 a year and those earning less. The notice period
for a blue-collar worker is generally less than one month for each five years of seniority, while
for low-wage and high-wage white-collar workers it is three and five months respectively (Cockx,
2013b).
Even if EPL for blue collar workers is weak, a system of short-time work compensation (STC)
specific for this group restrains firm mobility of blue collar workers. This STC compensates
blue collar workers for temporary disruptions in business activity. These disruptions may last
from maximum four weeks, in case of a complete temporary lay-off, up to maximum twelve
months, in case of a work suspension of at most one week for every two weeks. Firms must
justify the reason of the disruption to be able to invoke STC for their employees, but employer
contributions financing the scheme are not experience rated. The replacement rate may reach
nearly 100% (including employer top-ups), and no job search requirements or training are imposed
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on STC recipients, so that the scheme restrains mobility more strongly than in other countries.
STC is extensively used in economic downturns and partly explains why the unemployment rate
in Belgium only modestly increased during the Great Recession in 2008 (Hijzen and Venn, 2011;
Høj, 2013).
Finally, in a nutshell, in Belgium most of the wages are usually determined according to wage
scales by function or level of education, and for white collar workers also by seniority or age.
Wages are automatically adjusted to the evolution of the consumer price index, and every two
years the trade unions and employers’ organizations bargain at the sectoral level on the extent of
real wage increase. Wages are therefore downward rigid (Fuss, 2009).
We mentioned in the Introduction that Belgium has one of the most rigid labor markets in
OECD in that inflow rates into unemployment are among the lowest, while expected unemploy-
ment duration is among the highest. The description in this section suggests that this is very much
a consequence of institutions. Nevertheless, the sources of this rigidity are very different for the
low skilled youth, prevalently blue collar workers, than for high skilled youth, prevalently white
collar workers. This suggests that the mechanism underlying the long-run impact of adverse labor
market conditions at graduation may be very different according to skill level. This is why we
conduct a separate analysis for high and low educated youth.10
1.4 Data
For this analysis it is important to be able to accurately determine the timing of graduation, since
measurement error in this timing may lead to important compositional biases. For instance, some
studies assimilate graduation to the first registration as salaried worker according to administrative
data. Such definition disregards those who transit from school to non-employment and, hence,
disregards a group the size of which clearly varies with labor market conditions. This induces
spurious correlation between labor market conditions at graduation and subsequent labor market
outcomes.
To avoid this problem, we base our analysis on the Sonar surveys conducted on a representative
sample of three birth cohorts, born in 1976, 1978 or 1980, and living in Flanders at age 23, and
which contains information on the time at which school is left.11 The surveys (as well as follow-up
surveys at age 26 or 29) register retrospectively and on monthly basis the most important activity
of the respondents, among which education. Based on this information, graduation is identified
to occur in the first month that education has been interrupted for at least 4 months. We retain
in the sample individuals leaving education between age 18, i.e. the compulsory schooling age
in Belgium,12 and age 24. Graduates after age 24 are not considered, because the small number
of individuals involved would complicate inference dramatically (see Section 1.5.2). The surveys
10There is a very high correspondence between low (high) education and being employed as a blue (white) collar
worker: see Table A.9 in Chapter A.
11For more details, see SONAR (2003, 2004a,b).
12We drop 0.17% of individuals for which graduation is reported to occur before 18.
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also contain control variables for the analysis, which are measured at age 17, such that they are
predetermined at graduation: father’s and mother’s education (years of completed education since
age 12), the type of educational program (general, technical, vocational or a part-time vocational
and apprenticeship program) in which the individual is enrolled at age 17, and the number of
grade repetitions at age 17. The level of education is measured by the number of completed years
of education: grade repetitions are not counted. This variable is used as a control in a sensitivity
analysis.
The original Sonar sample contains about 3,000 individuals for each birth cohort, 9,000 in
total. We only retain men to avoid dealing with sample selectivity induced by labor force with-
drawal of women for reasons related to fertility and caring responsibilities.13 Apart from the
aforementioned selection criteria regarding school-leaving age, we drop the following individuals
to enhance sample homogeneity: those who attended special needs and arts education, who did
not speak Dutch at home, or who did not permanently reside in Flanders at graduation. After
eliminating, in addition, individuals with missing or inconsistent values in variables, this leaves us
with a final sample of 3,514 men. A more detailed description of the variable construction and the
sample selection can be found in Sections A.1 and A.2 of Chapter A.
Our empirical analysis also hinges on having access to high quality information on labor mar-
ket outcomes on a sufficiently long time span after graduation. We therefore matched the survey
data to administrative data of Belgian Social Insurance institutions centralized at the Cross Roads
Bank of Social Security. These data contain detailed quarterly information about labor market
histories between 1998 and 2010.14 For salaried workers we construct the following outcomes:
log annual earnings, log annual hours and log average hourly wage. The hourly wage is obtained
by dividing annual earnings by the total number of hours worked in a year.15 We complement
this information with three annual indicators of employment: self-employment (if registered as
such part of the year, irrespectively of being a salaried worker in the same year), salaried employ-
ment (strictly positive earnings and not being self-employed), overall employment (either self-
or salaried). Notice, by these very broad definitions of employment, the business cycle varia-
tion is more reflected in hours worked than in the employment rate. To get a sense of whether
the variation in hours worked reflects fluctuations in the time spent unemployed or hours worked
part-time,16 we also distinguish between hours worked full-time and part-time.
The administrative data provide additional control variables measured at age 17 (living in
13We do not study the scarring effect of graduating in downturns for women, because other labor market institutions
supporting mothering are likely to enter in the picture and complicate the interpretation. We therefore leave such an
analysis for future research.
14Notice that part of the early labor market experience of cohorts graduating between 1994 and 1997 is missing.
15Taking log-transformations of these outcomes for salaried workers potentially leads to a sample selectivity problem,
since for workers who are not in salaried employment this transformation is not defined and, hence, need to be dropped
(Heckman, 1974). However, we will argue below that this selectivity is not a big concern in light of the evidence that
graduating in downturns does not significantly affect the probability of being in salaried employment. Only for the high
educated in the first few years after graduation there might be an issue, but this is discussed.
16The administrative data do not measure overtime for full-time workers, so this cannot be a source of variation in
annual hours.
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Figure 1.1: National Unemployment Rates (UR):
overall (age 15-64) and youth (age 15-24).
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Figure 1.2: Provincial Unemployment Rates (UR):
overall (age 15-64).
single parent household, not living together with either parents, the number of other household
members by age class) and variables that help getting a better understanding of the mechanisms
underlying the long-term negative impacts on individual outcomes of adverse labor market condi-
tions at graduation (the median daily wage paid out on June 30 in recruiting firms and indicators of
firm and provincial mobility17). To obtain a measure of permanent firm quality, we average the log
median wage within recruiting firms over the observation period in a similar way as Oreopoulos
et al. (2012) (see Section A.1.3 of this dissertation for details).
Final sources of information are the Labor Force Surveys (LFS). These provide long time se-
ries of the provincial and national18 unemployment rates, used to characterize recessions in the
labor market. Figure 1.1 plots both the youth (age 15-24) and overall unemployment rate (age
15-64) from 1993 to 2012. Observe, even if the level and the variability of youth unemployment
is much higher than the overall rate, the time pattern of both series is very similar. The period of
graduation 1994-2004 covered by our data captures a complete cycle, so that the main effects of
interest can be identified on national data. However, in line with the literature, we aim at exploiting
provincial specific time-shocks in the analysis. As Flanders is a relatively small region, one may
question whether commuting and changing residence would not make it impossible to exploit the
latter variation. That is, workers could offset the negative impact of graduating in provinces with
few job opportunities by moving or commuting to provinces with a tighter labor market. How-
ever, the magnitude of the inter-provincial variation in the unemployment rate reported in Figure
1.2 demonstrates that mobility far from eliminates all inter-provincial variation.19 A caveat is that
17An individual is defined to change firm in year t if he is observed in a different firm in at least two quarters of the
year t, or if the first firm in which he was employed in year t differs from the last firm in year t−1. Transitions between
self-employment and salaried employment are included in the definition of firm mobility. An individual is defined to
move in year t, if he lives in another province at the end of year t than where he lived at the end of year t− 1.
18National refers to “Flanders” and not to “Belgium”.
19Notice that unemployment is measured in the province of residence and not of job location. Hence if workers
commute to avoid the negative local labor market conditions, this evens out the provincial variation in the unemployment
rate.
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the high educated might commute more than the low educated, since they are (1) less liquidity
constrained because of high expected wages or better working conditions and (2) more mobile
due to higher motivation to find jobs that meet their expectations about wages/job profiles. Since
provincial UR series by skill level are not available, we cannot check whether the provincial un-
employment rates for the high educated vary less than for the low educated. However, if mobility
would completely even out the inter-provincial variation of the unemployment rate for the high
educated and the provincial variation would only reflect the variation for the low educated, then
we should find for the high educated no relation between a higher provincial unemployment rate
at graduation and subsequent labor market outcomes. This is not consistent with our findings
reported below.20
In Table 1.1 in the Appendix 1.8 we report some descriptive statistics of the control variables
in the retained sample. We distinguish between men with a degree not higher than secondary
education, i.e.“low educated”, and those with a higher level of education, i.e. “high educated”.
We make this distinction throughout the analysis, because the minimum wage is more likely to
be binding for low educated youth and because EPL-strictness varies significantly between white
collar and blue collar workers (see Section 1.3). 69% of the low educated are prevalently (i.e.
more than 50% of the time) employed as blue collar workers, while for the high educated this
figure is only 11%.
1.5 Estimation Strategy
To identify the long-term effects of labor market conditions at entry on the mentioned labor market
outcomes, we exploit, separately for low and high educated youth, the variation in the unemploy-
ment rate at graduation both at the national and at the provincial level over 8 years (1994-2001
for the low educated and 1997-2004 for the high educated). We operationalize this identifica-
tion strategy by estimating, as in the existing literature (Section 1.2), a linear regression model of
each outcome of interest on the unemployment rate at graduation and on a number of potentially
confounding factors. This identification strategy requires that the composition of the graduating
cohort to be unrelated to this unemployment rate. We show that the unemployment rate at labor
market entry is not significantly related to (i) the timing of graduation, and (ii) the province of
living. As mentioned in the Introduction, we test the former by demonstrating that the duration
20The Belgian Federal Public Service Economy (Service public fédéral Economie) published a report on inter-
provincial commuting between residence and jobs for 2006 (Service public fédéral Economie, 2007). According to
these data, 19.8% of Belgian workers were working in a different province than the province of residence in 2006.
In Flanders, inter-provincial mobility varies across provinces: Flemish Brabant was the province with highest propor-
tion commuters in another Flemish province, Brussels or Wallonia (42%); this figure is 10%, 9%, 24% and 14% for
Antwerp, East Flanders, West Flanders and Limburg, respectively. Note that these figures do not make distinctions
in terms of gender, age nor education of the workers. These figures only exist with regards inter-regional mobility:
in 2006, mobility was higher among high educated workers (15.6%) compared to medium and low educated workers
(9.2% and 7.6%, respectively). Moreover, young worker below 25 years old were less mobile than mature workers
(7.4% compared to 11.1%, respectively). Men were more mobile than women (12% compared to 10%, respectively).
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between the end of compulsory education at the age of 18 and each year of potential graduation
is unrelated to the provincial unemployment rate in those years. To avoid breaking the flow of the
arguments, we relegate the discussion of these tests to Section A.5 of this dissertation.
Since the provincial (national) unemployment rate is a serially correlated grouped regressor, it
is well-known that standard inference is misleading in that it tends to over-reject null hypotheses
(Bertrand et al., 2004). If, as in our case, the number of clusters is small (40 in the provincial
model and 8 in the national model),21 it is very difficult to obtain correctly sized tests (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009; Cameron et al., 2008). In Section 1.5.2 we propose a new inference procedure that
builds on the work of Brewer et al. (2013) and Wooldridge (2006, 2010), but that is modified to
take the specificities of our data into account.
1.5.1 The Benchmark Linear Regression Model
The most general benchmark provincial regression model, which is separately estimated for low
and for high educated men, is specified as follows:
yigpt = fg(e)ugp+fgu(e)ugp1[ugp < u(g−1)p]+θe+φt+ft(e)upt+ηp+ωpt+f0(g)+x
′
iδ+εigpt
(1.1)
where
• yitgp is the labor market income of interest in calendar year t for individual i who graduated
in year g while living in province p at the start of graduation year g;22
• ugp is the unemployment rate in province p and graduation year g. fg(e) is a linear spline in
potential experience,23 so that the interaction with ugp represents the effects of interest, the
long-run effects from graduating in downturns;
• 1[.] denotes the indicator function which is one if the expression between brackets holds
and zero otherwise, so that 1[ugp < u(g−1)p] is equal to one in case of an upturn in the
graduation year. fgu(e) is again a linear spline in potential experience. This second term
estimates the long-run effects from graduating in upturns;
• θe is a fixed effect for potential experience (e ≡ t− g), f0(g) is a linear spline in graduation
year and φt is a calendar year fixed effect;
24
21In the provincial model the number of clusters is equal to the 8 graduation years times the 5 provinces.
22To avoid cumbersome notation, we ignore the subscript in pg .
23This terminology is borrowed from the literature. It counts all calendar years since graduation instead of actual
years of employment experience.
24Even after dropping the fixed effect of the reference category, calendar time effects cannot be separately identified
from the effect of potential experience and graduation year, because of the accounting identity e ≡ t − g. Since
the calendar time effect is not our main interest, we follow Oreopoulos et al. (2012) and ensure identification by just
dropping a second calendar time fixed effect rather than imposing that the cohort effects sum to zero, as in Deaton
(1997).
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• upt is the unemployment rate in calendar year t in the province p in which the individual
resides at the start of the graduation year g. This controls for provincial specific shocks in the
unemployment rate not captured by φt and potentially correlated with ugp. It is interacted
with ft(e), a linear spline in potential experience, which allows the current unemployment
rate to have different effects over time;
• ηp is a fixed effect for the province of residence at graduation;
• ωp is the provincial specific coefficient of a linear time trend. We include these provincial
specific time trends, because the unemployment rates exhibit differential downward time
trends (see Figure 1.2);
• xi are individual control variables measured at age 17 reported in Table 1.1;
• ǫigpt are the remaining errors, which include random unobserved province-graduation cohort
effects and measurement errors that may be serially correlated (see Section 1.5.2).
The linear splines are expressed as follows:
fm(τm) = αm +
Jτm∑
j=0
βmj .(τm − 3j)1[τm ≥ 3j] for m ∈ {g, gu, t, 0} (1.2)
where, except for m = g, αm ≡ 0, τm = e if m ∈ {g, gu, t}, and τ0 = g. βm0 is the slope of
the linear function in potential experience (if m ∈ {g, gu, t}) or graduation year (if m = 0), and
βmj is the magnitude by which this slope changes every three years (i.e. if τm ≥ 3j). The slope
may change at most Jτm times. Je = 3, but for the high educated sample we set βm3 = 0 for
m ∈ {g, gu, t}, since at most 10 years of potential experience are considered instead of 12 years
for the low educated.25 Jg = 2, since only 8 graduation years are considered.
fg(e) is the function of interest, since it describes for each year e since graduation the effect of
a percentage point increase of the unemployment rate at graduation on the outcome of interest. We
allow for an asymmetric effect in an upturn which, similarly, is measured by a percentage point
decrease of the unemployment rate at graduation.26 The effect of a percentage point decrease of
ugp is−(fg(e)+ fgu(e)). ft(e) allows for a differential effect of the current provincial unemploy-
ment rate from the common calendar year effect φt. f0(g) controls for common graduation year
effects.
25We restrict the number of graduation and experience years in the analysis to avoid too small cell sizes, as this is
problematic for inference (See Section 1.5.2). Beyond 10 (12) years of experience not all birth cohorts of the high (low)
educated are observed any longer.
26This specification has been proposed by Genda et al. (2010). A simple rationale for asymmetric persistence of
positive and negative shocks on employment and wage is offered by the insiders-outsiders theory, if newly hired workers
in upturn gain influence in wage process gradually while insiders who are fired in downturns immediately loose it (Begg
et al., 1989; Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). Higher asymmetries should be expected the higher the labor turnover costs
and, in case of dismissal in downturns, the higher the insiders’ transitions into unemployment compared to job-to-job
movements and the lower the importance of firm specific skills compared to general (so that insider status is quickly
lost).
Chapter 1 19
For all outcomes we always start by estimating the most general specification as specified in
(1.1). However, to enhance precision, we check each time whether we can impose the following
restrictions: all splines for the upturn and the current unemployment rate upt jointly equal to zero;
all θe and φt replaced by a linear spline as defined in (1.2); all ωp jointly equal to zero. In Section
1.6 we only report the results of the estimations in which restrictions are imposed that could not
jointly be rejected at the 5% level. We report in the tables which restrictions are imposed.
Finally, in a sensitivity analysis we also estimate a model in which we exploit the time variation
of the national unemployment rate. In this national model the subscripts p disappear and also
ft(e)upt, ηp and ωpt, since these terms are then no longer identified.
1.5.2 Inference with a Small Number of Clusters
Brewer et al. (2013) recently proposed a straightforward method for inference in difference-in-
differences (DiD) design with grouped errors. They demonstrate in Monte Carlo analysis that
correctly sized tests can be obtained by using bias corrected clustered standard errors in an ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regression of the covariate-adjusted group-time means of the dependent
variable on the covariates varying at the group-time level. The bias correction is simple to im-
plement, because STATA correctly scales the standard errors by default. To enhance the power
of this approach, the authors exploit the serial correlation in the grouped errors using the feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator proposed by Hansen (2007)27 that explicitly allows
for a common autocorrelation pattern (e.g. AR(2)) across groups. To allow for misspecification
of this autocorrelation process the aforementioned cluster robust inference is applied to this FGLS
estimator. This delivers correctly sized tests and, if the number of time periods is sufficiently large
(from about 10 time periods), yields substantial power gains.
Since our model can be seen as a generalized DiD setting, in which we have variables that vary
at the group level (gp), i.e. each combination of graduation year (g) and province (p) is a cluster,
at the time level (t = g + e), and at the group-time level (gpt), this approach can be applied to
our analysis. However, in contrast to Brewer et al. (2013), group-time cells in our sample contain
a relatively small number of observations, so that we cannot ignore measurement error in the
covariate-adjusted group-time means of the dependent variables. To generalize their approach, we
build on the work of Wooldridge (2006, 2010). Wooldridge proposes a FGLS estimator in case of
cross-sectional data with only measurement error and no unobserved group effects. We adjust this
method for panel data and show how, as in Brewer et al. (2013), autocorrelated unobserved group
effects can be integrated in this approach.
In a first step, run a regression of yigpt on xi and group-time dummies using the micro-data on
the individual level:
yigpt = µgpt + x
′
iδ + ǫigpt (1.3)
where µgpt are the group-time fixed effects, i.e. the covariate-adjusted group-time means, and ǫigpt
27Brewer et al. (2013) show that Hansen’s bias-corrected FGLS delivers only little more power than the ordinary
FGLS.
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is the error term of this micro regression. In a second step, the estimated group-time fixed effects
µˆgpt are regressed on the group-time level covariates:
µˆgpt = fg(e)ugp+fgu(e)ugp1[ugp < u(g−1)p]+θe+φt+ft(e)upt+ηp+ωpt+f0(g)+vgpt (1.4)
where vgpt = egpt + (µˆgpt − µgpt), egpt is the unobserved group-time shock measured at calendar
time t and (µˆgpt − µgpt) is the measurement error in the covariate-adjusted group-time means.
Brewer et al. (2013) assume the latter to be zero. Consequently, even if cluster robust standard
errors still result in correct inference, taking the (co-)variances of the measurement errors into
account could enhance efficiency.
In the case of cross-sectional data, Wooldridge (2006, 2010) proposes implementing the effi-
cient Minimum Distance (MD) estimator, also called the ‘Minimum Chi-Square’ estimator, of the
covariate-adjusted group means on the group level explanatory variables. This consists in estimat-
ing (a cross-sectional) version of (1.4) by FGLS. If egpt = 0, the optimal weight in the FGLS is
the inverse of the variance matrix of (µˆgpt − µgpt) estimated in the first step. Since the efficiency
of this procedure depends on whether unobserved group-time shocks egpt are indeed zero, it is
useful to notice that this can be tested for. If the observed group level explanatory variables cannot
fully explain the variation in µˆgpt, the regression model (1.4) is likely to be rejected against the
saturated model, i.e. the weighted sum of squared residuals (WSSR), distributed χ2 with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of groups minus the number of estimated parameters, is larger
than the conventional rejection level.
Generalizing Wooldridge (2006, 2010)’s approach to panel data requires accounting for the
serial correlation in the error term ǫigpt of the first step regression. We do this by taking the indi-
vidual i as clustering unit in the first step and use the conventional cluster-robust variance matrix of
the µˆgpt estimated in the first step as weighting matrix in the second step.
28 The χ2 goodness-of-fit
statistic allows testing for the presence of unobserved group-time shocks, i.e. egpt 6= 0. In case of
no rejection, the conventional standard errors can be used for inference. In case of rejection,29 the
(bias-corrected) cluster robust standard errors allow for serial correlation in egpt.
In case of rejection, we attempt to increase power by explicitly allowing for the variance in
egpt in addition to that of the measurement error, and for a particular serial correlation pattern
in egpt, as in Brewer et al. (2013). To this purpose, we follow Amemiya and Nold (1975) by
assuming that the measurement errors (µˆgpt − µgpt) and the unobserved group-time shocks (egpt)
are uncorrelated, and that the variance of egpt is homoskedastic across groups and time, so that we
can estimate the latter by subtracting an estimate of the average variance of the measurement error
(v̂ar(µˆgpt) ≡ sˆ
2
gpt) from an estimate of the average variance of the composite error term vgpt:
v̂ar(egpt) ≡ σˆ
2
e =
1
GPT
G∑
g=1
P∑
p=1
T∑
t=1
(
vˆ2gpt − sˆ
2
gpt
)
(1.5)
28Since the individual is taken as clustering unit, the number of clusters is sufficiently large to implement conventional
inference procedures.
29We use the conventional 5% as threshold for the size of the test.
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where vˆgpt denotes the residual of an OLS regression of (1.4), G the number of graduation years,
P the number of provinces, and T the number of calendar years retained in the grouped regres-
sion.30 Subsequently, this estimated variance can be added to the diagonal of the variance matrix
of the measurement error to obtain an estimate of the (heteroskedastic) variance matrix of vgpt:
v̂ar(vgpt) = σˆ
2
e + sˆ
2
gpt. The inverse of this variance is then used to estimate the parameters in
(1.4) by FGLS.31 Depending on whether the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the model or not,
respectively conventional or cluster robust standard errors should be calculated after this modified
FGLS.
In this empirical application we find for most outcomes that σˆ2e < 0,
32 even if the aforemen-
tioned χ2 rejects the model and, hence, suggests that unobserved group-time shocks are present.
This suggests that the imposed homoskedasticity assumption is not satisfied, and that it is thus
difficult to enhance power by explicitly taking the unobserved group-time shocks, in addition to
the measurement error, into account. The cluster robust standard errors calculated after the FGLS
that just takes measurement error into account still provides correct inference, however. These
are therefore the ones that we report in most of our estimations when the goodness-of-fit statistic
rejects the model.
Finally, we explain how we deal with a number of practical issues encountered with the pro-
posed inference methods. First, the benchmark outcomes must satisfy adding-up constraints: (i)
the indicator of salaried employment and the one of self-employment sum to the indicator of over-
all employment; (ii) log hourly wages and log annual hours worked sum to log annual earnings;
(iii) the sum of the annual number of hours worked full-time and part-time is equal to the total
annual hours worked. These adding-up constraints are automatically satisfied if the first and sec-
ond step regression models, (1.3) and (1.4), are estimated by OLS. However, this is no longer
true if FGLS is applied in the second step on each outcome separately, since then the weighting
matrices ignore the correlation that these constraints impose on these outcomes. To overcome this
problem, we jointly estimate both the first and the second step in a seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR), as proposed by Zellner (1962). Since the adding-up constraint makes the variance matrix
of the three outcomes singular and hence non-invertible, we leave out one of the three outcomes
and calculate the parameters and standard errors of the third model from the constraint.33 An
estimate of the variance matrix, the inverse of which is used as weight in the second step FGLS
SUR, is obtained from the conventional cluster robust estimate of the variance matrix of the co-
variate adjusted means µˆgpt calculated after a pooled OLS on the first step SUR. By clustering at
the individual level in the first step, the variance matrix accounts not only for unrestricted serial
30In the data the number of calender years varies by group, i.e. by gp combination. Therefore T should be indexed
by gp, but to avoid cumbersome notation we do not do this.
31Cockx and Dejemeppe (2005) show how an AR(1) process on egpt can be modeled.
32We only find σˆ2e > 0 for salaried employment rate in the national model, both the low and high educated group
(see Section A.9 of this dissertation).
33Barten (1969) has shown that the parameter estimates are invariant to the equation deleted. However, Berndt and
Savin (1975) have demonstrated that in case a model with autoregressive disturbances is modeled invariance requires
restrictions on the parameters of the autoregressive process.
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correlation in the outcomes, but also for unrestricted correlation across outcomes.
Second, in our data we find cases in which the employment status of all individuals belonging
to a cluster gp does not vary over some calendar years t. This induces perfect serial correlation
in the covariate-adjusted group-time means µgpt and, hence, the cluster robust variance matrix of
these µˆgpt is singular. We therefore use in these cases theMoore-Penrose generalized inverse of the
variance matrix as weight in the second step FGLS. To avoid numerical imprecision, we manually
set as many eigenvalues to zero as the number of times that the employment rate for particular
groups is repeated over time. This accordingly reduces the number of degrees of freedom in the
second step.
Finally, asymptotic inference for the Minimum Chi-Square estimator is only valid if groups are
sufficiently large. In the statistical literature some rules of thumb are suggested for what is large
enough for the Central Limit Theorem to apply. For continuous outcome variables (such as log
hours, log wages or log earnings) a group size (Ngpt) of 30 observations is typically considered
sufficient, while for dichotomous outcomes (such as the employment rate) the minimum of the
expected number of successes and failures should be sufficiently large. A commonly accepted
rule for the latter is that min{NgptPgpt, Ngpt(1− Pgpt)} ≥ 5, where Pgpt denotes the probability
of success and which can be estimated by aggregating the individual predictions of this probability
in the first step OLS regression of (1.3) to the cluster-time level gpt. According to Cochran (1954)
the approximation is, however, still acceptable if for less than 20% of the groups this expectation
is smaller than 5 while remaining larger than 1.
For the national model these rules are satisfied if we restrict the analysis to graduation years
1994-2001 for the low educated and to 1997-2004 for the high educated. For the provincial model
we must drop additional groups. For the continuous outcomes, applying the aforementioned rule
reduces the sample size too much, so that we retain groups-time cells containing between 16
and 30 observations, which still delivers a reasonable approximation if the distribution of the
underlying random variable does not differ too much from the Normal. For the dichotomous
outcomes, we calculate for each group-time cell and outcome the aforementioned expectations,
take the minimum of these expectations over the outcomes retained in the same SUR, and drop
group-time cells with the smallest minimum until the aforementioned Cochran’s rule is satisfied.
Dropping these cells introduces, however, a concern of selectivity. We therefore test for this.
We construct for each outcome an indicator that is equal to one if the individual belongs to a group-
time cell that is dropped according to the aforementioned rules and zero otherwise. Subsequently,
we use these indicators as dependent variable in a one-step regression on model (1.1) in which
we impose the same restrictions as the ones used for the corresponding outcome, and in which
we cluster the standard errors by group gp. Finally, we test the null hypothesis that all the coeffi-
cients of the linear spline (fg(e)) that interacts the unemployment at graduation (ugp) are jointly
significantly different from zero. Since the number of clusters is small, we tend to over-reject the
null-hypothesis. But the null hypothesis is never rejected in any of the considered outcomes, so
that we can therefore be confident that selectivity is not an issue.
In Table 1.2 in Appendix 1.8 we report for the benchmark continuous and dichotomous out-
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comes the number of cells that are dropped and retained, as well as the mean and maximum size
of these cells. We also provide the aforementioned statistics for cells that are retained, but that do
not satisfy the aforementioned stricter rules, i.e. for cell sizes between 16 and 30 if the outcome
is continuous, and for cells for which the minimum of the aforementioned expectation is smaller
than 5 in case of a dichotomous outcome. Finally, we also include the P-value of the joint test of
selectivity mentioned in the previous paragraph.
1.6 Results
We now discuss our findings for the low educated and high educated sub-samples. We will report
for each outcome the effect of a percentage point (pp) increase in the unemployment rate by the
potential number of years of experience in the labor market since graduation. This corresponds
to what is commonly reported in studies, but notice that it is difficult to use these effects to make
cross-country comparisons. This is because a pp rise of the unemployment rate in a typical reces-
sion depends on the degree of labor market flexibility, and also on whether the overall, or youth
unemployment rate is used in the analysis. In a rigid labor market the unemployment rate varies
less over the business cycle, than in a flexible one, and the youth unemployment rate tends to vary
more than the overall rate. The problem is that studies usually do not report by how many pp’s
the unemployment rate increases in a typical recession. An exception is the study of Oreopoulos
et al. (2012) for Canada, characterized by a flexible labor market. The authors report that the un-
employment rate rises by five pp’s in a typical recession. To compare, in Flanders this figure was
only 1.4 pp’s on average in the 1994-2010 period (and by 1.6 point only in the Great Recession in
2008).34 Consequently, if we want to compare the effect of a typical recession in Canada to such
one in Flanders, we must multiply the effect of a pp increase of the unemployment rate in Canada
by a much larger factor than in Flanders. This can put the findings in a different perspective. For
instance, despite the short-term effect of a one pp increase of the unemployment rate on earnings
is much smaller for high educated Canadian graduates (-1.8%) than for Flemish (-5.8%), the effect
for a typical recession is comparable or even slightly larger in Canada (-9% versus -8.1%).
1.6.1 The Findings for the Low Educated
In Figure 1.3 we graphically report for the low educated sample the effect of increasing the provin-
cial unemployment rate at graduation by one pp on the main outcomes of interest. The reader can
find in Table 1.3 in Appendix 1.9 the corresponding point estimates and standard errors, as well
some information about the estimated model, among which the P-value of the goodness-of-fit
statistic, whether cluster-robust or conventional standard errors are used (conventional standard
errors are used if the aforementioned P-value exceeds 5%), and which restrictions were imposed
on the benchmark specification (1.4). The complete estimation results (including the first step
34A recession is defined to be a period during which the unemployment rate increases uninterruptedly. Hereafter, we
will refer to a “typical recession” as the average pp increase of the provincial unemployment rate during such recessions
in Flanders in the 1994-2010 period.
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(1.3) and the second step OLS) are only reported in Section A.7 of this dissertation. Notice that
for all provincial models (1.4) was estimated in a SUR by FGLS in which the estimated variance
of the unobserved group effects was set to zero (v̂ar(egpt) = 0), since in all cases it was estimated
to be strictly negative in (1.5). It is actually only found to be strictly positive for one outcome only
in case that the variation of the national unemployment rate was exploited (see Section A.9 of this
dissertation).
The top panel of Figure 1.3 reveals that a recession at graduation does not significantly (at
5%) affect employment, but confidence intervals are relatively wide, especially for salaried and
self-employment. The point estimate suggests that a one pp increase of the unemployment rate
at graduation increases the self-employment rate by 3.6 pp’s (significant at 10%), but this effect
rapidly drops to zero after three years. This provides weak support that a recession pushes young
low skilled graduates to self-employment by lack of salaried employment.35 It also suggests that
there might be some pressure from employers in economic downturns to take-up pseudo self-
employment, as avoid the minimum wage restrictions and to be able to pay lower Social Insurance
contributions that are due for self-employed workers (see e.g. European Commission (2010)). In
line with this evidence, the salaried employment rate decreases, but to a lesser extent: according to
the point estimates, -1.7 and -1.1 pp in the first and second year of potential experience, but these
estimates are not significant. Since the point estimate of the effect on salaried employment is very
close to zero beyond the first two years of potential experience, we should only be concerned that
the effect of the unemployment rate at graduation on variables that are solely observed in case of
salaried employment, such as wages, hours and earnings, is biased as a consequence of selectivity
(Heckman, 1974) in the first few years after graduation, if at all.
35There are two competing hypotheses on the role of the business cycle on self-employment. Aside the mentioned
push hypothesis, the pull hypothesis states that high unemployment negatively affects individual expectations about
the success of self-employment, or reinforce credit constraints. Empirical evidence on the relative importance of these
hypotheses is mixed. For recent evidence, see e.g. Fairlie (2013) and Yu et al. (2014).
Chapter 1 25
Figure 1.3: The Effect of a One Percentage Point (pp) Increase in the Provincial Unemployment Rate at
Graduation: Low Educated.
-.
0
7
-.
0
5
-.
0
3
-.
0
1
.0
1
.0
3
.0
5
.0
7
.0
9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
experience
95% CI 95% CI not signif
P-val<0.1 P-val<0.05 P-val<0.01
Salaried employment rate
-.
0
7
-.
0
5
-.
0
3
-.
0
1
.0
1
.0
3
.0
5
.0
7
.0
9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
experience
95% CI 95% CI not signif
P-val<0.1 P-val<0.05 P-val<0.01
Self-employment rate
-.
0
7
-.
0
5
-.
0
3
-.
0
1
.0
1
.0
3
.0
5
.0
7
.0
9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
experience
95% CI 95% CI not signif
P-val<0.1 P-val<0.05 P-val<0.01
Employment rate (including self-employment)
-.
1
2
-.
0
9
-.
0
6
-.
0
3
0
.0
3
.0
6
.0
9
.1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
experience
95% CI 95% CI not signif
P-val<0.1 P-val<0.05 P-val<0.01
Log hourly gross wage (2011 euros)
-.
1
2
-.
0
9
-.
0
6
-.
0
3
0
.0
3
.0
6
.0
9
.1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
experience
95% CI downturn not signif P-val<0.1
P-val<0.05 P-val<0.01 upturn
effect of 1% point increase of UR0 in upturn/downturn
Log Annual number of hours in salaried employment
-.
1
2
-.
0
9
-.
0
6
-.
0
3
0
.0
3
.0
6
.0
9
.1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
experience
95% CI downturn not signif P-val<0.1
P-val<0.05 P-val<0.01 upturn
effect of 1% point increase of UR0 in upturn/downturn
Log Annual gross earnings (2011 euros)
-2
4
0
-2
0
0
-1
6
0
-1
2
0
-8
0
-4
0
0
4
0
8
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
experience
95% CI 95% CI not signif
P-val<0.1 P-val<0.05 P-val<0.01
Number of hours in full-time salaried employment
-2
4
0
-2
0
0
-1
6
0
-1
2
0
-8
0
-4
0
0
4
0
8
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
experience
95% CI 95% CI not signif
P-val<0.1 P-val<0.05 P-val<0.01
Number of hours in part-time salaried employment
-2
4
0
-2
0
0
-1
6
0
-1
2
0
-8
0
-4
0
0
4
0
8
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
experience
95% CI 95% CI not signif
P-val<0.1 P-val<0.05 P-val<0.01
Number of hours in salaried employment
The figure displays for the low educated the effect of increasing (decreasing in case of an upturn) the provincial unemployment rate at
graduation by one pp on the main outcomes of interest. The effects reported in top, middle and bottom panel result each time from
two-step FGLS estimates of a SUR model on the first two outcomes described in detail in Section 1.5.2. The effects for the third
outcome are obtained from the following adding up constraints: salaried employment+self-employment=overall employment; log
hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours worked=total hours worked. Table 1.3 in Appendix 1.9
reports the corresponding point estimates displayed in the figure.
In the middle panel of Figure 1.3 we observe that the average hourly wage is hardly affected
by adverse conditions at graduation. At the same time the annual number of hours worked drops
persistently during the 12 first years of potential experience, starting from a decrease of 4.4 pp
in the first year after graduation, increasing slightly to a value that ranges between -2.5 and -3
pp from year three to twelve. From the bottom panel we can deduce that nearly all the effect on
hours worked is induced by a reduction in hours worked full-time, and not by an increase in hours
worked part-time. Only in the first year after a recession, the number of hours worked part-time
increases significantly. These findings are in line with the hypothesis that the minimum wage
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is binding for this low skilled youth and, hence, induces a higher incidence of unemployment.36
They are also in accordance with the literature, mentioned in the Introduction, that early career
unemployment permanently increases the likelihood of unemployment later in the career (e.g.
Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013b)). However, they contrasts starkly with the sharp temporary
downward adjustment in wages, and marginal effects on employment and hours that Genda et al.
(2010) report for low educated youth in the flexible US labor market.
The effect on earnings nearly mirrors that on hours worked. This is because the effect on
wages is close to zero. We also find that the effect of an upturn at graduation on hours worked is
not symmetric to that of a downturn. In an upturn the number of hours increase more importantly
than they decrease in a downturn. Up to four years after an upturn, the hours worked increase
by 5 to 6 % for each pp decrease of the unemployment rate at graduation. Thereafter the effect
gradually fades to zero after ten years. This means that the costs of a recession are lower than the
benefits of a boom, but also that the costs are more persistent.
Even if the wage is hardly affected by the business cycle at graduation, we find that an increase
of one pp of the unemployment rate at graduation persistently decreases the median wage in the
recruiting firms by roughly 1.5% over all 12 years following labor market entry and this effect
is always significant, or close to (see Table 1.4). This suggests that scars of a recession are not
only induced by a higher incidence of unemployment, but also by the lower quality of the first
job, which is not directly apparent, because of the downward rigidity imposed by the minimum
wage. This is in line with the observation in the middle panel of Figure 1.3 that some years
after labor market entry a recession at graduation does seem to have a growing negative impact
on the hourly wage. In the benchmark model this growing negative impact is not statistically
significant. However, when in the sensitivity analysis we consider the second step OLS instead of
FGLS estimates this impact steadily decreases and becomes significantly negative at the 5% level
beyond seven years of experience (see Table A.22 of this dissertation). This is compatible with the
hypothesis that lower quality jobs entered during a recession have a less steep wage profile with
seniority than the higher quality jobs accessed during a tight labor market.
Since EPL is much stricter for white collar than for blue collar workers (see Section 1.3)
and the high educated are predominantly employed as white collars and the low educated as blue
collars (see Section 1.4), firm mobility is expected to be higher for the low than for the high
educated. This is only to a minor extent reflected in the fraction that remains employed in the
same firm. Five (ten) years after graduation this fraction is 26% (15%) for the low educated
and 31% (17%) for the high educated.37 This may be a consequence of the system of STC,
which allows firms to retain blue collar workers over the business cycle (see Section 1.3). By
contrast, 24% (18%) of the low educated changes jobs in more than two (four) out of the first (ten)
years of potential experience against 12% (7%) of the high educated. This suggests that a lower
EPL strictness does not so much enable more upward mobility, but that it rather leads to a more
36This is not incompatible with a zero effect on the employment rate, because the latter is only affected if the
unemployment spell is not interrupted by any employment throughout a complete calendar year.
37For more detailed statistics, see Chapter A, Table A.11.
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pronounced segmentation of the labor market in, on the one hand, a segment with relatively stable
employment and, on the other hand, a segment in which workers cycle from one short tenured job
to another. But this relationship is not necessarily causal, since this type of segmentation can be a
characteristic of the labor market for low skilled workers. In any case, the less strict EPL does not
allow the unfortunate low educated, entering the labor market during a recession, to catch up with
the more fortunate group. The unemployment rate at graduation is unrelated to firm mobility (see
Table 1.4).
Finally, geographic mobility is negligible. During the observation period each year on average
only 1.5% of the low educated changes residence to another province. It is therefore not surprising
to find that the unemployment rate at graduation is unrelated to geographic mobility (see Table
1.4).
1.6.2 The Findings for the High Educated
The findings for the high educated can be found in Figure 1.4 and Table 1.5. In the top panel
of Figure 1.4 we see that the overall employment rate of the unfortunate cohorts is during the
first five years after graduation slightly, but significantly lower than that of the more fortunate
cohorts. The point estimates gradually rise from -1.5 pp to zero in these years. After five years
the effects remains very closely to zero. The initial significant negative effect on employment for
the high educated contrasts with the insignificant effect for the low educated. The high educated
may be less liquidity constrained than low educated, and, hence, in face of a recession search
longer for jobs matched to their qualifications, or may even start studying again. In view of the
wide confidence intervals, it is difficult to assign this negative impact to a decrease in salaried
or self-employment. According to the point estimates, the drop in the first year is completely
explained by the lower salaried employment rate, while in the subsequent years it seems that the
lower self-employment rate is more the driving force. In any case, the impact on the employment
rate is relatively small, which is to be expected, because higher educated are more in demand,
irrespectively of the business cycle. Hence, also the aforementioned selectivity issue for the labor
market outcomes in salaried employment is likely to be negligible, or matters at most during the
first two years after graduation.
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Figure 1.4: Effect of one pp Increase in the Provincial Unemployment Rate at Graduation: High Educated.
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The figure displays for the high educated the effect of increasing (decreasing in case of an upturn) the provincial unemployment rate
at graduation by one pp on the main outcomes of interest. The effects reported in top, middle and bottom panel result each time from
two-step FGLS estimates of a SUR model on the first two outcomes described in detail in Section 1.5.2. The effects for the third
outcome are obtained from the following adding up constraints: salaried employment+self-employment=overall employment; log
hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours worked=total hours worked. Table 1.5 in Appendix 1.10
reports the corresponding point estimates displayed in the figure.
In contrast to our findings for the low educated, a recession does have a significant negative
impact on the hourly wage. In the first two years it is slightly lower than in the following ones,
but this could be a consequence of the aforementioned selectivity problem. Those who are un-
employed in the first years after a recession are likely to be less productive and earning lower
wages than the group that is employed in these years. This may bias the negative effect on wages
slightly upwards. From the third year this bias should no longer play a role. We observe that
the wage penalty rises steadily (and significantly) from then onwards, starting at -3.2% after three
years and attaining -4.4% after ten years. The initial wage penalty suggests that high educated
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graduates are forced to accept lower quality jobs for which they are possibly overeducated (see
Baert et al. (2013) for evidence on this using the same survey data) and which pay lower wages.
As a consequence of the high labor market rigidity, in particular the strict EPL (see Section 1.3),
job mobility is limited (see more evidence of this below). Hence, these unlucky generations are
trapped in these lower quality jobs and definitely miss the opportunity to be hired in career jobs
with a steeper seniority pay profile. In line with this hypothesis, the aforementioned study of Baert
et al. (2013) demonstrates that young unemployed graduates who accept a job for which they are
overeducated remain trapped in these jobs for many years. This explains why the wage penalty
rises over time rather than gradually fades, as in more flexible labor markets (Genda et al., 2010;
Oreopoulos et al., 2012).
The annual number of hours worked is 3.5% lower for each pp rise in the unemployment rate at
graduation, but rapidly rises to zero after three years, level at which it remains subsequently. From
the bottom panel of Figure 1.4 we can deduce that this is nearly entirely38 due to a reduction in full-
time hours. This suggests that those who refuse to downgrade become temporarily unemployed.
But in contrast to lower educated workers, this does not permanently increase the likelihood of
unemployment later in the career, but rather raises the likelihood of remaining employed in lower
quality jobs.
The combined effect on wages and hours yields the effect on earnings. At the start of Section
1.6, we have already made a comparison of this effect with that of the more flexible labor market
in Canada. Notice also, that the effect on hours worked is, as for the low educated, asymmetric for
up- and downturn. In an upturn the annual number of hours worked increases slightly more and
slightly longer.
In the previous section we already described firm mobility, and explained that the strict EPL
for white collar workers lowers it for the high relative to low educated. Nevertheless, in contrast
to the low skilled, we do find some evidence (see Table 1.6 in Appendix 1.10) that the high skilled
who graduate during a downturn are more likely to move from one job to another in the following
year. This may mitigate the initial wage penalty. However, in contrast to what is observed in
more flexible labor markets (see e.g. Oreopoulos et al., 2012), in all subsequent years the unlucky
graduates are not more (nor less) mobile than the lucky ones. In line with this and the aforemen-
tioned evidence, the median wage in the recruiting firm is during the first ten years of labor market
experience persistently smaller (on average 3.3%) for each pp increase of the unemployment rate
at graduation. Hence, the unfortunate workers remain trapped in lower quality jobs.
Finally, on average 3.2% of the high educated move to another province each year. This is
more than double as much as for the low educated. Nevertheless, we cannot find any evidence
that geographic mobility is significantly related to the unemployment rate at graduation (see Table
1.6).
38We also observe a small, but permanent increase in the number of hours worked part-time.
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1.6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In Section A.8 of this dissertation we report a number of sensitivity analyses for the six main
outcomes that we considered in the analysis: the three indicators of employment, log hourly wage,
log annual hours worked and log annual earnings. In a first sensitivity analysis we include dummy
variables for each number of completed years of education as individual control variables in the
first step regression. If the timing of education is unrelated to the unemployment rate, the inclusion
of these variables should not affect the conclusions. This is what we find.
Second, we contrast the provincial to the national model. In the national model identification
relies on the calender time variation of the unemployment rate at labor market entry in deviation
from the parametrically specified (linear spline) dependence of graduation time. Because of this
strong identifying assumption, we do not find a complete correspondence between the models,
but overall the patterns of the effects are quite comparable, certainly if we account for the higher
degree of imprecision in the national model. In particular, we find a larger negative effect on hours
worked (and, hence in earnings) in the first year after graduation, and for the high educated also
in years nine and ten. In addition, the effect on the self-employment rate of the high educated
displays a strong positive trend from experience years six to ten, which we did not observe in the
provincial model.
Third, for the dichotomous indicators we always estimated a linear probability model in the
first step. As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate a probit model in the first step, and, subsequently,
the covariate-adjusted group-time means on the aggregate regressors by FGLS. In Tables A.21 and
A.23 of this dissertation we report the partial effects on the probability of employment for each
year of potential experience, where the other aggregate regressors are evaluated at their sample
mean. These partial effects are very similar to the ones that we found in the benchmark linear
probability model. The main difference is that the estimates of probit model are much less precise.
The benchmark model was estimated by FGLS on the second step regression model (1.4).
This should generally deliver more precise estimates than those obtained by OLS with cluster
robust standard errors in this second step. For the continuous outcomes, FGLS results indeed
generally in more precise estimates than OLS. Exceptions are the effects on the log hourly wage
for the low educated (and only to slight extent for the high educated).39 However, this can be
a consequence of the log hourly wage being estimated jointly with log annual hours worked in a
SUR regression. The larger standard errors in the wage equation are more than compensated by the
higher precision of the effects in the hours equation. For the dichotomous variables, FGLS delivers
in this particular application somewhat less precise estimates of the effects of interest. Only for the
effect on the overall employment rate of the high educated the standard errors obtained by FGLS
are consistently smaller.
Finally, we compare OLS applied to the one-step regression model (1.1) to OLS applied in the
second step. In both cases we cluster standard errors by province and year of graduation combi-
39Notice, as mentioned in Section 2.5, the effect of a pp increase of the unemployment rate at graduation is now
found to be significantly negative as from seven years after labor market entry for low educated.
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nation (gp). Point estimates are very comparable, but because of the small number of clusters, we
expect the standard errors of effects in the one-step OLS regression to be downward biased. This
is what we find for the continuous outcomes. However, for the dichotomous outcomes this is only
the case for the effect on the overall employment rate of the low educated. This suggests that for
this particular application the downward bias is important for the continuous outcomes, but not for
the dichotomous ones.
A last sensitivity analysis refers to the impact of the dot-com recession,40 which occurred
between March 2001 and November 2001 according to the official definition.41 Compared to
others, this recession was quite mild in terms of decline in GDP, but was followed by a “jobless
recovery”, i.e. the subsequent GDP growth was not accompanied by a rise in employment. In
Flanders this recession caused the unemployment rate to rise by 1.7 pp in 2002-2003 (see Figure
1.1); the provincial unemployment rates remained at quite a high level also in 2004 and did not fall
before 2005 (see Figure 1.2). Since the dot-com recession emerged during the graduation period
of the high educated (i.e. the 1997-2004 period), it is important to ensure that the results for the
high educated are not driven by this recession, but that they hold for the entire graduation period.42
An additional argument for this robustness check is that this recession was largely unanticipated
by forecasters Kliesen (2003). As a consequence, it is likely that students did not opportunistically
decide the timing of or the province at graduation in view of the incoming recession: this runs in
favor of our identifying assumption. We run this sensitivity by adding to equation (1.1) a dummy
equal to one if graduation occurs in 2002-2004 (i.e. the jobless recovery following the dot-com
recession) and with an interaction between this dummy and fg(e)ugp. This interaction identifies
the differential short-run and long-run effects of increasing the provincial unemployment rate at
graduation by one pp when graduation occurs in the period 2002-2004 versus the preceding period
1997-2001. Subsequently, we compare graphically the scarring effects of one pp increase in the
unemployment rate when graduating in the period 1997-2004 - from the benchmark models in
Figure 1.4 - with those of graduating in the 2002-2004 period - from the sensitivity analysis. The
bottom line is that the results for the high educated are broadly the same when focusing on the dot-
com recession and on the entire graduation period. In Appendix 1.11 we report a more detailed
explanation of this sensitivity analysis and the aforementioned graphical comparison.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the short- and long-run impacts of graduating in a recession in Flan-
ders, the largest region in Belgium that is characterized by a very rigid labor market. We had
access to unusually rich data: comprehensive administrative data from the various institutions of
the Belgian Social Insurance system contain detailed information on individual labor market per-
formance in salaried employment (earnings, wages, hours worked) and self-employment up to
40It followed a period of stock price rise of internet-based firms that culminated in the collapse of the bubble.
41In Europe, recessions are defined by two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth.
42A similar sensitivity cannot be run for low educated as they graduate in 1994-2001, just before the recession.
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twelve years since graduation. These data were matched with survey data that follow closely the
educational path of a random sample of Flemish youth from the beginning of secondary educa-
tion until the first years in the labor market. The surveys allow us to precisely define the moment
of graduation, which is crucial in our analysis and typically not observed in administrative data.
Moreover, we propose a new method of inference, which is complicated by the fact that since
the regressor of interest, the provincial unemployment rate at graduation, is a serially correlated
variable that is measured at a grouped level. We combine the efficient Minimum Chi-square es-
timator of Wooldridge (2006, 2010) for cross-section data with the FGLS of Brewer et al. (2013)
for difference-in-differences approach and come up with a novel two-step FGLS estimator that
accounts for serial correlation of the panel; whenever possible we improve the efficiency of the
estimator by explicitly allowing for the variance in the grouped error. Our identifying assumption
is that the composition of graduates by year and province is not affected by the provincial unem-
ployment rate. This may be violated if students change the timing of - or the province of living at
- graduation depending on the business cycle. We show that inter-provincial mobility is negligible
and propose a new way to test that the timing of graduation is unrelated to the unemployment rate
based on a discrete duration model. Due to the limited sample size, we tackle several difficulties
arising from too small group size.
We analyzed long-run effects of graduating in a recession separately for high and low educated
workers, because labor market institutions are different for white and blue collar workers, for
which the aforementioned education types are very good proxies. While EPL is very strict for
white collars and relatively weak for blue collars, the minimum wage is binding for the latter
group and not for the former. Consequently, while a recession at graduation is found to have a
persistent negative effect on earnings for both groups, the high educated experience a persistent
negative effect on the hourly wage and not on the annual hours worked, and the reverse holds for
the low educated. These results are corroborated by a comprehensive set of sensitivity analyses.
Concretely, a typical recession, which increases the unemployment rate by 1.4 pp, would induce
the annual hours worked (and, hence, earnings) of the low educated to decrease by about 4.5% up
to twelve years after graduation, while the hourly wage (and, hence, earnings) of the high educated
would be roughly 6% lower than in case of a status quo ten years after labor market entry. The
Great Recession of 2008 resulted in an increase of the unemployment rate of 1.6 pp, so that we
predict that the negative consequences for the cohorts that graduated during the Great Recession
will be about 15% (=˜ 0.2/1.4) higher than the aforementioned ones.
Our results add to the evidence that labor market rigidity leads to much more persistent nega-
tive effects of recessions at labor market entry (Genda et al., 2010; Kawaguchi and Murao, 2014)
and to fundamentally unjust (since it is induced by just bad luck) inequality between generations.
At the same time our findings for low educated demonstrates that relaxing EPL alone is not suffi-
cient to avoid persistence. Broader structural policy reforms seem to be required, which are much
more difficult to implement.
From the point of view of the labor market, a flexicurity system should be advocated, where
workers are mostly protected by unemployment insurance, with limited employment protection
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and active labor market policies to offer employment experiences as quickly as possible to un-
employed. In Belgium, the existing unemployment benefit system is already an important safety
net that protects workers when unemployed in case of low demand; its monitoring system has
been shown to reduce the associated moral hazard problem and raise the job finding rate (Cockx
and Dejemeppe, 2012a). A second issue is the employment protection: this may be desirable to
a certain extent, since it promotes stable employment relationships where workers invest in their
firm-specific skills, which ultimately may foster productivity growth. However, excessive employ-
ment protection may hamper productivity growth if it prevents workers reallocation, or new hiring
due to high expected future firing costs in future downswings. This may result in overall higher
level of unemployment and longer unemployment duration. For the period under investigation,
Belgium was characterized by a flexible EPL for blue collar workers and a rigid EPL for white
collar workers: this asymmetry has caused substantial penalties for these groups of workers. On
the one hand, when graduating in downturns the high educated found it more difficult to occupy
white collar positions, because insiders were very well protected and firms reluctant to hiring.
Thus, they accepted lower-paying jobs for which employment protection was absent, incurring
a high risk of remaining trapped in mismatched positions. On the other hand, the low educated
were marginalized from the labor market, as a consequence of the additional competition provided
by the high educated, and experienced serious difficulties to find stable jobs. Note that since the
beginning of 2014 a single employment contract has been introduced in Belgium, stipulating the
same EPL for white and blue collar workers. Therefore, this controversial discrimination between
blue and white collars has been finally removed. Lastly, the very high level of Belgian minimum
wages should be moderated. This may facilitate the absorption of low educated new graduates, for
which minimum wages are binding.
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1.8 Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of Individual Controls in the Retained Sample.
Low Educated
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Label
live in single-parent 1885 0.119 0.324 0 1 1 if live with single parent at age17(Dec)§
not live with parents 1885 0.064 0.244 0 1 1 if not live with either parents at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 0-11† 1885 0.247 0.625 0 7 nr of other HH members aged0-11 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 12-17 1885 0.507 0.687 0 7 nr of other HH members aged12-17 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 18-29 1885 0.520 0.729 0 8 nr of other HH members aged18-29 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 30-64 1885 1.890 0.400 0 5 nr of other HH members aged30-64 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 65+ 1885 0.037 0.207 0 2 nr of other HH members aged65+ at age17(Dec)
father education 1885 4.582 3.196 0 13 father completed education since age12††
mother education 1885 4.199 3.066 0 13 mother completed education since age12
years of delay in sec.edu‡ 1885 0.825 0.843 -1 4 years of delay at age17(Aug)§
general edu§§ 1885 0.108 0.310 0 1 1 if general edu at age17(Aug)
technical edu 1885 0.379 0.485 0 1 1 if technical edu at age17(Aug)
vocational edu 1885 0.412 0.492 0 1 1 if vocational edu at age17(Aug)
apprenticeship/PT voc 1885 0.101 0.302 0 1 1 if apprent./PT vocational at age17(Aug)
birth cohort76§§ 1885 0.333 0.471 0 1 1 if born in 1976
birth cohort78 1885 0.333 0.471 0 1 1 if born in 1978
birth cohort80 1885 0.334 0.472 0 1 1 if born in 1980
High Educated
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Label
live in single-parent 1629 0.079 0.270 0 1 1 if live with single parent at age17(Dec)
not live with parents 1629 0.027 0.162 0 1 1 if not live with either parents at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 0-11 1629 0.154 0.424 0 3 nr of other HH members aged0-11 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 12-17 1629 0.578 0.687 0 4 nr of other HH members aged12-17 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 18-29 1629 0.583 0.717 0 4 nr of other HH members aged18-29 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 30-64 1629 1.926 0.299 1 4 nr of other HH members aged30-64 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 65+ 1629 0.029 0.185 0 2 nr of other HH members aged65+ at age17(Dec)
father education 1629 7.031 3.239 0 13 father completed education since age12
mother education 1629 6.382 2.935 0 13 mother completed education since age12
years of delay in sec.edu 1629 0.260 0.540 -1 3 years of delay at age17(Aug)
general edu 1629 0.652 0.477 0 1 1 if general edu at age17(Aug)
technical edu 1629 0.339 0.473 0 1 1 if technical edu at age17(Aug)
vocational edu 1629 0.009 0.092 0 1 1 if vocational edu at age17(Aug)
apprenticeship/PT voc 1629 0.001 0.025 0 1 1 if apprent./PT vocational at age17(Aug)
birth cohort76 1629 0.330 0.470 0 1 1 if born in 1976
birth cohort78 1629 0.341 0.474 0 1 1 if born in 1978
birth cohort80 1629 0.330 0.470 0 1 1 if born in 1980
§ “at age17(Dec)" (“at age17(Aug)") means that the variable is measured in December (August) of the year when the individual turns
age 17.
† HH refers to household.
†† It measures the number of years of education successfully attained since age 12.
‡ The variable measures the educational progression at age 17: a value of 0 means that the student is on time; -1 means that the
student has skipped one academic year; positive values indicate the number of repeated grades.
§§ In the first step of the main analysis, general education and birth cohort76 are the reference categories.
Chapter 1 35
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics Regarding the Selection Rules for the Benchmark Outcomes in the Provin-
cial Model∗.
Low educated High educated
Graduation period: 1994-2001 1997-2004
Outcomes§ Continuous Discrete Continuous Discrete
Number of cells (total) 420 420 350 350
Number of dropped cells 42 138 27 109
Number of retained cells 378 282 323 241
Statistics on dropped cells
Mean size dropped cells 10.29 30.97 13.11 27.95
Max size dropped cells 15 111 15 66
Statistics on retained cells
Mean size retained cells 45.19 57.56 37.64 47.48
Max size retained cells 104 111 79 89
Statistics on retained cells for which 16 ≤ Ngpt < 30 (continuous) or EXP
†
gpt < 5 (discrete)
‡
Number of retained cells 94 38 123 46
Avg size retained cells 23.06 45.08 23.08 34.07
Max size retained cells 29 111 29 66
P-value joint test for selectivity§§
Specification used for log hourly wage 0.322 0.637
Specification used for log hours worked 0.091 0.105
Specification used for all discrete outcomes 0.379 0.207
∗ To avoid too small cell sizes, we impose the following selection rules. For continuous variables, drop cells gpt with size
Ngpt < 16. For discrete variables, drop cells gpt with the smallest EXP
†
gpt until at most 20% of the retained cells are such that
EXPgpt < 5 (Cochran, 1954).
† EXPgpt = min{NgptPgpt, Ngpt(1− Pgpt)}, where Pgpt denotes the probability of success and which can be estimated by
aggregating the individual predictions of this probability in the first step OLS regression of (1.3) to the cell level gpt. Notice that the
aforementioned minimum is calculated for each outcome in the SUR and that the selection rule is applied on the basis of the smallest
minimum across these outcomes.
§ The benchmark continuous outcomes in the SUR are log hourly wage and log hours worked in salaried employment, and the
benchmark discrete variables are salaried employment and self-employment. The statistics in the table refer to one outcome, since
they are identical for each outcome retained in a SUR.
‡ These are groups that would have been dropped according to the more stringent selection rules, i.e. Ngpt < 30 for the continuous
outcomes and EXPgpt < 5 for the discrete outcomes.
§§ The test for selectivity is based on a one-step regression of an indicator that is set to one if the individual belongs to a cell that is
dropped according to the selection rules mentioned in ∗. Standard errors are clustered by group gp, which therefore tends to
over-reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients of the linear spline that interacts the unemployment rate at graduation are
jointly significantly different from zero. We impose the same restrictions on the regression model (1.1) as we do for each benchmark
outcome that we retain in the SUR (see Table 1.3). Consequently, since different sets of restrictions are imposed on the regression of
log hourly wage than on that of log hours worked, we report two P-values for the continuous outcomes. For the discrete outcomes the
same restrictions are imposed on both outcomes, so that only one P-value is reported.
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1.9 Appendix B. Results for the Main Outcomes of Interest of Low
Educated
Table 1.3: Effect of a One pp Increase of the Unemployment Rate at Graduation on Main Outcomes: Low
Educated.
Outcomes salaried self-empl. overall empl. log wage log hours§ log earnings FT hours PT hours Total hours
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symm. up/downturn yes yes - yes no - yes yes -
Effect Current URate over exp=0 yes yes - no no - no no -
Spline for calendar year FE yes yes - no no - no no -
Effect of prov-time trends=0 yes yes - no no - no no -
Test joint signif. all imposed restr.(P-val) 0.286 - 0.155 - 0.268 -
P-value of chi2 test 0.341 0.000 - 0.000 -
WSSR (2nd step) 331 - 1289 - 1519 -
Obs (2nd step)† 375 - 756 - 754 -
Parameters (2nd step) 54 - 88 - 86 -
Level of clustering no no no g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 -0.017 0.036 0.018 0.005 -0.044 -0.039 -123.741 36.280 -87.462
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.026) (33.386) (12.419) (26.467)
2 -0.011 0.021 0.010 -0.001 -0.035 -0.036 -82.608 15.700 -66.908
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.023) (28.233) (9.828) (23.051)
3 -0.005 0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.026 -0.033 -41.474 -4.879 -46.354
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022) (24.951) (9.819) (22.119)
4 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.026 -0.034 -30.805 -6.854 -37.659
(0.015) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (22.293) (8.855) (19.123)
5 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.026 -0.035 -20.135 -8.829 -28.964
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017) (20.394) (8.282) (16.793)
6 0.002 -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 -0.025 -0.036 -9.466 -10.804 -20.270
(0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.015) (19.475) (8.183) (15.434)
7 0.002 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.025 -0.033 -23.298 -2.250 -25.548
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (18.219) (7.363) (14.743)
8 0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.025 -0.031 -37.129 6.304 -30.826
(0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (18.010) (7.409) (14.801)
9 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.025 -0.028 -50.961 14.858 -36.103
(0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) (18.883) (8.307) (15.598)
10 0.003 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.027 -0.033 -44.904 15.268 -29.637
(0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (19.371) (7.981) (16.251)
11 0.004 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.030 -0.039 -38.848 15.678 -23.170
(0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (21.167) (8.434) (17.862)
12 0.006 -0.017 -0.011 -0.012 -0.033 -0.045 -32.791 16.088 -16.703
(0.015) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (23.977) (9.556) (20.202)
Standard errors between parentheses. The table shows the effect for low educated of increasing the provincial unemployment rate at
graduation by one pp on the mentioned outcomes. The reported estimates result from predictions based on the estimates of the linear
spline in potential experience fg(e) that multiplies the provincial unemployment rate at graduation ugp in (1.4). Since the outcomes
satisfy adding-up constraints (salaried employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log
earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours worked=total hours worked), the estimates are each time obtained from a two-step FGLS SUR
on the first two outcomes in the sum described in detail in Section 1.5.2 and briefly below. Effects on the third outcome (the sum) are
then obtained from the adding-up constraints. First step: (1.3) is estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level. Second step: (1.4) is estimated by FGLS, where the inverse of the variance matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is used as weight.
Depending on the outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be jointly rejected at the 5% level: these restrictions are listed in the
top panel of the table. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the model (P-value>0.05), standard errors clustered at the gp level are
reported; otherwise conventional ones.
§ For log hours worked the following additional restriction (not mentioned in the table) is also imposed: βg2 = 0, i.e. the slope of the
linear spline remains fixed after 6 years of experience. This restriction cannot be rejected.
† The lower number of observations for the discrete outcomes in the second step reflects both that a different number of cells was
dropped to ensure large enough cell sizes and the fact that the variance matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is singular so that we had to
use the generalized inverse of the variance as weight in the second step (see Section 1.5.2 for more details).
Column 5 and 6 report the effects of interests in downturn: the effects in case of an upturn are different, but not reported. All other
columns report the effect of interest independently of the business cycle, since this restriction is not rejected.
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Table 1.4: Effect on Mobility and Firm Quality: Low educated.
Outcomes geographical mobility§ firm mobility median daily wage in the firm
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn no yes yes
Effect Current URate over exp=0 yes yes yes
Spline for calendar year FE yes no no
Spline for exp FE yes no no
Effect prov-time trends=0 yes yes no
Test joint signif. all imposed restr.(P-val) 0.478 0.252 0.854
P-value of chi2 test - 0.001 0.001
WSSR (2nd step) - 413 422
Obs (2nd step) - 360 378
Parameters (2nd step) - 35 39
Test joint signif. URate_grad (P-val) 0.126 0.720 -
Level of clustering i g ∗ p g ∗ p
Estimation approach one-step two-step two-step
Potential experience (1) (2) (3)
1 0.000 0.008 -0.014
(0.003) (0.019) (0.011)
2 -0.001 0.005 -0.016
(0.002) (0.012) (0.010)
3 -0.001 0.001 -0.018
(0.003) (0.013) (0.009)
4 -0.001 -0.001 -0.016
(0.002) (0.010) (0.008)
5 0.000 -0.003 -0.015
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
6 0.000 -0.005 -0.014
(0.003) (0.009) (0.008)
7 0.002 0.001 -0.015
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
8 0.003 0.006 -0.015
(0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
9 0.004 0.012 -0.016
(0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
10 0.003 0.009 -0.017
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007)
11 0.002 0.006 -0.017
(0.004) (0.010) (0.008)
12 0.001 0.003 -0.018
(0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
Standard errors between parentheses. The table shows the effect for low educated of increasing the provincial unemployment rate at
graduation by one pp on the mentioned outcomes. The reported estimates result from predictions based on the estimates of the linear
spline in potential experience fg(e) that multiplies the provincial unemployment rate at graduation ugp in (1.4). Since the outcomes
need not satisfy adding-up constraints, except for geographic mobility (see §) the estimates are obtained from a two-step FGLS on
each outcome separately. The estimation procedure is described in detail in Section 1.5.2 and briefly below. First step: (1.3) is
estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Second step: (1.4) is estimated by FGLS, where the inverse of
the variance matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is used as weight. Depending on the outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be
jointly rejected at the 5% level: these restrictions are listed in the top panel of the table. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the
model (P-value>0.05), standard errors clustered at the gp level are reported; otherwise conventional ones.
§ Notice that the effect on geographic mobility between provinces is estimated in one step, since virtually no cell satisfies the rule of
Cochran (1954) discussed in Section 1.5.2. In the one-step approach both clustering at the individual and the g ∗ p-level tends to
over-reject. Since the P-value of the joint test of significance of the unemployment rate at graduation is higher at the individual than
at the g ∗ p level we report the former.
Column 1 reports the effects of interests in downturn: the effects in case of an upturn are different, but not reported. All other
columns report the effect of interest independently of the business cycle, since this restriction is not rejected.
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1.10 Appendix C. Results for the Main Outcomes of Interest of High
Educated
Table 1.5: Effect of a One pp Increase of the Unemployment Rate at Graduation on Main Outcomes: High
Educated.
Outcomes salaried self-empl. overall empl. log wage log hours log earnings FT hours PT hours Total hours
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symm. up/downturn yes yes - yes no no yes -
Effect Current URate over exp=0 yes yes - yes yes no yes -
Spline for calendar year FE yes yes - no no no no -
Effect of prov-time trends=0 yes yes - no no no no -
Test joint signif. all imposed restr.(P-val) 0.494 - 0.309 - 0.390 -
P-value of chi2 test 0.329 - 2.89E-34 - 4.48E-32 -
WSSR (2nd step) 310 - 1084 - 1059 -
Obs (2nd step)† 262 - 646 - 646 -
Parameters (2nd step) 48 - 75 - 78 -
Level of clustering no no no g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 -0.016 0.001 -0.015 -0.023 -0.035 -0.058 -81.986 23.301 -58.685
(0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.019) (22.004) (9.359) (18.501)
2 -0.006 -0.007 -0.013 -0.028 -0.014 -0.041 -31.209 15.540 -15.669
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (17.068) (6.611) (14.479)
3 0.003 -0.014 -0.011 -0.032 0.008 -0.025 19.569 7.778 27.347
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (15.191) (6.132) (12.584)
4 0.004 -0.011 -0.007 -0.033 0.004 -0.029 6.612 10.017 16.629
(0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (12.390) (5.697) (9.889)
5 0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.033 0.001 -0.032 -6.345 12.256 5.911
(0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (11.468) (5.445) (9.492)
6 0.005 -0.006 0.000 -0.033 -0.003 -0.036 -19.302 14.495 -4.807
(0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (12.835) (5.403) (11.630)
7 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.036 -0.002 -0.038 -11.662 14.625 2.963
(0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (11.589) (5.111) (9.769)
8 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.039 -0.001 -0.040 -4.022 14.755 10.733
(0.014) (0.014) (0.002) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (11.567) (4.964) (9.198)
9 -0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.042 0.001 -0.041 3.618 14.885 18.504
(0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (12.775) (4.975) (10.137)
10 -0.008 0.005 -0.003 -0.044 0.002 -0.043 11.258 15.016 26.274
(0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (14.919) (5.142) (12.244)
Standard errors between parentheses. The table shows the effect for low educated of increasing the provincial unemployment rate at
graduation by one pp on the mentioned outcomes. The reported estimates result from predictions based on the estimates of the linear
spline in potential experience fg(e) that multiplies the provincial unemployment rate at graduation ugp in (1.4). Since the outcomes
satisfy adding-up constraints (salaried employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log
earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours worked=total hours worked), the estimates are each time obtained from a two-step FGLS SUR
on the first two outcomes in the sum described in detail in Section 1.5.2 and briefly below. Effects on the third outcome (the sum) are
then obtained from the adding-up constraints. First step: (1.3) is estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level. Second step: (1.4) is estimated by FGLS, where the inverse of the variance matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is used as weight.
Depending on the outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be jointly rejected at the 5% level: these restrictions are listed in the
top panel of the table. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the model (P-value>0.05), standard errors clustered at the gp level are
reported; otherwise conventional ones.
† The lower number of observations for the discrete outcomes in the second step reflects both that a different number of cells was
dropped to ensure large enough cell sizes and the fact that the variance matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is singular so that we had to
use the generalized inverse of the variance as weight in the second step (see Section 1.5.2 for more details).
Columns 5-7 and 9 report the effects of interests in downturn: the effects in case of an upturn are different, but not reported. All other
columns report the effect of interest independently of the business cycle, since this restriction is not rejected.
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Table 1.6: Effect on Mobility and Firm Quality: High educated.
Outcomes geographical mobility§ firm mobility median daily wage in the firm
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn yes yes no
Effect Current URate over exp=0 yes yes yes
Spline for calendar year FE no no no
Spline for exp FE yes no no
Effect prov-time trends=0 yes yes yes
Test joint signif. all imposed restr.(P-val) 0.273 0.471 0.236
P-value of chi2 test - 0.964 0.028
WSSR (2nd step) - 214 336
Obs (2nd step) - 285 323
Parameters (2nd step) - 32 35
Test joint signif. URate_grad (P-val) 0.495 0.165 -
Level of clustering i no g ∗ p
Estimation approach one-step two-step two-step
potential exp (1) (2) (3)
1 0.009 0.026 -0.037
(0.006) (0.013) (0.007)
2 0.005 0.008 -0.038
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
3 0.001 -0.009 -0.039
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007)
4 0.001 -0.007 -0.035
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
5 0.001 -0.006 -0.031
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
6 0.001 -0.004 -0.027
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007)
7 0.002 -0.005 -0.029
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
8 0.003 -0.006 -0.031
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
9 0.005 -0.007 -0.033
(0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
10 0.006 -0.008 -0.035
(0.005) (0.015) (0.007)
Standard errors between parentheses. The table shows the effect for low educated of increasing the provincial unemployment rate at
graduation by one pp on the mentioned outcomes. The reported estimates result from predictions based on the estimates of the linear
spline in potential experience fg(e) that multiplies the provincial unemployment rate at graduation ugp in (1.4). Since the outcomes
need not satisfy adding-up constraints, except for geographic mobility (see §) the estimates are obtained from a two-step FGLS on
each outcome separately. The estimation procedure is described in detail in Section 1.5.2 and briefly below. First step: (1.3) is
estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Second step: (1.4) is estimated by FGLS, where the inverse of
the variance matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is used as weight. Depending on the outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be
jointly rejected at the 5% level: these restrictions are listed in the top panel of the table. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the
model (P-value>0.05), standard errors clustered at the gp level are reported; otherwise conventional ones.
§ Notice that the effect on geographic mobility between provinces is estimated in one step, since virtually no cell satisfies the rule of
Cochran (1954) discussed in Section 1.5.2. In the one-step approach both clustering at the individual and the g ∗ p-level tends to
over-reject. Since the P-value of the joint test of significance of the unemployment rate at graduation is higher at the individual than
at the g ∗ p level we report the former.
Column 3 reports the effects of interests in downturn: the effects in case of an upturn are different, but not reported. All other
columns report the effect of interest independently of the business cycle, since this restriction is not rejected.
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1.11 Appendix D. Additional Sensitivity: the Dot-com recession
The dot-com recession occurred in Belgium between March 2001 and November 2001 according
to the official definition. In Flanders this caused the unemployment rate to rise by 1.7 pp in
2002-2003 (see Figure 1.1); the provincial unemployment rates remained at quite a high level
also in 2004 and did not fall before 2005 (see Figure 1.2). Thus, this recession emerged during
the graduation period considered for the high educated, i.e. the 1997-2004 period. It is therefore
interesting to see to what extent the main results for the high educated are driven by the dot-com
recession, or whether this recession implied different penalties for new graduates compared to
those inflicted by one pp increase in the unemployment rate for the larger period 1997-2004. To
do this, we augment equation (1.1) with a dummy equal to one if graduation occurs in 2002-2004
(i.e. the jobless recovery following the dot-com recession) and with an interaction between this
dummy and fg(e)ugp.
43 This interaction identifies the differential long-run effects of increasing
the provincial unemployment rate at graduation by one pp when graduation occurs in the 2002-
2004 period versus the 1997-2001 period.
To facilitate the comparison with the main outcomes, Figure 1.5 plots the scarring effect of
graduating in the recession period - the effect of one pp increase in the unemployment rate at
graduation for the period 2002-2004 - against the benchmark, i.e. the effect of one pp increase
in the unemployment rate at graduation for the entire period 1997-2004, shown in Figure 1.4
in the main text. To avoid clutter, confidence intervals are plotted only for the benchmark effects.
Moreover, whenever the benchmark included asymmetric effects between graduating in downturns
or upturns, we plot only the former and not the latter.
In the top panel, the effects on the employment indicators are not significant, but suggest that
the “push-effect” into self-employment may be more important for graduating in the dot-com re-
cession than in the benchmark. Importantly, the temporary negative effect on overall employment
is significant in the benchmark, but it is absent in the recession period. In the middle panel, the
scarring effect on wages is similar but more pronounced for the 2002-2004 graduation period than
in the overall period 1997-2004. At the same time, the initial drop in (full-time) hours worked
is significant in the benchmark but disappears for the cohorts graduating in the recession. The
net effect on earnings is very similar in the two cases, but it suggests that graduating in the dot-
com recession inflicts a slightly more severe but less persistent scar (until potential experience 8),
compared to the benchmark. However, this may be also due to the loss of power resulting from
the additional parameters included in the sensitivity analysis. Overall, these results are consistent
with the idea that the high educated graduating in the dot-com recession preferred more often
to downgrade and enter the labor market in a mismatched job rather than waiting for better of-
fers - compared to the overall graduation period 1997-2004. In addition, the bottom panel shows
that those graduating in the recession work slightly less hours in full-time salaried employment at
43In the main analysis, the graduation year linear spline f0(g) is allowed to change slope each three years, i.e. in
1997, 2000 and 2003; thus the period 2002-2004 is split into two splines. As a robustness check, we redefined the f0(g)
to isolate the period 2002-2004 in the last spline: i.e. let the spline change slope in 1997, 2000 and 2002 and impose
linear trends on sub-periods 1997-1999, 2000-2001, and 2002-2004. This does not affect the results.
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potential experience 3-6 years, and work more hours in the subsequent period, compared to the
benchmark (but this effects are not significant). This seems to be compensated by an increase (de-
crease) in hours worked in part-time employment in (after) the first 6 years of potential experience
compared to the benchmark.
To sum up, this sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the results for the high educated are
broadly the same when focusing on the dot-com recession. Note that by allowing for a specific
scarring effect for the graduation cohorts 2002-2004, the confidence intervals widen: this indicates
that we are loosing power in adding the interactions to isolate the penalties from graduating in
the dot-com recession. Therefore, the analysis would gain from more compact specifications as
those estimated in Figure 1.4 in the main text. However, the above comparison suggests that, if
anything, the high educated graduating in the period 2002-2004 decreased their reservation wages
more rapidly than usual, and consequently preferred more often to downgrade to lower-paying
jobs rather than waiting for a better offer with no job.
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Figure 1.5: Effect of one pp Increase in the Provincial Unemployment Rate at Graduation for the High
Educated: Comparison between the Benchmark (graduation period 1997-2004) and Graduating in the
Dot-Com Recession (2002-2004).
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The figure compares for the high educated the effect of increasing the provincial unemployment rate at graduation by one pp on the
main outcomes of interest (a) when graduation occurs in the entire period 1997-2004 (i.e. the benchmark) versus (b) in the dot-com
recession, i.e. in the period 2002-2004. The scarring effect in (a) correspond to ones shown in Figure 1.4. The scarring effects in
(b) are computed as follows: for each outcome we estimate the benchmark specification - used to obtain Figure 1.4 - and allowed for
a differential effect for graduating in the period 2002-2004. Then, in this figure, we plot the scarring effects from graduating in the
period 2002-2004 (b) against the benchmark models (a). The confidence intervals are reported only for the benchmark models (a).
Whenever the benchmark model allowed for asymmetric effects of graduating in downturns/upturns, the former but not the latter are
reported. The effects reported in top, middle and bottom panel result each time from two-step FGLS estimates of a SUR model on
the first two outcomes described in detail in Section 1.5.2. The effects for the third outcome are obtained from the following adding
up constraints: salaried employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT
hours worked+PT hours worked=total hours worked.
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2
The scarring effect of early non-employment
2.1 Introduction
High levels of youth unemployment are a great concern for policy makers, especially since the start
of the Great Recession (Bell and Blanchflower, 2010). Historically, however, unemployment rates
have been higher for young workers than for older workers. This is understandable, since younger
workers have the least experience and hence are often the easiest to remove. Moreover, they lose
or leave a job more often than older workers, because job shopping helps them to find a good
match (Yedid-Levi et al., 2014). For instance, Topel and Ward (1992) find that two third of job
changes and wage growth occur in the first ten years of workers’ career. This initial high turnover
may involve also short spells in unemployment. Therefore, youth unemployment need not to be
necessarily detrimental to workers’ career, if this is part of the process to find stable employment.1
Other views predict that the experience of youth unemployment may entail long-term penalties in
terms of reduced wages and persistent unemployment. These outcomes are explained by human
capital loss (Pissarides, 1992), which may arise from the depreciation of existing capital - if the
worker is not subject to any kind of training when not employed - as well as from forgone work
experience (Ellwood, 1982). An alternative explanation comes from the signaling model, in which
past unemployment records are interpreted by employers as signals of low productivity in a context
1According to the literature on job displacement, the costs of job loss for young workers are smaller and less
persistent than for mature workers (e.g. Kletzer and Fairlie, 2003; Topel, 1990). This is because young workers, unlike
mature workers, experience steep earnings growth in subsequent work experience, after a job loss. At the same time,
earnings growth of displaced young workers is below the levels of young non-displaced workers: i.e. most of the
earnings loss is due to foregone wage growth due to displacement.
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of imperfect information (Lockwood, 1991).2
A broad evidence suggests that the consequences of experiencing youth unemployment are
not just temporary. A number of studies provide evidence of persistence in youth unemployment:
for UK, Gregg (2001) finds strong state dependence for new graduates experiencing early unem-
ployment. Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013a) show similar results for students graduating from the
German apprenticeship program. Based on a sample of young long-term unemployed in Belgium,
Cockx and Picchio (2013) find that past unemployment duration negatively affects the probabil-
ity to be employed. Other studies show that youth unemployment entails long-term penalties on
earnings or wages: Gartell (2009) and Gregg and Tominey (2005) find persistent negative effects
on earnings and wages for Sweden and UK, respectively. Results for the US show short-lived
penalties of youth unemployment on subsequent employment, but long-run penalties on wages
(e.g. Ellwood, 1982; Mroz and Savage, 2006). Moreover, Mroz and Savage (2006) find strong
evidence of human capital “catch-up” response to youth unemployment. By investing in training
when unemployed, youth mitigate the human capital losses induced by unemployment and, con-
sequently, the earnings losses, which however persist 9 years after unemployment. This evidence
is important from a policy point of view, as it provides grounds to advocate policies that aim to
reduce the scars of youth unemployment: for instance, integrating youth in the labor market be
means of wage subsidy programs; or, providing training schemes to young unemployed.
The goal of this study is to contribute to the existing empirical evidence on the long-term con-
sequences of early labor market performances for Flanders, the most prosperous of three Belgian
regions. Our analysis is based on very rich data combining survey data with administrative data.
Therefore, we are able to evaluate the impact of early labor market outcomes on a range of labor
market outcomes available for the first twelve years after graduation: hours worked and earnings
for salaried public and private sector employment, salaried and self-employment. This gives us a
comprehensive view of the long-term consequences of youth’s early labor market outcomes.
The main identification problem is the presence of unobserved factors that may affect early
as well as subsequent labor market performances, thereby introducing endogeneity. We address
this problem by means of an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, where the provincial unemploy-
ment rate at graduation is used as instrument for early labor market outcomes. An advantage of
this methodology is that it exploits the exogenous variation of the instrument to disentangle the
causality between early and subsequent labor market performances from the spurious correlation
induced by unobserved individual characteristics.
Throughout the analysis we distinguish between low and high educated new graduates because
in Belgium labor market institutions differ for blue and white collar workers, and this creates
different sources of rigidities for the low and the high educated.3 For instance, white collars are
sheltered by a very strict employment protection legislation (EPL), which represents the main
2Kroft et al. (2013b) send fictitious resumes to real job postings in US and find that the likelihood of receiving
callbacks for interviews significantly decreases with the length of the unemployment spells, mostly in the first 8 months.
This is evidence that employer screening plays a primary role in generating duration dependence.
3In the data there is a clear correspondence between low (high) educated and blue (white) collar workers: see Table
2.4 in Appendix 2.7.
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rigidity for high skilled workers. In contrast, blue collar workers have quite loose EPL,4 but are
supported by a short-time work compensation program (STC) that subsidies temporary reduction
of labor force during downturns. This introduces rigidity in the labor market of blue-collar workers
since it allows employers to tie their employees to them and has therefore similar consequences as
EPL for white collar workers. Moreover, (sectoral) minimum wages - among the highest of OECD
- are likely to be binding for low educated youth. Together with a quite generous unemployment
insurance (UI) system,5 minimum wages are therefore more relevant sources of rigidity for the
low educated. Based on the same data of this study, Chapter 1 investigates the scars of graduating
in downturns for Flanders and find that the low and the high educated undergo different hysteresis
mechanisms, which are explained by the distinct labour market institutions designed for white
and blue collars. While a downturn at graduation is found to inflict a persistent adverse effect on
earnings for both low and high educated workers, the latter are penalized in terms of hourly wages
and not of annual hours worked (because of strict EPL for white-collars and not binding minimum
wages); the reverse holds for the low educated.
Hence, as a consequence of unfavorable labor market conditions at graduation, the high edu-
cated downgrade to lower-paying jobs whereas low educated workers remain unemployed more
often. This suggests that, in Flanders, the long-term effects of graduating in downturns occur
through the loss of early work experience for the latter and through the acceptance of lower-paying
jobs for former. In particular, for the low educated the scar may persist since unemployment spells
convey bad signals to the employers, or because of human capital depreciation which makes the
unemployed less attractive to employers or, possibly, because of processes of discouragement or
habituation (Clark, 2003; Clark et al., 2001). The high educated instead may find it difficult to
upgrade to a position matching their initial aspirations as a consequence of the (useless) accumu-
lation of human capital - which is specific to lower-paying position - and due to the high barriers
to enter white-collar positions.
In this study we test the former hypothesis: that is, whether the low educated workers suf-
fer from long-term penalties from experiencing early non-employment. We identify causality by
means of an IV approach where the provincial unemployment rate at graduation is used as in-
strument for early non-employment. Unfortunately, we could not test the second aforementioned
hypothesis - i.e. if, for the high educated, the average level of hourly wages earned in the first years
after graduation has long-run repercussions on their subsequent career - as the instrument has not
sufficient explanatory power to implement the IV approach. The interested reader can find this
exercise in Appendix 2.14. Since we consider individuals graduating in the period 1994-2002 for
the low educated in the 5 Flemish provinces, inference hinges at most on 45 clusters. This raises
the possibility of underestimating standard errors due to few clusters. We tackle this problem
4Note that since the beginning of 2014 a single employment contract has been introduced in Belgium, stipulating
the same EPL for white and blue collar workers.
5UI covers also unemployed school-graduates without employment records with no time limits and loose job search
requirements. Until 2012, school graduates below age 26 were entitled to UI 9 months after registration at the Public
Employment Service. Since 2012 the waiting period has been extended from 9 to 12 months.
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applying wild bootstrap 6 to the IV approach, following Davidson and MacKinnon (2010).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the literature. Sec-
tion 2.3 describes the data. In Section 2.4 we explain the estimation strategy: we discuss the
IV approach, including the way in which we deal with the problem of inference with few clus-
ters. Section 2.5 discusses the results for the low educated and presents some sensitivity analysis.
Section 3.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
To our knowledge, two studies have investigated the long-term impacts of unemployment for Bel-
gium. Gangji and Plasman (2007) study the adverse effect of the incidence of unemployment on
re-entry wages considering a representative sample of Belgian workers aged 18-64 in the 1994-
2002 period. They address the problem of endogeneity due to unobserved individual character-
istics with a fixed effect (FE) estimation, thereby exploiting only the within-individual variation
of the data.7 They find that the incidence of unemployment is associated with a 5.1% penalty
in hourly wages. Of course, this is an average of heterogenous effects comprising workers with
different ages and skills. In Belgium, as argued in the Introduction, low and high skilled workers
may undergo different wage penalties due to the different labor market institutions. Moreover,
the incidence of unemployment for youth is likely to have different consequences than for mature
workers.
The second study by Cockx and Picchio (2013) is focused on the long-run effects of youth
long-term unemployment. It considers all Belgian school-graduates aged 18-25 who in 1998 were
registered to the National Employment Office and remained unemployed for at least 9 months,8
and follow them for each quarter until the end of 2002. They use a mixed proportional hazard
model with competing risks where omitted heterogeneity is tackled as follows. The unobserved
individual characteristics that are uncorrelated with the regressors are integrated out of the model.
As for the unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the regressors, they impose a func-
tional form restriction on the relationship between the former and the latter, thereby allowing for
the dependence.9 The causality of lagged endogenous unemployment duration, the parameter of
interest, is identified by the exclusion restrictions generated by the time variation of the exogenous
variables and by having multiple realizations per individual of the outcome variable. They find
evidence of strong negative duration dependence in the job finding probability: further prolonging
the unemployment spell by one year reduces the probability to find a job in the following 2 years
from 60% to 16% for men. Of course these results apply to the specific sub-sample of long-term
6Wild bootstrap preserves the group structure of the data (Cameron et al., 2008).
7The sample is restricted to workers whose wage is observed at least twice in the period. Selectivity is addressed by
Heckman’s two-step estimator, with the number of children and house property as exclusion restrictions.
8In Belgium, before 2012 school-graduates were eligible to UI benefits if still unemployed 9 months after the
registration to the National Employment Service.
9As a consequence, regressors’ coefficients cannot be given a structural interpretation as cannot be separated out
from the unobservables.
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unemployed youth.
We contribute to this literature by providing new evidence on the long-term effects of early
non-employment for low educated youth by means of IV approach, where the identification of the
causality between early non-employment and subsequent labor market outcomes comes from the
exogenous variation of the provincial unemployment rate at graduation. Note that our IV method
shares some similarities with the aforementioned approaches - in the way they deal with the pres-
ence of omitted individual factors correlated with the variable of interest. The FE approach reaches
consistency exploiting only the time-variation of the data, i.e. the variation within- and not across-
individuals. Hence, the identification comes from the part of the variation that is uncorrelated with
the (fixed) unobservables. The IV identification strategy is similar, as it exploits the (exogenous)
variation of the instrument that is correlated with the endogenous regressor. Similarly, in mixed
proportional hazard models, the time variation of the exogenous time-varying variables generate
exclusion restrictions that are used for the identification. In sum, the difference between the meth-
ods implemented in the existing literature and our approach boils down to the type of exogenous
variation that is exploited to identify causality.
For other countries, some studies have already applied IV to identify the long-term effects of
youth unemployment exploiting the variation in the local unemployment rate before the first entry
in the labor market.10 Based on UK data, Gregg (2001) and Gregg and Tominey (2005) study
the effect of youth unemployment on subsequent unemployment spells and wages, respectively:
in both cases, the local unemployment rate at age 16 (the end of compulsory education) is used
as instrument for early unemployment. The latter is defined as the cumulative months of unem-
ployment or non-employment in the period of age 16-âA˘S¸23, while the dependent variables are
measured at age 33 and 42. The sample is restricted to students born in 1958 graduating up to age
21. The results show strong adverse effects of early unemployment on later wages and employ-
ment. For Germany, Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013a) focus on a sample of students graduating
from the apprenticeship program between 1978 and 1980 and investigate the relationship between
the cumulative days spent in unemployment in the first 8 years after graduation and the total days
spent in unemployment in the subsequent 16 years. The regressor of interest is instrumented by
the local unemployment rate at graduation. They find significant and long-lasting scarring effects,
especially at the right tail of the unemployment distribution.
In a nutshell, the estimation strategy shared by these studies is based on the idea that the vari-
ation in the labor market conditions at school leaving is exogenous to the individual, and therefore
generates a variation in the individual early unemployment that is unrelated to unobserved factors
that may influence both early and adult performances. In particular, their identification relies on
the exclusion restriction that the labor market conditions at graduation affect the dependent vari-
ables uniquely through early unemployment. Therefore, the underlying identifying assumption is
that the scarring effect of graduating in downturns occurs entirely through the reduced early work
10A related study is Neumark (2002), who identifies the causality of early job stability on adult wages with IV, where
indicators of job stability in the first 5 years since graduation are instrumented by labor market conditions faced in this
early period.
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experience. For Flemish low educated, Chapter 1 of this dissertation provides evidence of this
pattern. However, the aforementioned exclusion restriction also rules out the possibility that this
scar arises through the acceptance of lower-paying wages. This is precisely how the scar takes
place for Flemish high educated (see Chapter 1). The reliability of this exclusion restriction is not
discussed in this literature. In contrast, in this study we adapt the estimation strategy in such a
way that the exclusion restriction is most likely valid in light of the aforementioned evidence: this
means using for the low educated a measure of early non-employment as endogenous variable.11
2.3 Data
The analysis is based on the Sonar survey database, a representative sample of three birth-cohorts
of Flemish youth - born in 1976, 1978 or 1980, which were interviewed at age 23, 26 and 29.12
The surveys register retrospectively and on monthly basis the most important activity of the re-
spondents, among which education. Based on this information, graduation is identified to occur
in the first month that education has been interrupted for at least for 4 months. The surveys also
contain control variables for the analysis, which are measured at age 17, such that they are pre-
determined at graduation: father’s and mother’s education (years of completed education since
age 12), the type of educational program (general, technical, vocational, part-time vocational or
apprenticeship) in which the individual is enrolled at age 17, and the number of repeated grades at
age 17 since secondary education. From this database we calculate for each individual the number
of completed years of education, i.e. the number of grades successfully passed from the start of
secondary education until graduation. Based on the latter we divide the sample in low and high
educated, with the former having completed at most secondary education and the latter having a
higher level of education.13 We make this distinction throughout the analysis, because, as men-
tioned in the Introduction, the minimum wage is more likely to be binding for low educated youth
at the start of the career and because EPL-strictness varies significantly between white and blue
collar workers.
The original Sonar sample contains about 9000 individuals, 3000 for each birth cohort. We
restrict it as follows, to increase the homogeneity of the sample. We exclude few observations
(0.17% of the sample) who dropped out from schooling before the end of compulsory education,
which in Belgium is set at age 18. We focus on men since female labor supply is different from
male labor supply due to mothering.14 We drop individuals who attended special needs and arts
education, who were not Belgian or did not speak Flemish at home, or who did not reside in Flan-
ders at graduation. We retained individuals graduating from age 18 and 24, as students graduating
with more than 24 years old are less than 5% of the sample. After eliminating, in addition, individ-
11For the high educated we use a measure of early wage as endogenous regressor. Since the instrument is weak in
the IV approach, results are relegated to Appendix 2.14. Hereafter we will focus on the low educated.
12For more details, see SONAR (2003, 2004a,b).
13Low educated are those with at most 6 years of completed education (7 years if enrolled in vocational track at age
17). High educated are those with higher years of completed education.
14Long-term effects of early labor market outcomes for women are equally interesting and left for future research.
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uals with missing or inconsistent values in variables, we are left with a final sample of 3586 low
and high educated men. From this, we focus on 1902 low educated, who graduated in the period
1994-2002. Descriptive statistics of the final sample is in Appendix 2.7.
The survey data are matched to administrative data of Belgian Social Insurance institutions
centralized at the Cross Roads Bank of Social Security, which give us access to high quality infor-
mation on individuals’ labor market outcomes for a sufficiently long time span after graduation.
In particular, these data report quarterly information on the registration as self-employed, as well
as earnings and time worked in dependent employment (for both public and private sector), be-
tween year 1998 and 2010. For salaried workers we construct log annual earnings and log annual
hours worked. The log-transformation allows us to interpret the coefficients of interest as semi-
elasticities. Note that we retain in the analysis also non-salaried employed by adding value one
to the continuous variables before taking the logarithmic transformation. Hence, non-salaried em-
ployed have zero log-earnings and zero log-hours worked. As a consequence our estimates on
continuous outcomes are unconditional on being salaried employed. This rules out the problem of
selectivity due to restricting to the salaried employed, i.e. a potentially positively selected group.
Yet it introduces another complication since the distribution of the outcome variables has a mass
point at zero. The fraction of corner solutions is however quite small, as only 15% of the low
educated are censored at zero at the moment of the evaluation. As a consequence, we will rely on
OLS.15 In addition, we construct three employment indicators: salaried employment, defined by
positive earnings from salaried employment; self-employment, based on the registration as self-
employed for at least one day during the calendar year; overall employment, which is the sum
of self- and salaried employment. Note that salaried employed who are also registered as self-
employed in the same calendar year are considered self-employed. These outcomes are measured
6 or 8 years after graduation. This choice is due to the availability of the administrative data (1998-
2010) and by the fact that we want to measure the dependent variables as late as possible for all
graduation cohorts. Since the low educated graduate in the period 1994-2002, the last graduation
cohort is followed until potential experience 8. Later than that the sample gets smaller as the last
graduation cohorts progressively drop out from the sample. At the same time, we want to get
an idea of the persistence of the scar: hence we choose to evaluate the outcomes also two years
earlier, i.e. at potential experience 6. Table 2.7 in Appendix 2.7 shows descriptive statistics of the
outcome variables.
The administrative data also provide additional control variables measured at age 17: living in
single parent household, not living together with either parents and the number of other household
members by age class. Descriptive statistics of the control variables are reported in Table 2.6
of Appendix 2.7.16 Finally, the administrative data give us access to yearly information on the
province of residence between the year in which individuals turn age 18 and 2010.
From the year of graduation onwards, we associate each calendar year to a potential year
15OLS estimation provides approximations of the unconditional effects, as it does not take into account the corner
solutions at zero. In principle, Tobit models would be more appropriate.
16For details on the construction of the control and outcome variables, see Section A.1 of this dissertation.
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of labor market experience,17 which corresponds to zero in the year of graduation. Potential
experience 0 lasts from the month subsequent to graduation until December of that calendar year.
Therefore, its length (measured in months) is computed as 12 −month_of_graduation, i.e. it
depends on the month of graduation: for a June graduate - which amounts to 90% of the sample
- it lasts 6 months. All subsequent years of potential experience have a duration of 12 months.
Our regressor of interest is a measure of the time spent in non-employment at potential experience
0-2, relative to the potential total hours if one would work full-time during the whole period. We
express it as a proportion in order to take into account the fact that the reference period changes
depending on the month of graduation, thereby ensuring that early non-employment is comparable
across individuals. On average this period corresponds to 2.5 years after graduation (30 months),
as 90% of the sample graduates in June. For simplicity hereafter we will refer to this reference
period as to its average, i.e. 2.5 years after graduation.
This endogenous regressor can be measured precisely, by exploiting the administrative data
on hours worked in salaried employment. However, the latter are available only since 1998, while
students graduate since 1994 in our sample. Therefore, we base this variable on the administrative
data for the individuals graduating since 1998 (68.5% of the sample), and exploit information from
Sonar (survey data) whenever potential experience 0-2 occurs before 1998 (31.5% of sample).
The reason why we combine administrative with survey data is to maximize the sample of study,
thereby exploiting the variation of the instrument for the entire graduation period 1994-2002,
rather than for the restricted period 1998-2002. Of course, the disadvantage is that the data on
time worked in the Sonar database are less precise and hence we have to make some assumptions
to convert this information into hours worked:18 this certainly introduces measurement error in
the endogenous regressor.
Briefly, the endogenous regressor is constructed as follows (for details, see Appendix 2.8):
first, define the reference period as the entire calendar year for potential experience 1 and 2, and
the part of calendar year following the month of graduation for potential experience 0; sum up all
hours worked including self-employment in the reference period (a);19 compute the potential total
hours if one would work full-time during the whole period (b); express early non-employment
as 100 ∗ (b − a)/b. As already mentioned, the denominator takes into account the fact that the
reference period changes depending on the month of graduation and ensures comparability across
individuals. This variable measures the intensity of early non-employment. It is equal to zero if in
the reference period one has always worked as much as a full-time salaried employed, and above
zero if one has worked less intensively than the full-time regime or if one has not worked for some
time. Given the possibility of measurement error arising from the combination of survey and ad-
ministrative data, Section 2.5.1 performs a sensitivity analysis for the restricted graduation period
1998-2002, where only administrative data are exploited to measure the endogenous regressor.
17This terminology is borrowed from the literature. “Potential” underlines that the variable counts all calendar years
since graduation, as opposed to actual experience which endogenously considers only years in employment.
18These are imputed from monthly employment indicators assuming full-time employment (see Appendix 2.8).
19For self-employed we assume the working regime of full-time salaried employed (see Appendix 2.8).
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A final source of information is the Labor Force Survey (LFS), which provides long time
series of the provincial unemployment rates for Flanders. In our analysis, we use the provincial
unemployment rate (15-64) at graduation as instrument for early non-employment. Figure 2.2
in Appendix A.1.5 plots this series from year 1993 until 2011. Note that the literature typically
exploits more disaggregated unemployment rate series.20 For Belgium, provincial unemployment
rates are the most disaggregated data available for the period considered. The main drawback is
that the inference relies on too few clusters, as the identification of the effects of interest comes
from the variation of the unemployment rates by provinces and years. To the extent that we tackle
this problem with wild bootstrap (see Section 2.4.4), provincial data are not much of a limitation.
In contrast, more aggregated series provide the advantage of reducing the problem of endogenous
migration, that would arise if new graduates offset the long-term effects of early non-employment
by moving or commuting into provinces where there are more job opportunities. Our data suggest
that in Flanders less than 2% of individuals change province of residence in the 1998-2010 period.
However, as Flanders is a relatively small region, people could commute to work across provinces.
In this case, we would underestimate long-term effects of early non-employment.21 However,
the magnitude of the inter-provincial variation in the unemployment rate reported in Figure 2.2
demonstrates that mobility and commuting are limited and far from eliminates all inter-provincial
variation.22
2.4 Estimation Strategy
We are interested in the causal relationship of early non-employment, say Y 0, on subsequent labor
market outcomes of interest Y for the low educated. Namely, we want to estimate an equation of
the following type, where X is a vector of control variables that will be defined below and ǫ is an
idiosyncratic error term:
Y = aY 0 + bX + e with e = (θ + ǫ) (2.1)
The main identification problem is the presence of some factors θ, unobserved to the researcher,
that may affect both early non-employment and subsequent labor market performances, thereby
introducing endogeneity. Therefore, OLS estimates will be biased as a consequence of these
omitted factors. We remove this bias by means of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator,
where the provincial unemployment rate at graduation is used as instrument (Z) for early non-
employment.23 In practice, the identification strategy relies on the variation of the provincial
20At district level (Schmillen and Umkehrer, 2013a) and by wards (Gregg, 2001; Gregg and Tominey, 2005).
21If anything, this should be more worrying for the high educated, since they are (1) less liquidity constrained because
of high expected wages or better working conditions and (2) more mobile due to higher motivation to find jobs that
meet their expectations about wages/job profiles.
22This is because LFS series are based on the province of residence and not of job location. Hence if workers
commute to avoid the adverse local labor market conditions, this evens out the provincial variation in the unemployment
rate.
23A similar approach has been used by Neumark (2002), Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013a), Gregg (2001) and Gregg
and Tominey (2005).
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unemployment rate at graduation Z, which is exploited to generate an exogenous variation in early
non-employment Y 0, which is then used to identify the causal relation of interest. In accordance
with the traditional IV approach, we assume that the effect of interest is homogeneous.24 In this
framework, the 2SLS identifies the causal effect of interest under two conditions:
1. Z is uncorrelated with e. This implies that Z does not directly affect the outcome Y (ex-
ogeneity), and that any indirect effect of Z on Y occurs uniquely through the endogenous
regressor Y 0 (exclusion restriction). This is an identifying assumption.
2. Z is correlated with Y 0, conditional on the controlsX in (2.1) (strength). This condition can
be tested by means of the F statistic of the excluded instrument in the first stage regression.
Note that in this framework the IV estimate refers to the entire population since the causal effect
of interest is assumed to be homogeneous across individuals. Next section discusses in detail the
identifying assumption 1. In particular, we will carefully examine which factors may violate the
exclusion restriction and define the specification in such a way that the latter is most likely satisfied
conditional on the covariates.
2.4.1 The Instrumental Variable Approach: identifying assumptions
Together, Condition 1 and 2 require that the instrument explains the endogenous regressor, but that
at the same time it is exogenous in model (2.1). This has the following implications.
First, it amounts to rule out reverse causality betweenZ and Y 0, that isZ affects Y 0 but not the
other way around. If it were the case, Z would be endogenous in (2.1) because of the correlation
with Y 0, and as consequence it should be included as additional regressor in the specification. We
exclude the possibility of reverse causality since the instrument and the endogenous regressor are
measured at the provincial and individual level respectively, and an aggregate variable cannot be
caused by an individual variable.
Second, the exogeneity assumption requires that the unemployment rate Z cannot affect the
unobserved composition of new graduates by year and province. If this were the case, the relation
between the instrument and early non-employment would spuriously reflect changes in the com-
position of graduates rather than causality, which would introduce selectivity. To rule this out, one
needs to assume that students choose the moment of graduation independently of the business cy-
cle (exogeneity of timing of graduation), and that before graduation they do not move to provinces
where the unemployment rate is lower relatively to others (exogeneity of place). We test the for-
mer condition in Section A.5 of this dissertation, and demonstrate that the duration between the
end of compulsory education at the age of 18 and each year of potential graduation is unrelated
24This is of course a restrictive assumption. In section 2.5.2 we discuss the interpretation of IV under heterogeneous
effects, where the IV estimator identifies a weighted average of local average treatment effects (LATEs) under additional
assumptions: Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) and Monotonicity.
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to the provincial unemployment rate in those years.25 As for mobility, almost nobody (0.44%)
change residence between the first year that our data inform about the place of living, i.e. on De-
cember 31 of the year in which the individual turns 17, and the year of graduation. Therefore, the
issue can be safely ignored. On this basis, we argue that in our sample the choice of graduation
is independent from the labor market conditions. However, we cannot rule out endogeneity due
to commuting, for instance if students enrolled into universities located in provinces where they
expected to find more jobs in the future.26
Third, the exclusion restriction requires that that the instrument is not correlated with any of
the omitted factors in model (2.1). If this holds, one can assume that the scars of graduating in
downturns for the low educated are determined exclusively by the proportion of time spent in early
non-employment. Accordingly, the persistence of these penalties should be rationalized entirely
by the loss of human capital originated by early non-employment, or by the fact that the latter is
perceived as a signal of bad quality by employers (see Introduction). This assumption is consistent
with the evidence of Chapter 1, who found that adverse labor market conditions at graduation
inflict to the low educated big initial penalties on earnings and hours worked, which fade away
slowly. The absence of a similar impact on wages is due to the presence of minimum wages, which
are likely to be binding for the low educated at the start of the career. Instead, the scars on earnings
and hours worked are explained by the labor market rigidities that prevents workers reallocation:
the short-term work compensation program that in hard times ties the employers to the employees,
and the EPL (flexible for blue collars while rigid for white collars) which pushes the high educated
to downgrade and hence increases the competition for low skilled positions. As a consequence,
the low educated who graduate in downturns are rather likely to experience longer periods of non-
unemployment at the start of the career. This has repercussions in the long-term, according to
the aforementioned evidence.27 Based on the latter, we argue that early non-employment is the
relevant channel to explain long-term effects of adverse labor market conditions at graduation for
the low educated.
Of course things can be a bit more blurry if we consider a wider definition of reservation wage
which incorporates also the future wage growth linked with seniority in addition to the current
wage. In this case, low educated graduating in a downturn may not only experience higher early
non-employment, but could also accept lower-quality jobs, i.e. with less steep wage profile than
the jobs accessed during a tight labor market. The unemployment rate at graduation would entail
a growing negative impact on subsequent wages as a consequence of accepting this initial job,
and this would represent a violation of the exclusion restriction when wages are the outcome of
25In a discrete duration model, an indicator of graduating since age 17 is regressed on birth cohort dummies, individ-
ual characteristics and the province of living measured at age 17, the elapsed duration in education since age 17, and
the unemployment rate in each potential year of graduation (interacted with the elapsed duration), testing whether the
coefficients of latter interactions are jointly significantly different from zero. The test deals with selectivity induced by
unobserved heterogeneity. It uses the same sample as this study.
26We do not have information on the location of universities in which students graduate nor of subsequent jobs.
27Note that this scar may be nuanced by the extensive use of STC for blue collars: they will experience long periods
of unemployment or reduced activity, but they are more likely to be called back.
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interest. This possibility is discussed in Chapter 1, where the unemployment rate at graduation has
a negative impact on wages starting from potential experience 6.28 This evidence is compatible
with the aforementioned hypothesis and hence represents a violation of the exclusion restriction
when wages are evaluated. Thus, we restrict the analysis on hours worked and earnings, since the
long-term penalties on the these outcomes are compatible with the idea that early non-employment
is the main driver of the scars.
Moreover, other channels may as well contribute to explain the long-term penalties of labor
market conditions at graduation: these channels would invalidate the exclusion restriction if not
included in the specification. An example is the persistence of the unemployment rate series. If the
current unemployment rate affects the outcomes, the correlation between the unemployment rate at
graduation and the current unemployment rate violates the assumption that the instrument affects
the outcomes only through early non-employment. To prevent that, it is important to additionally
control for the current unemployment rate, as typically done in the literature. However, this may
not be sufficient, as in principle one should control for all unemployment rate series up to the
moment of evaluation (Oreopoulos et al., 2012, 2008). To keep a parsimonious specification,
we add the average unemployment rate between the end of the early period and the moment of
evaluation - between potential experience 3 and 6.29
More generally, the problem of the persistence of the unemployment rates refers to the lit-
erature on wage determination, which investigates how the sequence of labor market conditions
experienced by a worker affects current wages (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991). According to this
view, labor markets operate as spot markets if current wages are affected by current unemploy-
ment rates and not by past ones. In contrast, wages result from long-term implicit contracts if past
unemployment rates explain current wages despite current ones: with costless mobility, the min-
imum unemployment rate since hiring should matter the most, as workers are able to renegotiate
the wage once better labor market conditions arise; if instead mobility is costly, the unemploy-
ment rate at hiring should be the relevant one. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) found that, once the
minimum unemployment rate since hiring is included together with the unemployment rate at hir-
ing, the former but not the latter significantly explains current wages. This is consistent with the
idea that wages are negotiated according to long-term implicit contracts with renewals.30 In this
case, the exclusion restriction may be violated if the unemployment rate at graduation mistakenly
picks up the effect of the minimum unemployment rate since hiring, because of the persistence
of the unemployment rates. To prevent that, we include the minimum unemployment rate since
graduation in the specification.31
28In the benchmark model this growing negative impact is not statistically significant, but it is significant in the
sensitivity analysis (see Table A.22 in Section A.9 of this dissertation).
29To rule out multicollineariy, we run a sensitivity analysis only including current unemployment rate (see Table 2.12
in Appendix 2.12). The stability of the results ensures that multicollinearity is not driving the results.
30Recently Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) criticize this interpretation. They argue that wages are still determined
by spot markets and not by long-term implicit contracts. They show that, once the current match quality is taken into
account, past labor market conditions no longer play a role in the wage determination.
31Note that the hypothesis of long-term implicit contracts seems more likely for the high educated, for instance to
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Finally, other violations of the exclusion restriction may be due to, for instance, differences in
institutions that could be correlated both with the unemployment rate at graduation and with the
outcomes. We therefore include province fixed effects to ensure that permanent differences across
provinces violate the exclusion restriction. Similarly, we include province-specific time trend to
capture whatever time-varying provincial heterogeneity, such as changes in legislations, that may
be correlated with the instrument and the labor market outcomes at the moment of evaluation.
Next section presents the equation of interest in light of all these arguments.
2.4.2 The Equation of Interest
To avoid clutter, we state the following definitions: t is the observation period, which runs from
graduation until the moment of evaluation of the outcomes of interest T , i.e. 6 or 8 years after
graduation; t0 is the time of measurement of predetermined individual controls, which corresponds
to the year in which individuals are aged 17; t1 is the time window in which we measure early
non-employment, i.e. on average the first 2.5 years after graduation32. We estimate the following
equation, where subscript i indicates the individual, g the graduation year and p the province of
residence at graduation:
yigpT = α+ βy
0
igpt1 + γ1URpT + γ2URp + x
′
it0δ + ζminURpt + ηp + ωpT + f(g) + eigpT
with eigpT = θi + ǫipgT (2.2)
• yigpT represents the following outcomes of interest measured in T , i.e. 6 or 8 years after
graduation: three indicators of salaried, self- and overall employment, as well as log hours
worked and log earnings in salaried employment. Before taking the logarithm of continuous
variables we add value one, so that non-salaried employed at the moment of evaluations are
included with value of zero after the logarithmic transformation. Therefore, the effects on
continuous outcomes are unconditional on being salaried employed. The reason why do
this is twofold: first, the instrument is not strong enough to estimate effects conditional on
salaried employment, but it becomes relevant when non-salaried employed are also included
in the sample.33 Second, unconditional effects refer to the entire population of workers and
avoid the problem of selectivity when focusing on the sub-population of salaried employed.
We take the log of continuous outcomes to interpret the estimates as semi-elasticities.
• y0igpt1 is the endogenous regressor representing early non-employment: it is expressed as the
percentage of time spent in non-employment in period t1, relative to potential total hours if
one would work full-time during the whole period.
• URpT is the current unemployment rate in the province of graduation, i.e. measured at
the moment of evaluation T . It ensures that the exclusion restriction is not violated by the
capture returns in human capital accumulation. In contrast, recent evidence has shown that labor markets operate like
spot markets for the low educated (Devereux and Hart, 2007; Kilponen and Santavirta, 2010).
32This time window corresponds to potential experience 0-2, i.e. from the month after graduation until December of
the second subsequent calendar year.
33In the first stage, the F statistic is about 4 in the conditional case and reaches 9 in the unconditional one.
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correlation between current local labor market conditions and local labor market conditions
at graduation.
• URp is the time average of the unemployment rate in the period subsequent to the measure-
ment of early non-employment, i.e. from potential experience 3 to 6. Together with URpT
, it controls for the persistence of the unemployment rate series.
• minURpt is the minimum unemployment rate in the province of residence of graduation
over the entire period t. It controls for the possibility that wages are determined by long-
term contracts which are renegotiated by the workers during upturns. Under this assumption,
the persistence of the unemployment rate series (i.e. the correlation betweenminURpt and
the instrument) and the correlation between the outcomes and the minimum unemployment
rate could violate the exclusion restriction.
• xi is a set of individual control variables, predetermined since measured in t0: birth cohort
dummies, family composition, parental education, repeated years since secondary education
as well as the educational track at age 17.
• ηp is fixed effects for the province of living at graduation: it controls for time-fixed provin-
cial heterogeneity, that is all differences across provinces that are constant over time: e.g.
differences in institutions, or in the structure of the economy.
• ωpT is the provincial specific linear time trends, which are included because the unemploy-
ment rates exhibit differential downward time trends (see Figure 2.2 in Appendix A.1.5).
More generally, it controls for any time-varying provincial heterogeneity, for instance for
changes in legislations or in the structure of the economy at the provincial level.
• f(g) is a linear spline in the graduation year, which controls for aggregate shocks af-
fecting all provinces over the graduation period. We impose a piece-wise linear spec-
ification because graduation year fixed effects absorb too much variation and as a con-
sequence the instrument becomes weaker in the first stage. The spline is formulated as
f(g) = α+
∑2
j=0 βj .(g − 3j)1[g ≥ 3j] with g = 1, .., 9.
• ǫigpT is an i.i.d. error term, while θi represents unobserved individual factors correlated with
y0it1 , thereby introducing endogeneity.
β is the coefficient of interest which represents the effect of one percentage point increase in the
proportion of time spent in early non-employment on subsequent outcomes of interest (employ-
ment rates, hours worked and earnings) for the low educated: in presence of scarring we expect a
negative β. The OLS estimate of β is biased due to the correlation between θi and y
0
igpt1
.
For all dependent variables, we estimate (2.2) by OLS or 2SLS. Thus, we estimate linear
probability models for discrete labor market outcomes. For continuous variables we report un-
conditional OLS effects and hence do not take into account that these outcomes are left-censored
at zero. However, we believe that this is a minor issue, since the fraction of corner solutions in
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the sample is quite small: only 15% of the low educated are not salaried employed at potential
experience 6.34 In any case, we provide heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in all estimations
to account for the fact that the dependent variables are dichotomous or censored at zero.
2.4.3 The Bias and Its Direction
The aforementioned bias can go in both directions. To see this, consider a simplified version
of (2.2): y = βy0 + θw + ǫ, where y0 is individual early non-employment, y is an individual
subsequent outcome of interest (i.e. employment rates, hours worked, and earnings) w is a fixed
individual characteristic. By assumption E(y0ǫ) = 0 and E(wǫ) = 0, and we expect a negative
β. Let Cov(y0, w) 6= 0. If w is observed, the OLS give unbiased estimators of β and θ: βOLS =
Cov(y0,y)
V ar(y0)
and θOLS =
Cov(w,y)
V ar(w) . If instead w is omitted, the OLS estimator is biased since βOLS =
E(y0,y)
E(y0)2
= E[y
0(βy0+θw+ǫ)]
E(y0)2
= β + θCov(y
0,w)
V ar(y0)
. The direction of the bias depends on the sign of θ -
the relationship between early non-employment and the outcome of interest - and the correlation
between the former and the omitted factor. Below we discuss four possible sources of bias and
their corresponding sign.
• Ability and Motivation: Everything else equal, more able and motivated individuals are
more likely to perform well in the labor market at any point in time: therefore these fac-
tors are negatively correlated with early non-employment and positively correlated with the
outcomes of interest. The overall bias is negative, so that OLS overestimate the (negative)
scarring effect of early non-employment.
• Returns to job search: heterogeneous returns may arise because of differences in the search
intensity or in the methods of search chosen. Ceteris paribus, individuals with higher re-
turns search more and more successfully (also on-the-job), and therefore perform better in
the labor market. Hence, the outcomes of interest are positively correlated with returns to
search. At the same time, in the first phase of job shopping they may alternate jobs with
short spells in non-employment, if they find it optimal to consume leisure when young and
their opportunity cost is lower.35 This may generate a positive correlation between returns
to job search and early non-employment (Neumark, 2002). Under these assumptions, the
bias is positive and OLS underestimate scarring.
• Liquidity constraints: everything else equal, individuals with high liquidity constraints have
low reservation wages because they need to earn a salary. Thus, we expect liquidity con-
straints to be negatively correlated with early non-employment. At the same time, these in-
dividuals are likely to accept low quality jobs because of their low reservation wage, which
is likely to translate into worse labor market performances over time. We therefore expect
34In Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013a) the dependent variable, the number of days spent in unemployment in prime
age, is censored at zero for almost 60% of cases. They use Tobit models.
35Neumark (2002) justify this assumption as follows: in a standard life cycle utility-maximization model individuals
are more likely to consume leisure at the point in the life cycle when their wages are low.
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also a negative correlation with the outcomes of interest. The resulting bias is positive so
that OLS underestimate scarring.
• Measurement error: as explained in Section 2.3, we introduce measurement error in the con-
struction of early non-employment, because we use information from the Sonar database to
impute hours worked in the first 2.5 years since graduation for students graduating before
1998, which are not observed in the administrative data. Measurement error in the endoge-
nous regressor reduces OLS estimates towards zero (Hausman, 2001), thereby underesti-
mating the scarring effect of early non-employment.36
To recapitulate, we expect OLS to overestimate the negative effect of early non-employment on
the outcomes of interest, if the bias comes from ability. In contrast, the OLS estimate will be
overestimated if the bias is due to returns to job search, measurement errors in the endogenous
regressor or liquidity constraints. The literature is in favour of the latter hypothesis (Gregg, 2001;
Gregg and Tominey, 2005; Neumark, 2002; Schmillen and Umkehrer, 2013a).
2.4.4 Inference
It is well known that standard errors are underestimated in a micro-level regression with grouped
covariates because it is assumed that each observation is independent of all others while the in-
formation of the grouped covariates is repeated within each cluster. Therefore, correct inference
requires to take into account that the independent information of the grouped covariates is at the
group level, which can be done with cluster-robust standard errors (Angrist and Pischke, 2008;
Moulton, 1990, ch.8). In our 2SLS we use a grouped variable, the unemployment rate at grad-
uation, as instrument for the endogenous regressor, early non-employment, which varies at the
individual level. Therefore, the identification of causality comes from the variation by province
and time of the provincial unemployment rates at graduation, which is exploited to construct the
fitted values of the first stage.37
The clustered estimator is consistent provided that the number of clusters is large enough,
as consistency is determined by the law of large numbers. This is because, given the grouped
structure of the data, the relevant unit are clusters and not observations. Since we consider the
low educated graduating in the 5 Flemish provinces in the period 1994-2002, inference hinges on
44 clusters.38 This raises the possibility of underestimating standard errors due to few clusters.
Empiricists tend to agree that 50 clusters is enough when clusters have roughly the same size,
but that a higher number of clusters is required when clusters are unbalanced (Cameron et al.,
2008; MacKinnon and Webb, 2014). Applying the clustered estimator when clusters are too few
36In linear models, OLS estimates of y0 are underestimated due to measurement errors and the bias can be eliminated
with IV. However, this does not holds for non-linear models (Amemiya, 1985; Hausman et al., 1995).
37In 2SLS, the bias of the conventional variance estimator with grouped data is determined by the intra-class correla-
tion of the second stage residuals (ρe) and by the intra-class correlation of the first stage fitted values (ρx). ρx is highest
with grouped regressors in the first stage. As for OLS, ρe > 0 does not matter for standard errors as long as ρx is zero,
but also a small ρe can give important bias with ρx > 0 (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, ch.8).
38Clusters are 44 since g2002p3 is empty. Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.7 shows the distribution across clusters.
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is likely to worsen the bias, as cluster robust standard errors may be even smaller than conventional
ones. This is what we find by comparing conventional and cluster robust standard errors of 2SLS
estimations (see Table 2.1), which suggests that we have too few clusters.
We tackle this problem with wild restricted efficient residual bootstrap (WRE bootstrap) pro-
posed by Davidson and MacKinnon (2010), which are designed for 2SLS in context of het-
eroscedasticity or clustered data. This procedure combines the restricted efficient residual boot-
strap (RE bootstrap) proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (2008) for the 2SLS, with wild boot-
strap, which allows for intra-cluster correlation and heteroscedasticity (Cameron et al., 2008). For
completeness, we apply wild bootstrap also to the t statistic of the instrument in the first stage, as
well as to the t statistic of the regressor of interest when estimating (2.2) by OLS.39 The bootstrap
procedures are explained in detail in Appendix 2.10.
Because of few clusters, also the F statistic of the first stage is overestimated. To adjust it,
we exploit the fact that in case of one instrument the F statistic is the square of the t statistic of
the instrument in the first stage: i.e. with G clusters, F (1, G − 1) = t2(G − 1). Therefore, the
bootstrap F statistic is the critical value of the F (1, G − 1) distribution that corresponds to the
bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument in the first stage.40
2.5 Results
Table 2.1 summarizes the results for the low educated from estimating (2.2) by OLS and 2SLS
on alternative labor market outcomes, measured 6 years after graduation. As a matter of space,
we report only the effects of interest, i.e. the effect of early non-employment β in the structural
equation and the impact of the instrument in the first stage regression. The complete regressions
are reported in Appendix 2.11. Odds and even columns show heteroscedastic-robust and cluster
robust standard errors, respectively. The former takes into account that the dependent variables
are dichotomous or censored at zero, while the latter allows for intra-cluster correlation induced
by the fact that the instrument varies at the gp level. The fact that the 2SLS cluster robust standard
errors are smaller than the 2SLS heteroscedastic-robust ones (columns 3 and 4 in Panel A) suggests
that clustering is ineffective because of too few clusters. We ensure to make correct inference by
bootstrapping the t statistic of the effects of interest and by reporting the corresponding P-value.
Panel B summarizes the results of the first stage. We report the original F statistic (10.51) as
well as the bootstrap one (9.25), which accounts for the problem of few clusters. As expected,
the former is overestimated. According to the Stock-Yogo critical values, the IV estimator of β
39In the first stage the instrument is grouped, hence we need to cluster. In contrast, when estimating (2.2) by OLS the
regressor of interest varies at the individual level: hence, clustering is not a major issue. For completeness we provide
both heteroscedastic-robust and cluster-robust standard errors.
40We are aware of only one study by Baltagi et al. (2013) on the performance of wild bootstrap applied to the F
statistic in context of heteroscedastic - but not clustered - data. Bootstrapping directly the F test in our wild bootstrap
procedure did not always yield the expected results (sometimes, the bootstrap P-value of the F statistic was smaller than
the P-value of the original F). For this reason, we relied on the bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument in
the first stage.
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over-rejects the null, as it leads to a rejection rate close to 15% when the true rejection rate is
5% (Stock and Yogo, 2005).41 Hence, because of this test size, the IV estimates should to be
taken with caution. The reported estimate suggests that one percentage point (pp) increase in
the unemployment rate at graduation increases early non-employment by 5 pp. For Flanders, the
unemployment rate rises on average by 1.4 pp in the 1994-2010 period (and by 1.6 pp in the Great
Recession in 2008). Thus, graduating in an average downturn increases the proportion of hours
spent in non-employment early in the career by about 7% (1.4× 5).
The upper part of Panel A refers to the employment indicators. The sign of the estimates
suggests that early non-employment has a positive (negative) impact on the probability to be self-
(salaried) employed, but the size of the effect is very small. In contrast to OLS, 2SLS are not
significant: this may be a consequence of too small power of the test, because of the limited vari-
ation of the instrument. The null hypothesis of the exogeneity test is largely not rejected for all
indicators, indicating that both estimators are consistent but the OLS is more efficient than the
2SLS one.42 We therefore focus on OLS: for one pp increase in early non-employment, the proba-
bility to be salaried (overall) employed decrease by 0.17% (0.12%). These effects are statistically
significant. Self-employment increases by 0.05%, but the impact is statistically insignificant.
More significant effects are shown in the bottom part of Panel A, which reports the uncondi-
tional effects of interest on continuous labor market outcomes. The null of the exogeneity test is
rejected in all cases, meaning that the 2SLS estimator is consistent while the OLS one is not. A
comparison between the estimates suggests that OLS underestimate scarring, which is in line with
the hypothesis that the bias is caused by returns to search, liquidity constraints or measurement
errors in the endogenous regressor, and consistent with what found in the literature. The 2SLS re-
sults indicate that one pp rise in early non-employment reduces earnings and hours worked by 10%
and 7%, respectively (column 4). Both estimates are highly significant (at 1% level). Note that,
for the cluster robust case (column 2 and 4) the P-values are computed according to the t(G− 1)
distribution (with G being the number of clusters), to make a conservative inference.43 However,
the P-values of column 4 may be still underestimated due to the small number of clusters. We
tackle this computing the bootstrap P-value for the t statistic of β. The latter is higher than the
P-value from cluster robust standard errors, but still lower than 0.05. Hence, despite the small
number of clusters, the impact of early non-employment on continuous outcomes is significant.
These estimates suggest that the low educated who, as a consequence of graduating in the
adverse labor market conditions, found it difficult to get a stable position at the start of the career
41With one instrument, the critical value for maximal size test of 10% and 15% is 16.3 and 8.96.
42With clustered standard errors, the exogeneity test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one
for the equation with a smaller set of instruments where the suspect regressor is treated as endogenous, and one for the
equation where the suspect regressor is treated as exogenous. Under the null that both sets of instruments are valid (i.e.
the suspect regressor is exogenous), the statistic is distributed as χ2(1). Note that this statistic is not corrected for the
problem of few clusters. Hence, the P-value may be too small.
43In Stata this is automatically done in clustered OLS, but not in clustered 2SLS, where the P-values in the second
stage are computed with the Normal distribution. In this case, the estimate remains significant at 1% level. Table 2.8 in
Appendix 2.11 reports the clustered 2SLS with the significance level based on the Normal distribution.
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(i.e. the compliers), are still significantly penalized in terms of hours worked and earnings, 6 years
after graduation. The results on hours worked are not directly comparable but consistent with the
existing literature, which reports persistent effects of early unemployment on subsequent unem-
ployment: for UK new graduates aged 16-21, Gregg (2001) estimates that a 3-months increase
in the unemployment duration before age 23 significantly increases the time out of work between
age 28 and 33 by 2 months. Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013a) focus on new graduates from the
German apprenticeship program and find that one additional day of unemployment during the first
8 years since graduation increases unemployment in the following 16 years by 0.96 days.
Table 2.8 in Appendix 2.11 show the entire OLS and 2SLS regressions. The individual controls
show the expected signs: in the first stage, grade repetitions in secondary education is positively
associated with early non-employment, while technical, vocational and apprenticeship programs
are associated with a lower proportion of time spent in early non-employment, compared to gen-
eral education. This suggests that the former programs ease the transition from school to work. An
interesting result refers to mother education, which has a positive effect on early non-employment
in the first stage, whereas a significant and negative (positive) impact on hours worked, earnings
and salaried employment (self-employment) in OLS. This may capture the effect of unobserved
liquidity constraints on the time worked, so that less constrained individuals (associated to higher
mother’s education) spend more time in early non-employment and work less hours in salaried em-
ployment (with consequent lower earnings). In the same spirit, low educated individuals with low
educated mothers are also more likely to opt for salaried employment (with expected stable income
under long-term contracts), while they are more likely to engage in (riskier) self-employment if
their mothers are high educated. These effects become insignificant in 2SLS, to the extent that the
endogeneity problem due to omitted liquidity constraints in (2.2) is tackled by the IV approach.
We repeat the analysis measuring the outcomes 8 years after graduation, to investigate the
persistence of such scar. These results are reported in Table 2.2. The effects are qualitatively
similar to the ones measured 2 years earlier: the estimates on discrete outcomes remain very
small, while the adverse effects on continuous outcomes are still significant, but smaller than
the ones measured at experience 6. These results may suggest that, for low educated youth, the
scar originating from early non-employment on continuous outcomes persists still 8 years after
graduation, i.e. it fades away slowly. However, the bootstrap F statistic in the first stage decreases
to 6, warning against the problem of weak instrument. In this case, we know that 2SLS estimator
is biased towards the OLS one. Therefore, we cannot discriminate to what extent 2SLS are able
to identify the fact that the scar decreases over time, and to what extent they are simply biased
towards the OLS: according to the F statistic, we may worry about the latter possibility. Thus,
unfortunately these results are not very informative.
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Table 2.1: Effect of Interest on Outcomes Measured 6 Years After Graduation for Low Educated.
Panel A: Effect of early non-employment in the structural equation:
OLS 2SLS
standard errors† robust cluster g ∗ p robust cluster g ∗ p
outcomes: (1) (2) (3) (4)
salaried empl. coeff -0.00169*** -0.00169*** -0.00256 -0.00256
se (0.00034) (0.00041) (0.00375) (0.00290)
P-val§ 0.00019 0.38202
Bootstrap P-val‡ 0 0.45646
Exogeneity test P-val§§ 0.767
self-empl. coeff 0.00054* 0.00054 0.00248 0.00248
se (0.00030) (0.00041) (0.00338) (0.00258)
P-val 0.19177 0.34175
Bootstrap P-val 0.18619 0.37437
Exogeneity test P-val 0.438
overall empl. coeff -0.00115*** -0.00115*** -0.00008 -0.00008
se (0.00021) (0.00025) (0.00207) (0.00151)
P-val 0.00005 0.95655
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.96697
Exogeneity test P-val 0.467
log earnings coeff -0.0269*** -0.0269*** -0.1002** -0.1002***
se (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0419) (0.0291)
P-val 2.51E-08 0.0013
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.0060
Exogeneity test P-val 0.00970
log hours worked coeff -0.0203*** -0.0203*** -0.0722** -0.0722***
se (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0307) (0.0207)
P-val 8.96E-09 0.0011
Bootstrap P-val 0.0060
Exogeneity test P-val 0.0113
Panel B: Effect of the instrument in the first stage : OLS
outcome: standard errors: robust cluster g ∗ p
early non-empl. coeff 5.4615*** 5.4615***
se (1.7273) (1.6848)
P-val 0.00230
Bootstrap P-val 0.00400
F stat 10.51
Bootstrap F stat†† 9.25
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. Panel A reports results from estimating β in (2.2) on
outcomes measured at potential experience 6. β is the effect of one pp increase in y0igpt1 , i.e. the % of hours spent in
non-employment in the first 2.5 years after graduation relative to potential total hours if one would work full-time during the whole
period. For clustered standard errors, we report the P-value and the wild bootstrap P-value. Column 1-2 (3-4) show OLS (2SLS). In
2SLS the provincial unemployment rate at graduation is used as instrument for y0igpt1 . Panel B shows the effect of the instrument on
y0igpt1 in the first stage and the corresponding F statistic.
† Robust indicates heteroscedastic-robust standard errors; clusters are defined by year g and province of residence at graduation p
(G=44 clusters).
§ The P-value from clustered standard errors is computed using the t(G− 1) distribution, with G=44 (stars are reported accordingly).
‡ Bootstrap P-values are computed according to the wild bootstrap procedures explained in Appendix 2.10 for 999 repetitions.
†† Bootstrap F statistic is the F statistic corresponding to the bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument: we rely on the
equivalence between F and t distribution: for G = 44, t2(G− 1) = F (1, G− 1).
§§With clustered standard errors, this test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation where
y0t1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
t1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that y0t1 is exogenous, the
statistic is distributed as χ2(1).
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Table 2.2: Effect of Interest on Outcomes Measured 8 Years After Graduation for Low Educated.
Panel A: Effect of early non-employment in the structural equation:
OLS 2SLS
standard errors† robust cluster g ∗ p robust cluster g ∗ p
outcomes: (1) (2) (3) (4)
salaried empl. coeff -0.00119*** -0.00119** -0.00009 -0.00009
se (0.00035) (0.00046) (0.00430) (0.00323)
P-val§ 0.01252 0.97670
Bootstrap P-val† 0.01401 0.94494
Exogeneity test P-val§§ 0.739
self-empl. coeff 0.00030 0.00030 -0.00087 -0.00087
se (0.00031) (0.00043) (0.00385) (0.00354)
P-val 0.48347 0.80640
Bootstrap P-val 0.48448 0.82282
Exogeneity test P-val 0.744
overall empl. coeff -0.00089*** -0.00089*** -0.00097 -0.00097
se (0.00019) (0.00021) (0.00220) (0.00187)
P-val 0.00013 0.60815
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.68068
Exogeneity test P-val 0.966
log earnings coeff -0.0230*** -0.0230*** -0.0674* -0.0674**
se (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0394) (0.0311)
P-val 2.34E-06 0.0360
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.0841
Exogeneity test P-val 0.162
log hours worked coeff -0.0172*** -0.0172*** -0.0487* -0.0487**
se (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0290) (0.0224)
P-val 2.53E-06 0.0355
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.0861
Exogeneity test P-val 0.171
Panel B: Effect of the instrument in the first stage : OLS
outcome: standard errors: robust cluster g ∗ p
early non-empl. coeff 4.9717*** 4.9717***
se (1.6605) (1.6060)
P-val 0.00345
Bootstrap P-val 0.01802
F stat 9.584
Bootstrap F stat†† 6.05
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. Panel A reports results from estimating β in (2.2) on
outcomes measured at potential experience 8. β is the effect of one pp increase in y0igpt1 , i.e. the % of hours spent in
non-employment in the first 2.5 years after graduation relative to potential total hours if one would work full-time during the whole
period. For clustered standard errors, we report the P-value and the wild bootstrap P-value. Column 1-2 (3-4) show OLS (2SLS). In
2SLS the provincial unemployment rate at graduation is used as instrument for y0igpt1 . Panel B shows the effect of the instrument on
y0igpt1 in the first stage and the corresponding F statistic.
† Robust indicates heteroscedastic-robust standard errors; clusters are defined by year g and province of residence at graduation p
(G=44 clusters). § The P-value from clustered standard errors is computed using the t(G− 1) distribution, with G=44 (stars are
reported accordingly).
‡ Bootstrap P-values are computed according to the wild bootstrap procedures explained in Appendix 2.10 for 999 repetitions.
†† Bootstrap F statistic is the F statistic corresponding to the bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument: we rely on the
equivalence between F and t distribution: for G = 44, t2(G− 1) = F (1, G− 1).
§§With clustered standard errors, this test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation where
y0t1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
t1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that y0t1 is exogenous, the
statistic is distributed as χ2(1).
Chapter 2 70
2.5.1 Sensitivity Analysis for the Low Educated
As a first sensitivity analysis, we want to rule out that results in Table 2.1 are driven by multi-
collinearity, which may arise because in (2.2) we add many controls for the persistence of the
unemployment rate (the current unemployment rate, the average unemployment rate since the end
of the early period and the moment of evaluation as well as the minimum unemployment rate
since graduation). Therefore, to rule this possibility we re-run the model including only the cur-
rent unemployment rate (thereby excluding URp and minURpt): the results of this restricted
specification are reported in Table 2.12 of Appendix 2.12. Note that the effect of interest should
be interpreted as an average effect between the scarring of early non-employment due to adverse
labor market conditions at graduation and the persistence of the unemployment rate in the period
before the moment of evaluation.44 The stability of the results ensures that multicollinearity is not
driving the results.
Next, we assess the impact of measurement error in the endogenous regressor, which arises
from the combination of survey and administrative data. In fact, early non-employment is mea-
sured precisely for individuals graduating in the 1998-2002 period - by means of administrative
data - but it is imputed for those graduating in the period 1994-1997, based on the Sonar database
(see Appendix 2.8 for details). This allows us to maximize the variation of the instrument consid-
ering the entire graduation period 1994-2002, at the cost of introducing some measurement error
in the endogenous regressor. Therefore, in this second sensitivity analysis we re-run the analysis
for low educated restricting the sample to graduation period 1998-2002, so that the endogenous
regressor is measured uniquely by administrative data. Of course, clusters are drastically reduced
from 44 to 24.45 This is problematic not only because it exacerbates the problem of few clusters,
but also because equation (2.2) contains too many parameters (k = 30) compared to the number
of clusters, and as a consequence the rank condition in 2SLS is not satisfied.46 Therefore, we need
to reduce the parameters in equation (2.2).
We decide to exclude some of the non-significant individual controls and rather include in the
specification all the aggregate regressors, which are very important to ensure the validity of the
exclusion restriction.47 In particular, we drop the following controls that are jointly not significant
at the 5% level according to an F test in the first stage regression: dummy for living with single
parent, dummy for not living with parents, number of household members aged 12-17, 18-29,
30-64, 65+ (we keep the number of household members aged 0-11 since it is significant); plus, we
aggregate all educational tracks different from general education (technical, vocational, part-time
education or apprenticeship) and include a dummy for general education instead.48 Therefore, the
new regression includes the following individual controls: father and mother education, repeated
grades at age 17, dummy for general education at age 17, number of household members aged 0-
44This is because URp is significant in (2.2) whileminURpt is not: see Table 2.8 and 2.9 Appendix 2.11.
45In principle, 5 graduation years times 5 provinces, i.e. G = 25. However, g2002p3 is empty.
46The variance-covariance matrix of moment conditions has size (30× 30) and rank=24 (Baum et al., 2003).
47Compared to the aggregate regressors individual controls play a minor role, as they alleviate the problem of omitted
individual characteristics, which is anyway tackled by the IV approach.
48The reference is an aggregated category for technical, vocational, part-time education and apprenticeship.
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11 when the individual is aged 17, birth cohort dummies. Table 2.11 shows that results are robust
to this alternative specification, as the OLS estimate of the endogenous regressor is very stable in
the full specification (column 1 and 4) and in the restricted specification (column 2 and 5); both
specifications consider the graduation period 1994-2002.
Panel B of Table 2.10 reports the first stage regression for the 1998-2002 period. This table
should be compared to Table 2.1. First, the bootstrap F statistic is 3.6 for the graduation period
1998-2002 compared to 9.2 for the period 1994-2002: therefore, the instrument becomes weak by
restricting to the former period. As expected, the increased discrepancy between the original F
and the bootstrap F statistic in Table 2.10 compared to Table 2.1 shows that the few-clusters bias
worsens a lot by shifting from 44 to 24 clusters. Second, the direct effect of the instrument on
early non-employment for the 1998-2002 period doubles compared to the period 1994-2002. An
explanation is that the former period focuses on the dot-com recession, whose effects are mitigated
in considering a larger span. Given the low F statistic, 2SLS are not reliable.
However, we can focus on the OLS results in Table 2.11 to shed lights on the importance
of the measurement error in the endogenous regressor. In principle, this should bias the OLS
estimate for the period 1994-2002 (Column 1 and 4) towards zero. At the same time, the OLS
estimate in Column 3 and 6 should not be affected by measurement error “by construction”, since
the endogenous regressor is entirely measured by administrative data for the 1998-2002 period.
We therefore compare the first row across columns (1 with 3 and 4 with 6): for each outcome,
the estimate based on the graduation period 1994-2002 is slightly smaller than the corresponding
estimate for the period 1998-2002. This is consistent with the presence of measurement error in
the endogenous regressor for the graduation period 1994-2002. However, this difference is small
(0.2 pp), which suggests that overall the OLS estimates are quite close in the 1998-2002 and 1994-
2002 period: as a consequence, we conclude that measurement error in early non-employment is
not a major issue in the main results.
Of course, another explanation could be that the combination of bias from various sources
(ability, returns to search, liquidity constraints) may differ in the period 1998-2002 - when mea-
surement error is absent - compared to the period 1994-2002 - when measurement error is present
- and yet yield the same net effect: however, this requires that these (fixed) omitted factors affect
individual labor market performances differently in the 1994-1997 and 1998-2002 period, which
is peculiar. We think that this last story is more difficult to be argued.
2.5.2 Discussion on the validity of the IV approach
Under the assumption of homogenous effects, the 2SLS identifies the effect of interest under
the Condition 1 and 2 illustrated in Section 2.4. This section discusses the limitations of this
approach by assessing the validity of each assumption and the role played by each of them in the
identification. Consistently with the notation used in Section 2.4, let Y be the outcome, Z the
instrument, Y 0 the endogenous regressor. The IV estimator is βIV = cov(Y, Z)/cov(Y
0, Z).
We start noting that it can be expressed as the ratio between the causal effect of Z on Y in the
reduced form regression (RF) and the causal effect of Z on Y 0 in the first stage (1ststage): βIV =
Chapter 2 72
cov(Y,Z)
cov(Y 0,Z)
= cov(Y,Z)/V ar(Z)
cov(Y 0,Z)/V ar(Z)
= RF1ststage . Condition 1 (exogeneity) is required to interpret the
numerator as causal. By virtue of the exclusion restriction, this causal effect can only result from
Z effecting Y 0 and Y 0 in turn affecting Y . Condition 2 allows us to quantify the effect of interest
(the effect of Y 0 on Y ), dividing cov(Y, Z) by cov(Y 0, Z), which yields the IV estimator. At the
extreme in which Z has no explanatory power in the first stage, cov(Y 0, Z) = 0 and the ratio
would not exist. If condition 1 is not satisfied, the reduced form yields a biased estimate of the
effect of Z on Y and, as a consequence, the IV estimator provides a biased estimate of the effect of
Y 0 on Y . Furthermore, the bias of the IV estimator is magnified in presence of weakly correlated
instruments.
In Section 2.4 we extensively discuss the validity of Condition 1. We formally test the exo-
geneity of the timing of graduation, and argue that the place of graduation is also exogenous since
we hardly observe any inter-provincial mobility in the data. However, commuting across provinces
is a source of endogeneity that we cannot control for. Moreover, we identify a number of factors
that may represent a source of violation of the exclusion restriction and set up the specification in
(2.2) so that the latter is most likely satisfied, conditional on the covariates. In our case, Condition
2 is the most problematic, as the instrument is not strong enough. As already mentioned, this may
magnify problems related to even small violations of Condition 1.
Differently from the IV estimator, the effect of Z on Y in the reduced form equation only
requires the exogeneity of Z to be given a causal interpretation. For this reason, we complement
the IV approach with the estimates of the reduced form equation, which are reported in Table
2.13 together with the first stage:49 for continuous outcomes, these effects are unconditional on
being salaried employed. The effect of Z on the employment indicators evaluated 6 years after
graduation are not significant (Columns 4-6 of Table 2.13). Instead, the unconditional effects of
Z on the continuous variables are negative and significant: one pp increase in the unemployment
rate at graduation decreases earnings by 54% and hours worked by 39%, 6 years after graduation.
These effects are very big. The reason is that they are unconditional average effects, which include
also the effects for those who are not salaried employed at the moment of evaluation. Dividing
these effects by the effect of Z on Y 0 in the first stage (Column 7) gives the 2SLS estimates of
interest in Table 2.1.
So far the discussion has relied on the quite unrealistic assumption of homogenous effects.
Allowing for heterogeneous effects, an IV estimator identifies an average causal effect for the
sub-population that reacts to the instrument under two additional assumptions:50
• Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA): no interference between units.
• Monotonicity: the effect of Z on Y 0 has the same sign for everybody.
In a simple framework with no covariates where both Z and Y 0 are discrete, the IV estimator
identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE) for the compliers. In a more complicated
framework as in our case, the IV estimator can be interpreted as a weighted average of local
49In the reduced form, y0igpt1 in (2.2) is replaced by the unemployment rate at graduation; in the first stage, y
0
igpt1
in
(2.2) is replaced by the unemployment rate at graduation while at the same time yiT is replaced by y
0
igpt1
.
50Condition 1 is split into random assignment and exclusion restriction. Condition 2 remains invariant.
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average treatment effects (LATEs) (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).51
The SUTVA assumption requires that the outcomes Y are independent across individuals.
This is satisfied if one can rule out crowding-out effects: these effects occur if there are less job
openings than new graduates so that the latter compete for the same jobs and, as a consequence,
only some of them get good positions while some others remain unemployed, get lower-paying
jobs, or work less hours. This is a quite strong assumption to make in the context of labor markets.
The monotonicity assumption requires that a higher unemployment rate at graduation Z prolongs
(shortens) early non-employment for every low educated person. The direction of the effect does
not matter to the extent that it has the same sign for all individuals.52 Also this assumption boils
down to crowding out effects in the labor market, as it rules out the possibility that, by graduating
in a downturns, some new graduates may experience longer early non-employment while other
luckier ones work since the start of the career. As for the case of homogenous effects, the IV
is the ratio between the effect of Z on Y in the reduced form equation and the effect of Z on
Y 0 in the first stage. In the program evaluation literature, the numerator is the Intention-To-Treat
(ITT) effect. The SUTVA ensures that the numerator is not biased, which typically occurs in case
of externalities (Heckman et al., 1999). Monotonicity (together with the exclusion restriction)
ensures that the IV estimator identifies the causal effect of interest for the compliers - i.e. in
this case those who experience high incidence of non-employment because graduated with high
unemployment rates. If either the exclusion restriction or the monotonicity are violated, the IV
estimates the LATE for the compliers plus a bias, which can be characterized depending on the
assumption that is not satisfied. Clearly, allowing for heterogeneous effects comes at the cost of
requiring more assumptions which, as already mentioned, may be restrictive in this specific case.
We conclude relating the analysis of this chapter with Chapter 1, since both of them rely on
the same data (see Appendix 2.7 for details). In the current section we estimate unconditional ITT
effects of the instrument on alternative outcomes which are evaluated at potential experience 6.
Given that the dependent variables are fixed at a given point in time, we exploit the cross-section
variation. By contrast, Chapter 1 exploits the entire panel structure of the data and jointly estimate
distinct ITT effects on the same outcomes - one for each year of potential experience. The ef-
fects on continuous variables are conditional on salaried employment. Consequently, these results
cannot be directly compared since the two studies use different frameworks. Namely, in Chapter
1, the panel structure allows to control for calendar time FE in the specification (which accounts
for common shocks affecting the entire economy),53 and in general contain much more informa-
51With covariates X , the IV is a weighted average of covariates-specific LATEs (one for each value of X), where
more weight is attributed to covariate values where Z creates more variation in the fitted values. If Y 0 is continuous,
the IV is a weighted average of LATEs, where the weights depend on how the compliers are distributed over the range
of Y 0. With multiple instruments, the IV is a weighted average of LATEs for instrument-specific compliant sub-
populations, where the weights are proportional to the relative strength of each instrument in the first stage. Similarly,
if Z is continuous, the IV is a weighted average of instrument values-specific LATEs, and bigger weights are given to
the instrument values that contribute the most in explaining Y 0 in the first stage: here, bigger weights are given to the
clusters gp whose unemployment rate variation is mostly correlated with early non-employment.
52Monotonicity is important given the heterogeneity of the effect, since the LATE is an average causal effect.
53There are additional differences in the specification: Chapter 1 includes asymmetric effects for graduating in
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tion, which yields more precise estimates. By excluding minURpt and URp from (2.2) - which
gives the most similar specification to the one estimated in Chapter 1 - we estimate a conditional
ITT of -3.8% on earnings and -0.9% on hours worked (estimation output not reported).54 The
corresponding effects in Chapter 1 are -3.6% on earnings and -2.5% on hours worked (see Table
1.3 in Section 1.9). As expected, results from the panel estimation are more precise.55 The point
estimates of the effect on earnings are quite close across the two studies, as opposed to the ones
referring to the effect on hours worked. However, the latter are not inconsistent, given the large
confidence intervals of the conditional ITT resulting from our approach.
2.6 Conclusions
We consider a sample of low educated youth graduating in the period 1994-2002 in Flanders, the
most prosperous of three Belgian regions. We study the impact of early non-employment on work-
ers’ subsequent career, measured 6 and 8 years after graduation. We deal with the endogeneity
of unobserved individual characteristics with an IV approach, where the provincial unemploy-
ment rate at graduation is used as instrument for non-employment. The problem of few clusters is
addressed by wild bootstrap methods.
Since in Belgium labor market institutions differ for blue and white collar workers, we focus
on low educated new graduates. Chapter 1 of this dissertation provides evidence that Belgian
low and high educated graduating in the period 1994-2004 are exposed differently to adverse
labor market conditions because of these institutional differences: due to strict EPL for white
collars, the high educated graduating in downturns are forced to downgrade and as a consequence
are trapped in lower-paying jobs. The low educated instead tend to experience non-employment
because of the flexible EPL for blue collars, and because wages are downwards-rigid due to the
presence of minimum wages. We define the identification strategy in light of these results, so to
ensure that the exclusion restriction is most likely satisfied: that is, we consider a measure of early
non-employment as endogenous variable, since for the low educated the scar from graduating in
downturns occurs through the loss of early work experience.56
In this study we have applied an IV approach to unveil the causality between early non-
employment and subsequent labor market outcomes. Throughout the article we have discussed
the assumptions required by the IV estimator, their validity and the role they play in the identi-
fication. Unfortunately, our IV estimators suffer from weak identification problem, which may
magnify any small violation of the exclusion restriction.
We find that one pp increase in the time spent in non-employment in the first 2.5 years since
upturns/downturns, and interact the unemployment rate at graduation and the current one with experience splines. In
current chapter,minURpt and URp are included in (2.2).
54We focus on the continuous outcomes as they yield significant ITT effects, as opposed to the discrete ones.
55Standard errors of conditional ITT on earnings and hours worked are respectively 0.015 and 0.014 in Chapter 1,
and 0.027 and 0.025 in this study.
56For high educated we use early wage as endogenous regressor as accepting lower-paying jobs is the main channel
to explain the scars of graduating in downturns. However, the instrument is weak (see Appendix 2.14).
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graduation decreases annual earnings and hours worked from salaried employment by 10% and
7% respectively, 6 years after graduation. Provided that our identification strategy is correct,
these effects are causal. They may originate by the foregone human capital that would have been
accumulated in case of early work-experience, or because early non-employment is interpreted as
a signal of low quality. From a policy perspective, it is therefore very important that low educated
workers acquire work experience at the start of their career. This may be impeded in a rigid
labor market where workers reallocation is costly and as a consequence exiting unemployment is
harder and may have long-lasting consequences. Early work experience instead may be enhanced
by a flexicurity system in which workers are reallocated easily while unemployed workers are
protected by an unemployment insurance system. In this context, the majority of unemployment
is temporary - to the extent that the hiring cost are low. Long-term unemployed, who are provided
for by the unemployment insurance, may be additionally supported in their job search by active
labor market policies.
The Belgian low educated workers face a number of rigidities which restrain workers reallo-
cation: the short-term work compensation program, by anchoring the employees to the employers,
is an example. A second rigidity is represented by the very high Belgian minimum wages, which
limit the absorbtion of low educated new graduates for whomminimumwages are binding. A third
one is the asymmetry between the flexible EPL for blue collars and a rigid EPL for white collars,
which characterized the Belgian labor market until 2013: in adverse labor market conditions, low
educated new graduates risked to be marginalized, if they had to face the additional competition
of higher educated new graduates, who in turn downgraded because of rigid EPL for white collar
workers - which increased the hiring costs to fill white collar positions. Thus the low educated
experienced serious difficulties to find stable jobs as a consequence of this asymmetry. Note that
this controversial discrimination between blue and white collar workers has been removed since
the beginning of 2014, as a single employment contract has been introduced, stipulating the same
EPL for white and blue collar workers.
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2.7 Appendix A. Description of the Final Sample
In this study we consider almost the same sample as in Cockx and Ghirelli (2014). They consider
3514 individuals (comprising both low and high educated) while we consider 3586 individuals
(see Table 2.3): i.e. we add 72 individuals (2% of the sample), including low educated graduating
in 2002 and high educated graduating in 1995-96. For details in the construction of the control
and outcome variables, see Section A.1, A.2 and A.3 of this dissertation.
Table 2.3: Dividing the Sample in Low and High Educated
education low educated high educated Total
1 2 2
2 36 36
3 89 89
4 113 113
5 185 185
6 1,111 1,111
7 366 289 655
8 55 55
9 707 707
10 367 367
11 232 232
12 33 33
13 1 1
Total 1,902 1,684 3,586
Completed education refers to the number of years of education successfully attained from the beginning of secondary education, i.e.
at age 12. Low educated are those who graduate with at most secondary education, which consists in 7 years of education in case of
vocational track and 6 years for all other educational programs. High educated are those with higher than secondary education.
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Table 2.4: Correspondence Between Low-High Educated and Blue-White Collar Workers
Function Undertaken 6 Years After Graduation†
hline Low educated High educated
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
blue collar 1,193 62.72 62.72 184 10.93 10.93
white collar 390 20.5 83.23 1,193 70.84 81.77
functionary 68 3.58 86.8 105 6.24 88
missing 251 13.2 100 202 12 100
Total 1,902 100 1,684 100
Prevalent Function Undertaken up to 6 Years After Graduation‡
Low educated High educated
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
blue collar 1,346 70.77 70.77 235 13.95 13.95
white collar 401 21.08 91.85 1,337 79.39 93.35
functionary 53 2.79 94.64 36 2.14 95.49
missing 102 5.36 100 76 4.51 100
Total 1,902 100 1,684 100
† It refers to the type of function undertaken at potential experience 6.
‡ It refers to the function that is undertaken more than 50% of the time from graduation up to potential experience 6. 70% (14%) of
low (high) educated are prevalently employed as blue collars. Thus, there is clear correspondence between low (high) educated and
blue (white) collars.
Table 2.5: Number of Individuals by Graduation Year and Province of Residence at Graduation
Low educated
grad_year prov1 prov2 prov3 prov4 prov5 Total
1994 30 9 31 48 25 143
1995 47 22 44 48 48 209
1996 84 45 65 85 38 317
1997 78 41 65 67 36 287
1998 111 46 78 90 61 386
1999 99 42 47 64 47 299
2000 56 18 30 28 31 163
2001 26 8 11 17 18 80
2002 10 3 0 2 3 18
Total 541 234 371 449 307 1902
The analysis considers the graduation period 1994-2002 for the low educated. The combination g2002 & prov3 is excluded since
empty. Provinces are in the following order from 1 to 5: Antwerp, Flemish Brabant, Western Flanders, Eastern Flanders, Limburg.
Each combination of graduation year and province of residence at graduation represents a cluster gp in the main analysis.
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics of Individual Control Variables: Low Educated
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max label
birth cohort76 1902 0.330 0.470 0 1 1 if born in 1976
birth cohort78 1902 0.332 0.471 0 1 1 if born in 1978
birth cohort80 1902 0.338 0.473 0 1 1 if born in 1980
live in single-parent 1902 0.120 0.326 0 1 1 if live with single parent at age17(Dec)
not live with parents 1902 0.064 0.244 0 1 1 if not live with either parents at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 0-11 1902 0.248 0.625 0 7 nr of other HH members aged0-11 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 12-17 1902 0.508 0.689 0 7 nr of other HH members aged12-17 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 18-29 1902 0.521 0.731 0 8 nr of other HH members aged18-29 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 30-64 1902 1.889 0.400 0 5 nr of other HH members aged30-64 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 65+ 1902 0.037 0.211 0 2 nr of other HH members aged65+ at age17(Dec)
father education 1902 4.586 3.201 0 13 father completed education since age12
mother education 1902 4.212 3.062 0 13 mother completed education since age12
years of delay in sec.edu 1902 0.828 0.840 -1 4 years of delay at age17(Aug)
general education 1902 0.110 0.313 0 1 1 if general edu at age17(Aug)
technical education 1902 0.379 0.485 0 1 1 if technical edu at age17(Aug)
vocational education 1902 0.410 0.492 0 1 1 if vocational edu at age17(Aug)
apprenticeship/PT voc. 1902 0.100 0.301 0 1 1 if apprenticeship/PT voc. edu at age17(Aug)
Descriptive statistics are computed on the sample used in the main analysis, in which the dependent variables are measured 6 years
after graduation.
Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics of Outcomes and Endogenous Regressor: Low Educated
Variable Obs§ Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Label
At potential experience 6
log earnings 1902 8.419 3.588 0 10.770 log annual gross earnings from salaried empl.
log hours 1902 6.202 2.669 0 7.725 log annual hours worked in salaried empl.
self-empl. 1902 0.122 0.327 0 1 1 if only pos. earnings from salaried (& not self-empl)
salaried empl. 1902 0.837 0.369 0 1 1 if registered as self-empl.
overall empl. 1902 0.959 0.198 0 1 1 if pos.earnings from salaried or registered as self-empl.
early non-empl. 1902 30.596 29.647 0 100 % hours not worked relative to FT salaried empl.
At potential experience 8
log earnings 1894 8.615 3.461 0 10.943 log annual gross earnings from salaried empl.
log hours 1894 6.311 2.563 0 7.725 log annual hours worked in salaried empl.
self-empl. 1894 0.150 0.357 0 1 1 if only pos. earnings from salaried (& not self-empl)
salaried empl. 1894 0.822 0.383 0 1 1 if registered as self-empl.
overall empl. 1894 0.971 0.166 0 1 1 if pos.earnings from salaried or registered as self-empl.
early non-empl. 1894 30.553 29.634 0 100 % hours not worked relative to FT salaried empl.
Descriptive statistics is based on the sample studied in the main analysis, in which low educated graduate in the period 1994-2002.
The employment indicators are related as follows: salaried+self=overall employment. For continuous outcomes we add value one
before taking the log, so that non-salaried employed at the moment of evaluation are included with outcomes=0 after the logarithmic
transformation.
§ Low educated are observed in both years of potential experience, except for 8 individuals who are observed in the labor market at
potential experience 6 but not 2 years later.
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2.8 Appendix B. Construction of the Endogenous Variable
We define potential experience as a variable counting each calendar year since graduation. Poten-
tial experience 0 corresponds to the year of graduation and runs from the month after graduation
until December of that calendar year; therefore, it potentially lasts less than 12 months (6 months
for a student graduating in June). Potential experience 1 runs from January until December of the
subsequent calendar year, thereby lasting 12 months. Subsequent potential experience years are
defined similarly.
The regressor of interest is the percentage of hours spent in non-employment at potential ex-
perience 0-2, relative to potential total hours if one would work full-time during the whole period.
We express everything in hours because this is the smallest unit of measurement used in the admin-
istrative data (it is used to measure time worked in part-time employment). The reference period
is computed considering the entire calendar year for potential experience 1 and 2, and the part of
the calendar year following the month of graduation for potential experience 0. That is, for one
who graduated in June, the time spent working at potential experience 0-2 is divided by the total
working hours in 30 months of full-time salaried employment. As already mentioned in Section
2.3 of the main text, for simplicity we refer to this reference period as “the first 2.5 years since
graduation”, i.e. the average reference period since most of the sample graduates in June.
Define a as the total hours worked (including self-employment) in the first 2.5 years from
graduation and b the potential total hours if one wold work full-time during the whole period;
then the regressor of interest is computed as 100 ∗ (b − a)/b. Below we explain in detail how its
components are constructed.
1. Construct a according to the following steps.
I. a is mostly based on the total hours worked in salaried employment and the date of reg-
istration and cancellation from the self-employment register from the Data Warehouse.
Since hours worked are not available for self-employment, we assume that the latter
work as much as a full-time salaried worker: i.e., 5 days per week and 8 hours per day
until 2002, and 5 days per week and 7.6 hours per day from 2003 onwards. This is due
to the introduction of a new law in Belgium that changed the daily working hours from
8 to 7.6 from the first of January 2003. Whenever one combines self-employment and
salaried-employment in the same quarter we make the same assumption, so that the
hours worked do not exceed the bounds.
II. The construction of a requires an additional adjustment due to the limited availability
of the administrative data, which cover the period 1998-2010. Since the sample con-
tains 3 birth cohorts (1976, 1978, 1980) and that compulsory education ends at age 18
in Belgium, these data can be used in the following cases (68.5% of the final sample):
all individuals born in 1980, those born in 1978 graduating at least at age 20 and those
born in 1976 graduating at least at age 22. Figure 2.1 summarizes the availability of
the data. To retain in the analysis also students born in 1978 (1976) graduating at age
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18-29 (18-21),57 we exploit the monthly working status from the Sonar database and
impute the values of a following the procedure used for self-employed workers. That
is, for each month in which individuals are working according to Sonar we attribute
the working hours of a full-time salaried worker: i.e. 8 (7.6) working hours per day
until (strictly after) 2002 and 21.6 working days per month (assuming 65 working days
in a quarter gives 21.6 working days per month: 21.6× 3 = 65).
2. Construct b. Recall that it is defined as the potential total hours if one wold work full-time
during the first 2.5 years since graduation. As for a, we consider a full-time working regime
of 5 days per week and 8 (7.6) hours per day until (strictly after) 2002. This gives a total
of 2080 annual working hours until 2002 (8 hours/day × 65 days/quarter × 4 quarter/year)
and 1976 annual working hours from 2003 onwards (7.6 hours/day × 65 days/quarter × 4
quarter/year).
3. The regressor of interest is computed as (b− a)/b ∗ 100 and hence ranges between [0, 100].
In some cases (10% of the final sample) this percentage is negative because of overtime
work. Therefore, it is censored at 0.
1994 1996 1998 2004 2010
C76
C78
C80
year
Data Warehouse
Sonar
Graduation
Figure 2.1: Availability of data for the construction of the main regressor. In 1998 birth cohorts 76, 78 and
80 are aged 22, 20 and 18, respectively. Birth cohort 76 (78) turns age 18 in 1994 (1996).
57These cases correspond to 31.5% of the final sample.
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2.9 Appendix C. LFS - Provincial unemployment rate
graduation period
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
ro
v
in
c
ia
l 
U
R
 (
1
5
-6
4
) 
in
 %
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
year
Antwerp West Flanders
East Flanders Flemish Brabant
Limburg
Based on total population(men & women). Source:Labour Force Survey.
Figure 2.2: Provincial unemployment rates (15-64) for Flanders: graduation period 1994-2004, consider-
ing low and high educated together. For details, see Section A.1.5 of this dissertation.
2.10 Appendix D. Bootstrap Procedure
The basic idea of bootstrap testing is to compare the observed value of some test statistic with the
empirical distribution of B bootstrap test statistics computed on as many pseudo-samples, where
B is the number of bootstrap replications. We use a Wild Restricted Efficient Residual Bootstrap
(WRE Bootstrap) proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (2010). It is the wild version of the Re-
stricted Efficient Residual bootstrap designed for 2SLS by Davidson and MacKinnon (2008). Few
words on the terminology (which will become clearer below): Residual means that the objects
to sample in generating the pseudo-samples are the residuals.58 Wild refers to a procedure that
creates pseudo-samples based on residuals ∗ 1 with probability 0.5 and residuals ∗ (−1) with
probability 0.5, with this assignment at the cluster level. This allows to preserve the intra-cluster
correlation. Efficient means that the first stage of 2SLS is efficiently estimated in case of weak
instruments. Restricted means that the null hypothesis of interest is imposed on the data generat-
ing process (DGP): this enhances efficiency in the procedure. Consider the following system of
equation, which is a simplified version of the 2SLS model of interest:
yigp = βy
0
igp + x
′
iδ + eigp (2.3)
y0igp = πZgp + x
′
iδ + uigp (2.4)
(2.3) is the structural equation where individual labor market outcomes yigp are regressed on early
non-employment y0igp and individual controls (for simplicity we omit the grouped covariates and
58Alternatively, one can sample pairs [y X] of data.
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the time subscripts in (1)), and (2.4) is the first stage regression where the endogenous explanatory
variable is regressed on the grouped instrument Zgp and all exogenous regressors xi. The fact
that the instrument is grouped requires cluster robust standard errors in 2SLS. We are interested
in bootstrapping the t statistic of y0igp, i.e. t(βˆ, β0) =
(βˆ−β0)
se(βˆ)
. Call τˆ the observed value of
this statistic. The bootstrap procedure will generate an empirical distribution of B bootstrap test
statistics τ∗, with B being the number of repetitions, and where these statistics are generated using
the bootstrap DGP which imposes the null hypothesis that is tested. In practice this is implemented
as follows:
1. Estimate the system in (2.3)-(2.4) by 2SLS with cluster robust standard errors and obtain
the statistic τˆ .
2. Estimate the restricted version of (2.3) by OLS imposing the null hypothesis β = 0 (with
conventional standard errors). Predict the residuals e˜igp and the fitted values y˜igp. (Re-
stricted)
3. Estimate (2.4) including e˜igp as additional control, i.e.:y
0
igp = πZgp + x
′
iδ + γe˜igp +
residuals. Compute the residuals u˜igp = residuals + γˆe˜igp. This allows the residuals
of the first stage not to be too small in case of weak instrument (Efficient). Accordingly,
compute the fitted values y˜0igp = πˆZgp + x
′
iδˆ.
4. At the cluster level, multiply the residuals u˜igp and e˜igp by a random variable ν
∗, where
ν∗ = 1 and ν∗ = −1 with probability 1/2, respectively. Note that the same ν∗ is applied to
both residuals: this preserves the correlation across (2.3) and (2.4).59 (Wild)
5. Construct y∗igp = y˜igp + ν
∗e˜igp and y
0∗
igp = y˜
0
igp + ν
∗u˜igp.
6. Estimate (2.3)-(2.4) by 2SLS where yigp is replaced by y
∗
igp and y
0
igp by y
0∗
igp, with cluster
robust standard errors and obtain the t statistics τ∗.
7. Repeat steps 4-6 B times, where B is the number of repetitions, so to get an empirical
distribution of τ∗j for j = 1, ..., B.
8. Calculate the bootstrap P-value as p∗(τˆ) = 2min( 1B
∑B
1 1[τ
∗
j < τˆ ],
1
B
∑B
1 1[τ
∗
j > τˆ ]).
Below we describe the simpler procedure to compute wild bootstrap in the OLS case. In the main
analysis, we apply this to the OLS estimations of the structural equation and to the first stage.
Below we take the first stage as example: we are interested in estimating (2.4) by OLS and then
in bootstrapping the t statistic of the instrument, t(πˆ, π0) =
(πˆ−π0)
se(πˆ) . The procedure is reported
below:
1. Estimate (2.4) by OLS with cluster robust standard errors and obtain the statistics τˆ .
59Here we use the Rademacher weights, which have been shown to work well when the residuals are not too asym-
metric. Other weights can be used.
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2. Re-estimate (2.4) imposing the null hypothesis π = 0 (with conventional standard errors).
Predict the residuals u˜igp and the fitted values y˜
0
igp. (Restricted)
3. At the cluster level, multiply the residuals u˜igp by a random variable ν
∗, where ν∗ = 1 and
ν∗ = −1 with probability 1/2, respectively.
4. Construct y0∗igp = y˜
0
igp + ν
∗u˜igp.
5. Estimate (2.4) by OLS where y0igp is replaced by y
0∗
igp, with cluster robust standard errors
and obtain the t statistics τ∗.
6. Repeat steps 3-5 B times, where B is the number of repetitions, so to get an empirical
distribution of τ∗j for j = 1, ..., B.
7. Calculate the bootstrap P-value as p∗(τˆ) = 2min( 1B
∑B
1 1[τ
∗
j < τˆ ],
1
B
∑B
1 1[τ
∗
j > τˆ ]).
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2.11 Appendix E. Complete Results for the Low Educated
Table 2.8: Complete Estimations on Continuous Outcomes for the Low Educated
second stage on continuous outcomes first stage
Outcomes‡ log earnings log hours worked early non-empl.
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
clustered standard errors: g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UR_grad 5.4615***
(1.6848)
early non-empl. -0.0269*** -0.1002*** -0.0203*** -0.0722***
(0.0040) (0.0291) (0.0029) (0.0207)
UR_pe6 0.4822** 0.4172** 0.3340** 0.2879** 0.3779
(0.1904) (0.1919) (0.1382) (0.1391) (1.6071)
lin_grad_year -0.1588 0.0469 -0.1140 0.0317 3.5329
(0.2945) (0.2995) (0.2133) (0.2190) (2.2946)
lin_grad_year|trend>3 0.9033** 0.6407 0.6680** 0.4821 -4.4281
(0.4002) (0.4242) (0.2914) (0.3108) (2.8479)
lin_grad_year|trend>6 -0.4604* -0.4394 -0.3337* -0.3188 3.9169
(0.2582) (0.2852) (0.1866) (0.2035) (3.1378)
d_province2 -1.3812* -1.2603 -0.9473* -0.8617 3.6574
(0.7107) (0.9544) (0.5039) (0.6678) (8.6769)
d_province3 -2.1752*** -2.9225*** -1.5767*** -2.1058*** -11.7452
(0.6066) (0.9315) (0.4343) (0.6701) (8.9621)
d_province4 0.0841 0.1825 0.0743 0.1439 0.7495
(0.4801) (0.4983) (0.3503) (0.3567) (4.7080)
d_province5 0.8991 0.9211 0.6684 0.6840 -15.1893**
(0.6099) (0.6721) (0.4494) (0.4864) (6.6042)
lin_calend_year_prov2 0.0498 0.0410 0.0349 0.0287 0.0774
(0.1386) (0.1413) (0.1018) (0.1024) (0.9931)
lin_calend_year_prov3 0.0723 0.1638 0.0587 0.1235 2.2624
(0.1136) (0.1441) (0.0810) (0.1039) (1.7325)
lin_calend_year_prov4 -0.0946 -0.1524 -0.0685 -0.1094 -1.0198
(0.1267) (0.1477) (0.0927) (0.1051) (1.2618)
lin_calend_year_prov5 -0.0813 -0.0760 -0.0595 -0.0557 1.8419
(0.1067) (0.1194) (0.0795) (0.0868) (1.1761)
avg_UR_pe3-6 -1.2836*** -1.4348** -0.9654*** -1.0725*** -0.3037
(0.4509) (0.5863) (0.3261) (0.4136) (4.4775)
min_UR_pe0-6 -0.5718 -0.4848 -0.3121 -0.2505 -6.4742
(0.6219) (0.6613) (0.4388) (0.4659) (7.1097)
birth cohort76 0.7043 -0.3299 0.5424 -0.1897 -13.2641***
(0.5632) (0.7686) (0.4125) (0.5581) (3.6802)
birth cohort78 0.4261 -0.0504 0.3190 -0.0183 -5.9156**
(0.3677) (0.4687) (0.2690) (0.3408) (2.5815)
live in single-parent 0.3453 0.7897 0.2736 0.5882 6.1392
(0.4632) (0.5207) (0.3466) (0.3838) (4.1354)
not live with parents 0.4272* 0.5203 0.3483* 0.4142 1.0913
(0.2431) (0.3501) (0.1792) (0.2529) (2.5611)
HH members aged 0-11 -0.0178 0.0845 -0.0478 0.0246 1.3007
(0.1123) (0.1472) (0.0882) (0.1069) (1.1570)
HH members aged 12-17 0.1680 0.1467 0.1262 0.1111 -0.2429
(0.1177) (0.1473) (0.0884) (0.1087) (0.9030)
HH members aged 18-29 0.0112 0.2054 0.0074 0.1449 2.6587**
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Table 2.8 – continued from previous page
Outcomes‡ log earnings log hours worked early non-empl.
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.1164) (0.1561) (0.0869) (0.1133) (1.0291)
HH members aged 30-64 -0.0333 -0.0800 -0.0109 -0.0439 -0.4836
(0.4065) (0.4287) (0.3021) (0.3128) (3.2574)
HH members aged 65+ -0.0680 0.0308 -0.0288 0.0412 1.2468
(0.3639) (0.4196) (0.2683) (0.3078) (3.1042)
father education 0.0011 0.0294 0.0000 0.0200 0.3816
(0.0255) (0.0330) (0.0188) (0.0240) (0.2531)
mother education -0.1053*** -0.0485 -0.0766*** -0.0364 0.7800**
(0.0356) (0.0432) (0.0270) (0.0317) (0.2925)
years of delay in sec.edu -0.0545 0.3485* -0.0424 0.2429 5.4123***
(0.1112) (0.2094) (0.0808) (0.1509) (1.1119)
technical edu 0.4431 -0.4556 0.3576 -0.2787 -11.8663***
(0.3274) (0.4733) (0.2473) (0.3399) (2.9533)
vocational edu 0.4572 -0.3519 0.3683* -0.2045 -10.6291***
(0.2772) (0.4516) (0.2105) (0.3232) (3.3428)
apprenticeship/PT voc -0.1879 -1.1339* -0.1077 -0.7774* -12.5300**
(0.4530) (0.6234) (0.3375) (0.4495) (4.7050)
Constant 15.0563*** 18.1333*** 10.7753*** 12.9534*** 24.5592
(3.7528) (5.2570) (2.6939) (3.7253) (49.3992)
Observations 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902
R-squared 0.0895 -0.2401 0.0895 -0.2090 0.1070
F stat of first step§ 10.51
Exogeneity test P-val† 0.00970 0.0113
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. Columns 1-4 report the results from estimating (2.2) by
OLS (odds columns) and 2SLS (even columns). Column 5 reports OLS results from estimating the first stage. All estimations report
cluster robust standard errors by graduation year g and province of residence at graduation p (G = 44). Column 5 reports the F
statistic of the first stage and even columns report the exogeneity test for early non-employment (y0igpt1 ).
‡ Continuous outcomes are measured at potential experience 6; early non-emp-loyment is measured in the first 2.5 years after
gradaution. For continuous outcomes we add value one before taking the logarithm, so that those who are not salaried employed at
the moment of evaluation are included with outcomes=0 after the logarithmic transformation.
§ This statistic is not corrected for the problem of few clusters. The corrected value resulting from the bootstrap procedure is 9.25
(see table 2.1).
†With clustered standard errors, the exogeneity test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation
where y0t1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
igpt1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that y0igpt1 is
exogenous, the statistic is distributed as χ2(1). This statistic is not corrected for the problem of few clusters.
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Table 2.9: Complete Estimations on Discrete Outcomes for the Low Educated
second stage
Outcomes:‡ salaried empl. self-empl. overall empl.
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
clustered standard errors: g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
early non-empl. -0.00169*** -0.00256 0.00054 0.00248 -0.00115*** -0.00008
(0.00041) (0.00290) (0.00041) (0.00258) (0.00025) (0.00151)
UR_pe6 0.00481 0.00404 0.01081 0.01253 0.01562 0.01657*
(0.02385) (0.02209) (0.01947) (0.01765) (0.01020) (0.00999)
lin_grad_year -0.00253 -0.00009 -0.01367 -0.01911 -0.01621 -0.01920
(0.03120) (0.03028) (0.02544) (0.02343) (0.01397) (0.01340)
lin_grad_year|trend>3 0.02993 0.02680 0.00338 0.01032 0.03331* 0.03712**
(0.04020) (0.04043) (0.03029) (0.02903) (0.01832) (0.01813)
lin_grad_year|trend>6 -0.01720 -0.01695 0.01884 0.01829 0.00164 0.00134
(0.02568) (0.02477) (0.02503) (0.02252) (0.01457) (0.01375)
d_province2 -0.22288** -0.22144** 0.17666* 0.17347** -0.04621 -0.04797
(0.09844) (0.09548) (0.09049) (0.08719) (0.04174) (0.03996)
d_province3 -0.17150*** -0.18038*** 0.13845** 0.15820** -0.03304 -0.02218
(0.06193) (0.06407) (0.06588) (0.06577) (0.03720) (0.04285)
d_province4 -0.11409** -0.11292** 0.10736** 0.10477** -0.00673 -0.00816
(0.04892) (0.04910) (0.04459) (0.04794) (0.02450) (0.02611)
d_province5 0.04132 0.04158 -0.06171 -0.06229 -0.02039 -0.02071
(0.06183) (0.06032) (0.04557) (0.04483) (0.03418) (0.03449)
lin_calend_year_prov2 0.01976 0.01966 -0.01544 -0.01521 0.00432 0.00445
(0.01597) (0.01524) (0.01253) (0.01214) (0.00565) (0.00651)
lin_calend_year_prov3 -0.00496 -0.00387 0.00501 0.00259 0.00005 -0.00128
(0.01207) (0.01140) (0.01565) (0.01376) (0.00716) (0.00690)
lin_calend_year_prov4 0.01299 0.01231 -0.01369 -0.01217 -0.00070 0.00014
(0.01118) (0.01157) (0.00964) (0.01055) (0.00642) (0.00679)
lin_calend_year_prov5 -0.00608 -0.00602 0.01656 0.01642* 0.01048** 0.01041**
(0.01074) (0.01027) (0.01012) (0.00967) (0.00471) (0.00491)
avg_UR_pe3-6 -0.08309** -0.08489** 0.03333 0.03733 -0.04976* -0.04756*
(0.04062) (0.04005) (0.03418) (0.03230) (0.02622) (0.02516)
min_UR_pe0-6 -0.01193 -0.01089 0.00452 0.00222 -0.00741 -0.00867
(0.06247) (0.05970) (0.05849) (0.05672) (0.02769) (0.02854)
birth cohort76 0.00488 -0.00741 0.01471 0.04204 0.01959 0.03462
(0.04397) (0.06402) (0.03588) (0.05434) (0.02535) (0.03517)
birth cohort78 0.02309 0.01743 -0.00086 0.01173 0.02223 0.02916
(0.03666) (0.04407) (0.03059) (0.03645) (0.01745) (0.02152)
live in single-parent -0.00309 0.00220 -0.03561 -0.04736 -0.03870 -0.04516
(0.05525) (0.05471) (0.05233) (0.05472) (0.03217) (0.03371)
not live with parents 0.02521 0.02631 -0.01502 -0.01748 0.01019 0.00883
(0.02900) (0.02995) (0.02753) (0.03031) (0.01581) (0.01592)
HH members aged 0-11 -0.00246 -0.00124 0.00596 0.00325 0.00350 0.00201
(0.01217) (0.01251) (0.01277) (0.01265) (0.00574) (0.00627)
HH members aged 12-17 0.02291* 0.02265* -0.01252 -0.01196 0.01039 0.01070
(0.01185) (0.01173) (0.01041) (0.01069) (0.00709) (0.00683)
HH members aged 18-29 0.00009 0.00240 0.00374 -0.00139 0.00384 0.00101
(0.01152) (0.01355) (0.01034) (0.01150) (0.00604) (0.00688)
HH members aged 30-64 -0.01697 -0.01752 -0.02276 -0.02152 -0.03972 -0.03904
(0.05212) (0.05087) (0.04874) (0.04896) (0.02847) (0.02961)
HH members aged 65+ -0.02001 -0.01884 0.00730 0.00469 -0.01271 -0.01414
(0.04165) (0.04136) (0.03573) (0.03540) (0.02182) (0.02205)
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salaried empl. self-empl. overall empl.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
father education -0.00132 -0.00099 0.00045 -0.00030 -0.00087 -0.00128
(0.00198) (0.00226) (0.00202) (0.00213) (0.00160) (0.00170)
mother education -0.00971*** -0.00904** 0.00937*** 0.00787** -0.00034 -0.00116
(0.00341) (0.00417) (0.00294) (0.00327) (0.00181) (0.00210)
years of delay in sec.edu 0.00440 0.00919 -0.02391** -0.03456* -0.01952*** -0.02537*
(0.01275) (0.02067) (0.01070) (0.01764) (0.00702) (0.01381)
technical edu 0.01038 -0.00031 0.02957 0.05333 0.03995*** 0.05301**
(0.03694) (0.04459) (0.03180) (0.04181) (0.01452) (0.02678)
vocational edu 0.00818 -0.00144 0.03776 0.05914 0.04594*** 0.05770**
(0.03164) (0.04096) (0.02700) (0.04065) (0.01546) (0.02569)
apprenticeship/PT voc -0.06240 -0.07366 0.08533* 0.11033** 0.02292 0.03667
(0.05336) (0.06364) (0.04311) (0.05434) (0.02842) (0.03967)
Constant 1.41749*** 1.45409*** -0.15519 -0.23651 1.26230*** 1.21757***
(0.35242) (0.37325) (0.32471) (0.34533) (0.20910) (0.22952)
Observations 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902
R-squared 0.04170 0.03730 0.03098 0.00332 0.05818 0.03540
Exogeneity test P-val† 0.767 0.438 0.467
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. Columns 1-6 report the results from estimating (2.2) by
OLS (odds columns) and 2SLS (even columns). The first stage regression is reported in Table 2.8 (Column 5). All estimations report
cluster robust standard errors by graduation year g and province of residence at graduation p (G = 44). Even columns report the
exogeneity test for early non-employment (y0igpt1 ).
‡ The discrete outcomes are measured at potential experience 6.
†With clustered standard errors, the exogeneity test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation
where y0t1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
igpt1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that y0igpt1 is
exogenous, the statistic is distributed as χ2(1). This statistic is not corrected for the problem of few clusters.
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2.12 Appendix F. Sensitivity Analysis For the Low Educated
Table 2.10: Effect of Interest for the Low Educated: Graduation Period 1998-2002.
Panel A: Effect of early non-employment in the structural equation:
OLS 2SLS
standard errors† robust cluster g ∗ p robust cluster g ∗ p
Continuous outcomes:‡‡ (1) (2) (3) (4)
log earnings coeff -0.0287*** -0.0287*** -0.1406** -0.1406**
se (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0666) (0.0597)
P-val§ 6.09E-06 0.0273
Bootstrap P-val‡ 0 0.0821
Exogeneity test P-val§§ 0.0306
log hours worked coeff -0.0215*** -0.0215*** -0.1033** -0.1033**
se (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0492) (0.0439)
P-val 3.19E-06 0.0277
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.0781
Exogeneity test P-val 0.0318
Panel B: Effect of the instrument in the first stage : OLS
outcome: standard errors: robust cluster (g*p)
early non-empl.(% hours) coeff 11.9484*** 11.9484***
se (3.4994) (3.4918)
P-val 0.00233
Bootstrap P-val 0.07007
F stat 11.70921
Bootstrap F stat†† 3.60923
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. Panel A reports results from estimating β in (2.2) on
continuous outcomes measured at potential experience 6. β is the effect of one pp increase in y0igpt1 , i.e. the % of hours spent in
non-employment in the first 2.5 years after graduation relative to potential total hours if one would work full-time during the whole
period. For clustered standard errors, we report the P-value and the wild bootstrap P-value. Column 1-2 (3-4) show OLS (2SLS). In
2SLS the provincial unemployment rate at graduation is used as instrument for y0igpt1 . Panel B shows the effect of the instrument on
y0igpt1 in the first stage and the corresponding F statistic.
‡‡ For continuous outcomes we add value one before taking the log, so that non-salaried employed at the moment of evaluation are
included with outcomes=0 after the logarithmic transformation.
† Robust indicates heteroscedastic-robust standard errors; clusters are defined by year g and province of residence at graduation p
(G=24 clusters). § The P-value from clustered standard errors is computed using the t(G− 1) distribution, with G=24 (stars are
reported accordingly).
‡ Bootstrap P-values are computed according to the wild bootstrap procedures explained in Appendix 2.10 for 999 repetitions.
†† Bootstrap F statistic is the F statistic corresponding to the bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument: we rely on the
equivalence between F and t distribution: t2(G− 1) = F (1, G− 1), with G = 24.
§§With clustered standard errors, this test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation where
y0t1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
igpt1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that y0igpt1 is exogenous,
the statistic is distributed as χ2(1).
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Table 2.11: Complete OLS Estimations for the Low Educated: Graduation Period 1994-2002 vs 1998-2002;
Full vs Restricted Specification (excluding some individual controls).
Continuous outcomes‡‡: log earnings log hours worked
g94-02§ g98-02† g94-02 g98-02
full spec.§§ restricted spec.†† full spec. restricted spec.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cluster g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
early non-empl -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.022***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
UR_pe6 0.482** 0.617*** 0.594 0.334** 0.432*** 0.446
(0.190) (0.179) (0.544) (0.138) (0.130) (0.393)
lin_grad_year -0.159 -0.114 0.812* -0.114 -0.082 0.636*
(0.294) (0.284) (0.460) (0.213) (0.205) (0.333)
lin_grad_year|trend>3 0.903** 0.661* -1.032 0.668** 0.492* -0.797
(0.400) (0.360) (0.701) (0.291) (0.260) (0.503)
lin_grad_year|trend>6 -0.460* -0.334*
(0.258) (0.187)
avg_UR_pe3-6 -1.284*** -0.826** -1.879 -0.965*** -0.634** -1.485
(0.451) (0.394) (1.373) (0.326) (0.289) (0.993)
min_UR_pe0-6 -0.572 -0.692 -3.139*** -0.312 -0.398 -2.203**
(0.622) (0.590) (1.118) (0.439) (0.419) (0.791)
d_province2 -1.381* -0.913 -4.627*** -0.947* -0.611 -3.214**
(0.711) (0.704) (1.597) (0.504) (0.503) (1.169)
d_province3 -2.175*** -1.756*** -4.127** -1.577*** -1.275*** -3.026**
(0.607) (0.547) (1.740) (0.434) (0.392) (1.238)
d_province4 0.084 -0.109 -1.617 0.074 -0.069 -1.116
(0.480) (0.456) (1.380) (0.350) (0.333) (0.984)
d_province5 0.899 0.741 1.125 0.668 0.553 0.741
(0.610) (0.609) (1.902) (0.449) (0.451) (1.397)
lin_calend_year_prov2 0.050 0.075 0.126 0.035 0.055 0.064
(0.139) (0.144) (0.307) (0.102) (0.106) (0.228)
lin_calend_year_prov3 0.072 0.147 -0.135 0.059 0.114 -0.106
(0.114) (0.104) (0.137) (0.081) (0.075) (0.094)
lin_calend_year_prov4 -0.095 -0.007 -0.120 -0.069 -0.004 -0.102
(0.127) (0.109) (0.304) (0.093) (0.080) (0.219)
lin_calend_year_prov5 -0.081 -0.102 -0.078 -0.059 -0.075 -0.041
(0.107) (0.107) (0.357) (0.079) (0.080) (0.263)
birth cohort76 0.704 0.813 0.816 0.542 0.622 0.625
(0.563) (0.510) (0.599) (0.412) (0.373) (0.437)
birth cohort78 0.426 0.487 0.471 0.319 0.364 0.353
(0.368) (0.350) (0.353) (0.269) (0.255) (0.256)
HH members aged 0-11 -0.018 0.016 0.005 -0.048 -0.022 -0.028
(0.112) (0.116) (0.136) (0.088) (0.091) (0.103)
father education 0.001 -0.002 -0.017 0.000 -0.003 -0.014
(0.026) (0.025) (0.041) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031)
mother education -0.105*** -0.100*** -0.103** -0.077*** -0.073*** -0.074**
(0.036) (0.035) (0.045) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033)
years of delay in sec.edu -0.055 -0.143 -0.190 -0.042 -0.106 -0.140
(0.111) (0.096) (0.166) (0.081) (0.071) (0.120)
general edu -0.449 -0.161 -0.362 -0.145
(0.299) (0.353) (0.227) (0.266)
live in single-parent 0.345 0.274
(0.463) (0.347)
Continued on next page
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Continuous outcomes‡‡: log earnings log hours worked
g94-02§ g98-02† g94-02 g98-02
full spec.§§ restricted spec.†† full spec. restricted spec.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
not live with parents 0.427* 0.348*
(0.243) (0.179)
HH members aged 12-17 0.168 0.126
(0.118) (0.088)
HH members aged 18-29 0.011 0.007
(0.116) (0.087)
HH members aged 30-64 -0.033 -0.011
(0.406) (0.302)
HH members aged 65+ -0.068 -0.029
(0.364) (0.268)
technical edu 0.443 0.358
(0.327) (0.247)
vocational edu 0.457 0.368*
(0.277) (0.210)
apprenticeship/PT voc -0.188 -0.108
(0.453) (0.337)
Constant 15.056*** 12.907*** 29.988*** 10.775*** 9.279*** 22.077***
(3.753) (3.432) (7.716) (2.694) (2.453) (5.519)
Observations 1,902 1,902 946 1,902 1,902 946
R-squared 0.090 0.084 0.097 0.090 0.084 0.098
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. Columns 1 and 4 estimate (2.2) by OLS considering the
graduation period 1994-2002: they are equivalent to the estimations reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.8. Columns 2 and 5
estimate the restricted specification discussed for the sensitivity exercise in Section 2.5.1, based on the graduation period 1994-2002.
Columns 3 and 6 estimate the same restricted specification on the graduation period 1998-2002, which is used in the second
sensitivity analysis. Standard errors are clustered by graduation year g and province of living at graduation p.
§ graduation period 1994-2002 considered.
† graduation period 1998-2002 considered: for this reason, the third graduation year spline lin_grad_year|trend > 6 is omitted.
‡‡ For continuous outcomes we add value one before taking the log, so that non-salaried employed at the moment of evaluation are
included with outcomes=0 after the logarithmic transformation.
§§ The full specification corresponds to equation (2.2).
†† The restricted specification is the one used in the second sensitivity analysis in Section 2.5.1.
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Table 2.12: Effect of Interest for the Low Educated Excluding URp and minURpt from the Specification.
Panel A: Effect of early non-employment in the structural equation:
OLS 2SLS
standard errors† robust cluster g ∗ p robust cluster g ∗ p
outcomes: (1) (2) (3) (4)
salaried employment coeff -0.00169*** -0.00169*** -0.00199 -0.00199
se (0.00034) (0.00041) (0.00387) (0.00348)
P-val§ 0.00019 0.57020
Bootstrap P-val‡ 0.00000 0.62462
Exogeneity test P-val§§ 0.937 0.931
self-employment coeff 0.00054* 0.00054 0.00219 0.00219
se (0.00030) (0.00041) (0.00340) (0.00313)
P-val 0.19253 0.48668
Bootstrap P-val 0.19219 0.52853
Exogeneity test P-val 0.619 0.587
overall employment coeff -0.00115*** -0.00115*** 0.00020 0.00020
se (0.00021) (0.00025) (0.00229) (0.00164)
P-val 0.00005 0.90232
Bootstrap P-val 0.00000 0.91291
Exogeneity test P-val 0.540 0.386
log earnings coeff -0.0269*** -0.0269*** -0.0947** -0.0947***
se (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0447) (0.0354)
P-val 2.78E-08 0.0105
Bootstrap P-val 0.0000 0.0300
Exogeneity test P-val 0.0796 0.0361
log hours worked coeff -0.0203*** -0.0203*** -0.0666** -0.0666***
se (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0326) (0.0251)
P-val 1.00E-08 0.0111
Bootstrap P-val 0.0000 0.0340
Exogeneity test P-val 0.108 0.0483
Panel B: Effect of the instrument from the first stage (OLS)
outcome‡‡: standard errors: robust cluster (g*p)
early non-empl. coeff 5.0319*** 5.0319***
se (1.6519) (1.7139)
P-val 0.0053
Bootstrap P-val 0.0120
F stat 9.279 8.620
Bootstrap F stat†† 5.84
Continued on next page
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. Panel A reports results from estimating β in (2.2) on
outcomes measured at potential experience 6, excluding URp andminURpt. β is the effect of one pp increase in y0igpt1 , i.e. the %
of hours spent in non-employment in the first 2.5 years after graduation relative to potential total hours if one would work full-time
during the whole period. For clustered standard errors, we report the P-value and the wild bootstrap P-value. Column 1-2 (3-4) show
OLS (2SLS). In 2SLS the provincial unemployment rate at graduation is used as instrument for y0igpt1 . Panel B reports the effect of
the instrument on y0igpt1 in the first stage and the F statistic. For continuous outcomes we add value one before taking the log, so that
non-salaried employed at the moment of evaluation are included with outcomes=0 after the logarithmic transformation.
† Robust indicates heteroscedastic-robust standard errors; clusters are defined by year g and province of residence at graduation p
(G=44 clusters).
§ The P-value from clustered standard errors is computed using the t(G− 1) distribution, with G=44 (stars are reported accordingly).
‡ Bootstrap P-values are computed according to the wild bootstrap procedures explained in Appendix 2.10 for 999 repetitions.
†† Bootstrap F statistic is the F statistic corresponding to the Bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument: we rely on the
equivalence between F and t distribution: with G = 44, t2(G− 1) = F (1, G− 1).
§§With clustered standard errors, this test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation where
y0t1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
igpt1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that y0igpt1 is exogenous,
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the statistic is distributed as χ2(1).
2.13 Appendix G. Reduced Form Estimations for the Low Educated
Table 2.13: Complete Estimations of Reduced Form and First Stage for the Low Educated.
Reduced Form (ITT effects) 1st stage
Outcomes:§§ log earnings log hours worked salaried self overall empl. early non-empl.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
clustered standard errors: g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
UR_grad -0.5475*** -0.3945*** -0.01400 0.01355 -0.00045 5.4615***
(0.1662) (0.1223) (0.01675) (0.01365) (0.00851) (1.6848)
P-val§ 0.00198 0.00239 0.40799 0.32666 0.95777 0.00230
Bootstrap P-val‡ 0.00801 0.00601 0.45646 0.36036 0.96496 0.00400
UR_pe6 0.3793* 0.2606* 0.00307 0.01347 0.01654 0.3779
(0.1898) (0.1390) (0.02343) (0.01867) (0.01025) (1.6071)
lin_grad_year -0.3072 -0.2235 -0.00914 -0.01035 -0.01949 3.5329
(0.3349) (0.2428) (0.03309) (0.02628) (0.01455) (2.2946)
lin_grad_year|trend>3 1.0846** 0.8020** 0.03816 -0.00066 0.03749* -4.4281
(0.4259) (0.3118) (0.04150) (0.02987) (0.01878) (2.8479)
lin_grad_year|trend>6 -0.8321*** -0.6017*** -0.02699 0.02800 0.00101 3.9169
(0.2976) (0.2193) (0.02719) (0.02393) (0.01559) (3.1378)
d_province2 -1.6270* -1.1259* -0.23081** 0.18254* -0.04827 3.6574
(0.8282) (0.5902) (0.10284) (0.09202) (0.04254) (8.6769)
d_province3 -1.7451* -1.2573* -0.15028** 0.12907* -0.02120 -11.7452
(0.8831) (0.6340) (0.06874) (0.06645) (0.03691) (8.9621)
d_province4 0.1073 0.0898 -0.11484** 0.10662** -0.00822 0.7495
(0.5737) (0.4196) (0.05039) (0.04570) (0.02701) (4.7080)
d_province5 2.4438** 1.7812** 0.08051 -0.09996 -0.01945 -15.1893**
(0.9123) (0.6716) (0.09174) (0.07501) (0.03869) (6.6042)
lin_calend_year_prov2 0.0333 0.0231 0.01946 -0.01501 0.00444 0.0774
(0.1463) (0.1076) (0.01658) (0.01269) (0.00669) (0.9931)
lin_calend_year_prov3 -0.0630 -0.0400 -0.00967 0.00821 -0.00147 2.2624
(0.1586) (0.1134) (0.01455) (0.01646) (0.00668) (1.7325)
lin_calend_year_prov4 -0.0502 -0.0358 0.01492 -0.01469 0.00023 -1.0198
(0.1322) (0.0980) (0.01172) (0.00997) (0.00685) (1.2618)
lin_calend_year_prov5 -0.2607* -0.1888* -0.01074 0.02099 0.01025* 1.8419
(0.1436) (0.1064) (0.01490) (0.01350) (0.00532) (1.1761)
avg_UR_pe3-6 -1.4044*** -1.0505*** -0.08411** 0.03657 -0.04753* -0.3037
(0.4377) (0.3218) (0.04124) (0.03380) (0.02560) (4.4775)
min_UR_pe0-6 0.1642 0.2171 0.00570 -0.01383 -0.00813 -6.4742
(0.8643) (0.6086) (0.06138) (0.05224) (0.02860) (7.1097)
birth cohort76 0.9998 0.7684* 0.02659 0.00914 0.03572 -13.2641***
(0.6088) (0.4473) (0.04683) (0.03551) (0.02615) (3.6802)
birth cohort78 0.5426 0.4090 0.03259 -0.00294 0.02965 -5.9156**
(0.4035) (0.2949) (0.03871) (0.03095) (0.01872) (2.5815)
live in single-parent 0.1743 0.1447 -0.01354 -0.03213 -0.04567 6.1392
(0.4770) (0.3578) (0.05554) (0.05226) (0.03403) (4.1354)
not live with parents 0.4109* 0.3354** 0.02352 -0.01477 0.00874 1.0913
(0.2252) (0.1661) (0.02742) (0.02702) (0.01600) (2.5611)
HH members aged 0-11 -0.0459 -0.0693 -0.00457 0.00648 0.00191 1.3007
(0.1194) (0.0950) (0.01213) (0.01265) (0.00581) (1.1570)
HH members aged 12-17 0.1711 0.1287 0.02328** -0.01256 0.01072 -0.2429
Continued on next page
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Table 2.13 – continued from previous page
Reduced Form (ITT effects) 1st stage
Outcomes:§§ log earnings log hours worked salaried self overall empl. early non-empl.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.1152) (0.0866) (0.01143) (0.01027) (0.00697) (0.9030)
HH members aged 18-29 -0.0612 -0.0472 -0.00441 0.00521 0.00079 2.6587**
(0.1209) (0.0904) (0.01253) (0.01090) (0.00622) (1.0291)
HH members aged 30-64 -0.0316 -0.0090 -0.01628 -0.02272 -0.03900 -0.4836
(0.4278) (0.3192) (0.05313) (0.04852) (0.03035) (3.2574)
HH members aged 65+ -0.0942 -0.0489 -0.02203 0.00779 -0.01425 1.2468
(0.3784) (0.2784) (0.04265) (0.03599) (0.02242) (3.1042)
father education -0.0089 -0.0075 -0.00196 0.00065 -0.00132 0.3816
(0.0268) (0.0198) (0.00202) (0.00203) (0.00160) (0.2531)
mother education -0.1267*** -0.0927*** -0.01104*** 0.00981*** -0.00123 0.7800**
(0.0393) (0.0297) (0.00364) (0.00299) (0.00179) (0.2925)
years of delay in sec.edu -0.1941 -0.1481 -0.00468 -0.02114** -0.02582*** 5.4123***
(0.1216) (0.0888) (0.01336) (0.01037) (0.00802) (1.1119)
technical edu 0.7340** 0.5785** 0.03010 0.02389 0.05400*** -11.8663***
(0.3559) (0.2693) (0.03912) (0.03184) (0.01708) (2.9533)
vocational edu 0.7136** 0.5634** 0.02580 0.03278 0.05858*** -10.6291***
(0.3132) (0.2384) (0.03306) (0.02674) (0.01792) (3.3428)
apprenticeship/PT voc 0.1222 0.1277 -0.04154 0.07925* 0.03771 -12.5300**
(0.4961) (0.3700) (0.05738) (0.04296) (0.03086) (4.7050)
Constant 15.6713*** 11.1794*** 1.39113*** -0.17560 1.21553*** 24.5592
(4.5909) (3.3431) (0.38766) (0.33394) (0.22040) (49.3992)
Observations 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902
R-squared 0.0484 0.0469 0.02537 0.02905 0.03172 0.1070
F stat of first step 10.51
Bootstrap F stat† 9.25
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. Column 1-6 report the OLS result from estimating the
reduced form equation of (2.2), i.e. where y0igpt1 is replaced by the unemployment rate at graduation: the coefficients of the
unemployment rate at graduation on the outcomes represent the Intention-To-Treat (ITT) effects. Column 7 reports the first stage
regression, where yiT is replaced by y
0
igpt1
and y0igpt1 is replaced by the unemployment rate at graduation. In all cases, for the
coefficient of the unemployment rate at graduation we report the P-value and the wild bootstrap P-value.
§§ The outcomes of interest (Column 1-5) are measured at potential experience 6. The dependent variable in the first stage (Column
6) is measured in the first 2.5 years after graduation. For continuous outcomes (Column 1-2) we add value one before taking the log,
so that non-salaried employed at the moment of evaluation are included with outcomes=0 after the logarithmic transformation.
§ The P-value from clustered standard errors is computed using the t(G− 1) distribution, with G=44 (stars are reported accordingly).
‡ Bootstrap P-values are computed according to the wild bootstrap procedures explained in Appendix 2.10 for 999 repetitions.
† Bootstrap F statistic is the F statistic corresponding to the Bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument: we rely on the
equivalence between F and t distribution: t2(G− 1) = F (1, G− 1) with G = 44.
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2.14 Appendix H. The Analysis for the High Educated
For the high educated we use the average hourly wages earned in the first 2.5 years since graduation
as endogenous regressor, since the high educated are persistently damaged by adverse labor market
conditions at graduation because they accept lower-paying jobs (see Chapter 1). Accordingly,
early wages should be the relevant channel through which the instrument affects the outcomes of
interest (exclusion restriction). In this case we have to restrict the sample to the graduation period
1998-2004, since we do not observe early wages for those graduating before 1998: this leaves us
with a sample of 35 clusters (7 graduation years times 5 provinces). The size of the clusters is
reported in Table 2.14.
As outcome of interest we use the log of wage at potential experience 6: therefore, the depen-
dent variable is missing for those who were not salaried employed at the time of the evaluation,
as the log-transformation is not defined (13% of the sample). The endogenous regressor instead
is expressed in level; 60 similarly as for the dependent variable, it is missing for individuals who
never earned a wage in the first 2.5 years since graduation (6.5% of the sample). Hence, the es-
timates should be interpreted as semi-elasticities, conditional on being salaried employed both 6
years after graduation and in the early period. Of course, conditional effects may be biased if the
sub-sample of salaried employed is selected: we do not tackle this problem. Descriptive statis-
tics of the individual controls and the endogenous variables are reported in Table 2.15. Note that,
since high educated graduate in the period 1998-2004, the last graduation cohort is followed un-
til potential experience 6. Later than that this sample gets smaller as the last graduation cohorts
progressively drop out from the sample.
For the high educated, we study the long-term effect of early wages on subsequent wages:
therefore, we expect a positive β and the persistence of early wages on subsequent labor market
performances will be considered as evidence of scarring. In this case, we do not expect measure-
ment error since we restrict the sample to the graduation period 1998-2004 and measure early
wage only exploiting administrative data. Ability and returns to job search are positively corre-
lated with both early wages and the outcomes of interest, thereby causing a positive bias. Liquidity
constraints are instead negatively correlated with both early wages and the outcomes of interest,
which also lead to a positive bias. Accordingly, in any case we expect OLS to overestimate β.
As for the low educated, also here we tackle the endogeneity problem of early wages with an
IV approach where the unemployment rate at graduation is used as instrument for the endogenous
regressor. In this case the exclusion restriction imposes that the long-term penalties of graduating
in downturns are uniquely explained by the acceptance of lower-paying jobs early in the career. In
this case, persistence would arise by the accumulation of human capital specific to lower-paying
jobs or by the foregone human capital that one would have accumulated in a higher-paying job. Of
course things can be a bit more blurry if we consider a wider definition of reservation wage which
also includes non-pecuniary dimensions: then, high educated would be forced to accept lower
quality jobs, such as temporary jobs or seasonal jobs, which may entail not only lower wages
60Transforming y0igpt1 as log(y
0
igpt1
) yielded a lower F statistic. Hence, we decided to express y0igpt1 in level.
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but also unemployment spells upon termination of the contract. Under heterogenous effects, the
monotonicity assumption requires that a higher unemployment rate at graduation makes every
high educated person earning a higher (or lower) early wage.
In table 2.16, the bootstrap F statistic of the first stage is 2 which warns against the problem
of weak instrument. For one pp increase in the unemployment rate at graduation, the average
wage in the first 2.5 years since graduation decreases by 0.22 Euros. In case of weak instrument,
the 2SLS is biased towards the OLS. Both OLS and 2SLS estimates show the expected sign: a
higher early wage is associated with better labor market outcomes 6 years after graduation. The
estimate is highly significant for OLS, which in principle could be due to endogeneity or causality.
Unfortunately, in this case our IV approach is not effective to identify the latter.
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Table 2.14: Number of Individuals by graduation year and province of residence at graduation.
High educated
grad_year prov1 prov2 prov3 prov4 prov5 Total
1998 49 29 50 44 17 189
1999 55 54 61 63 37 270
2000 74 66 42 63 31 276
2001 61 39 44 48 33 225
2002 88 53 52 52 32 277
2003 53 35 24 32 26 170
2004 31 19 16 24 13 103
Total 457 319 327 361 220 1684
The analysis considers the graduation period 1998-2004 for the high educated. Provinces are in the following order from 1 to 5:
Antwerp, Flemish Brabant, Western Flanders, Eastern Flanders, Limburg. Each combination of graduation year and province of
residence at graduation represents a cluster gp in the main analysis.
Table 2.15: Descriptive Statistics for the High Educated
Individual Control Variables:
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max label
birth cohort76 1684 0.357 0.479 0 1 1 if born in 1976
birth cohort78 1684 0.328 0.470 0 1 1 if born in 1978
birth cohort80 1684 0.315 0.465 0 1 1 if born in 1980
live in single-parent 1684 0.078 0.268 0 1 1 if live with single parent at age17(Dec)
not live with parents 1684 0.027 0.161 0 1 1 if not live with either parents at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 0-11 1684 0.156 0.427 0 3 nr of other HH members aged0-11 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 12-17 1684 0.573 0.683 0 4 nr of other HH members aged12-17 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 18-29 1684 0.582 0.715 0 4 nr of other HH members aged18-29 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 30-64 1684 1.929 0.298 1 4 nr of other HH members aged30-64 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 65+ 1684 0.030 0.188 0 2 nr of other HH members aged65+ at age17(Dec)
father education 1684 6.935 3.273 0 13 father completed education since age12
mother education 1684 6.322 2.947 0 13 mother completed education since age12
years of delay in sec.edu 1684 0.260 0.539 -1 3 years of delay at age17(Aug)
general education 1684 0.633 0.482 0 1 1 if general edu at age17(Aug)
technical education 1684 0.357 0.479 0 1 1 if technical edu at age17(Aug)
vocational education 1684 0.009 0.094 0 1 1 if vocational edu at age17(Aug)
apprenticeship/PT voc. 1684 0.001 0.024 0 1 1 if apprenticeship/PT voc. edu at age17(Aug)
Endogenous Variables§:
log hourly wage 1280 2.852 0.234 2.174 3.493 log hourly wage in salaried empl.
avg_early_wage 1280 13.566 2.560 8.014 31.375 average hourly wage in salaried empl.
Descriptive statistics are reported for the high educated graduating in the period 1998-2004.
§ “Log hourly wage” is measured at potential experience 6, whereas “avg_early_wage” is measured in the first 2.5 years since
graduation. Both endogenous variables are conditional on being salaried employed at potential experience 6 and in the first 2.5 years
after graduation. Hourly wages are computed as annual earnings divided by the annual hours worked in salaried employed. The
outcome of interest (“Log hourly wage”) is expressed in logarithm whereas the endogenous variable (“avg_early_wage”) is
expressed in level.
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Table 2.16: Complete Estimations on Hourly Wages for the High Educated
second stage first stage
outcomes† log hourly wage avg_early_wage
OLS 2SLS OLS
clustered se g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
(1) (2) (3)
UR_grad -0.2239*
(0.1131)
avg_early_wage 0.0397*** 0.0626
(0.0040) (0.0430)
P-val‡ 1.60E-11 0.1547
Bootstrap P-val§ 0 0.3784
UR_pe6 -0.0096 -0.0061 -0.1125
(0.0106) (0.0105) (0.1264)
lin_grad_year 0.0262 0.0200 0.1559
(0.0166) (0.0216) (0.1757)
lin_grad_year|trend>3 0.0054 -0.0025 0.5491**
(0.0170) (0.0220) (0.2493)
d_province2 -0.0244 0.0135 -1.8109**
(0.0556) (0.0835) (0.7469)
d_province3 0.1924** 0.1816** 0.3435
(0.0890) (0.0902) (0.6809)
d_province4 0.0388 0.0944 -2.1026***
(0.0782) (0.1182) (0.7124)
d_province5 0.0980 0.1026 0.0096
(0.0982) (0.0924) (0.4239)
lin_calend_year_prov2 -0.0069 -0.0091 0.0963
(0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0853)
lin_calend_year_prov3 -0.0387** -0.0335* -0.2369*
(0.0162) (0.0192) (0.1293)
lin_calend_year_prov4 -0.0127 -0.0187 0.2210**
(0.0112) (0.0143) (0.0926)
lin_calend_year_prov5 -0.0113 -0.0106 -0.0520
(0.0129) (0.0118) (0.0559)
avg_UR_pe3-6 -0.0124 -0.0242 0.4844
(0.0306) (0.0357) (0.3852)
min_UR_pe0-6 -0.0570 -0.0285 -1.1750**
(0.0547) (0.0793) (0.4599)
birth cohort76 0.1144*** 0.0790 1.5638***
(0.0301) (0.0724) (0.3043)
birth cohort78 0.0527*** 0.0313 0.9167***
(0.0154) (0.0409) (0.1876)
live in single-parent 0.0091 0.0241 -0.6719
(0.0527) (0.0537) (0.5381)
not live with parents 0.0083 0.0175 -0.4004
(0.0417) (0.0458) (0.2521)
HH members aged 0-11 -0.0031 -0.0032 0.0091
(0.0154) (0.0151) (0.1056)
HH members aged 12-17 0.0030 -0.0003 0.1442
(0.0096) (0.0110) (0.1028)
HH members aged 18-29 0.0080 0.0081 0.0048
(0.0083) (0.0084) (0.1017)
HH members aged 30-64 0.0014 0.0150 -0.6153
(0.0397) (0.0392) (0.5187)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.16 – continued from previous page
second stage first stage
log hourly wage avg_early_wage
OLS 2SLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
HH members aged 65+ 0.0213 0.0257 -0.2119
(0.0288) (0.0293) (0.2499)
father education 0.0060** 0.0055* 0.0231
(0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0234)
mother education -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0014
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0279)
years of delay in sec.edu -0.0412*** -0.0241 -0.7543***
(0.0133) (0.0332) (0.1078)
technical edu -0.0320** -0.0252* -0.2940
(0.0131) (0.0145) (0.1808)
apprenticeship/PT voc -0.1069** -0.1115** 0.2022
(0.0511) (0.0494) (0.5282)
Constant 2.5052*** 2.1346*** 17.3247***
(0.2562) (0.7360) (3.0029)
Observations 1,280 1,280 1,280
R-squared 0.2979 0.2433 0.1244
F stat of first step 3.920
Bootstrap F stat of first step§§ 2.0824
Exogeneity test P-val†† 0.614
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. Columns 1 and 2 report the results from estimating (2.2) by
OLS and 2SLS, respectively; the outcome is measured at potential experience 6. Column 3 reports the first stage regression, where
the dependent variable is measured in the first 2.5 years since graduation. All estimations report cluster robust standard errors by
graduation year g and province of residence at graduation p (G = 35). The sample is restricted to individuals who are salaried
employed 6 years after graduation and in the first 2.5 years after graduation. Hence, the estimation reports conditional effects.
† Hourly wages are computed as annual earnings divided by the annual hours worked in salaried employed. The outcome of interest
is expressed in logarithm whereas the endogenous variable is expressed in level.
‡ The P-value from clustered standard errors is computed using the t(G− 1) distribution, with G=35 (stars of the corresponding
coefficient are reported accordingly).
§ Bootstrap P-values are computed according to the wild bootstrap procedures explained in Appendix 2.10 for 999 repetitions.
§§ Bootstrap F statistic is the F statistic corresponding to the Bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument: we rely on the
equivalence between F and t distribution: t2(G− 1) = F (1, G− 1), with G = 35.
††With clustered standard errors, the exogeneity test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the
equation where y0t1 is treated as endogenous, and one for the equation where y
0
igpt1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that
y0igpt1 is exogenous, the statistic is distributed as χ
2(1). This statistic is not corrected for the problem of few clusters.
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Is it socially efficient to impose job search
requirements on unemployed benefit claimants
with hyperbolic preferences?
Published in the Journal of Public Economics (2014, Volume 113, Pages 80-95)
3.1 Introduction
Long-term unemployment is a major problem, in particular in a number of European labor markets
(OECD, 2011). This pattern comes along with evidence that the unemployed have a very low
search activity (Krueger and Mueller, 2010; Manning, 2011). It is well known that the provision
of Unemployment Insurance (UI) raises moral hazard problems, i.e. the more generous UI, the
lower the search incentives for the unemployed (e.g. Lalive et al., 2006). Many countries impose
job search requirements on benefit recipients to cope with moral hazard in UI (OECD, 2007).
To verify compliance, job search effort is monitored and, in the case of non-compliance, benefit
recipients are sanctioned. However, as any policy addressing moral hazard, monitoring involves an
insurance-efficiency trade-off (Boone et al., 2007; Boone and van Ours, 2006; Cockx et al., 2011).
Restoring incentives comes at the cost of reducing the capacity of UI to adequately insure workers
against the risk of unemployment. Job search monitoring is different from other policy instruments
as it does not directly affect the unemployment benefit (UB) level. However, monitoring increases
job search costs and decreases the average quality of prospective jobs, since rational, forward-
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looking unemployed workers typically reduce their reservation wage in response to the higher job
search requirements. Hence, the expected lifetime utility of the unemployed is negatively affected.
These results apply for individuals with standard exponential time preferences. These individ-
uals discount the future at a constant rate and, hence, behave consistently over time. However, both
laboratory experiments and empirical studies find evidence that procrastination in intertemporal
choices is common (e.g. see Ainslie, 1992; Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989; Thaler and Shefrin,
1981; for a critical review see Frederick et al., 2002). That is, people seem to show self-control
problems whenever they have to commit to a plan entailing present costs and future rewards (or
vice versa). They may keep postponing the costly task over time and end up not achieving the
future rewards, even if it was rationally optimal to reach them. This is evidence of hyperbolic
discounting. Individuals exhibit a high degree of discounting in the short run and a relatively low
degree of discounting in the long run. To cope with this limitation, a new branch of economics
has been investigating intertemporal choices under the assumption of hyperbolic time preferences
(e.g., Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).1
Recently, based on a longitudinal experiment on intertemporal effort choices, Augenblick et al.
(2013) found limited evidence of a present bias in choices over monetary payments. By contrast,
individuals procrastinate substantially in effort choices. Moreover, these individuals are more
likely to choose a commitment device that forces them to complete more effort than they instan-
taneously desire, since they are aware of their present bias and take actions to limit their future
behavior, i.e. they are sophisticated hyperbolic agents. This is consistent with earlier research
by DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) - hereafter referred to as PDV - and Paserman (2008) who
find evidence that hyperbolic preferences are particularly relevant to explain the patterns of job
search behavior observed in the US. Job search effort typically entails immediate costs and de-
layed benefits. Consequently, individuals with hyperbolic preferences are always tempted to delay
job search. Since unemployed workers engage too little in job search, PDV show that they are will-
ing to pay a positive price for a commitment device that forces them to search more intensively
if they are sophisticated hyperbolic agents. Job search monitoring could be such a commitment
device. Based on simulations of an estimated structural job search model on US data, Paserman
(2008) has indeed demonstrated that, if workers are impatient, monitoring job search can improve
their long-run utility by lowering the expected duration of unemployment and raising the expected
wages. In other words, to the extent that monitoring is relatively cheap to implement (Boone et al.,
2007; Cockx et al., 2011), it can unambiguously lower government expenditures and increase so-
cial welfare without facing an insurance-efficiency trade-off. This contrasts with the conclusions
for unemployed people with exponential time preferences.
Empirical evidence does not unambiguously support these positive conclusions with regards
1Researchers have studied the implications of this different behavioral assumption on various economic decisions.
For instance, among others Laibson (1997) and Angeletos et al. (2001) examined saving-consumption decisions, while
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) focused on learning decisions and Fang and Silverman (2009) on labor supply and welfare
participation. Others investigated specific consumption decisions: e.g. Mullainathan and Gruber (2005) focused on
smoking, Fang and Wang (2010) on preventive health care, while DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) studied contract
choices and attendance to health clubs.
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to job search monitoring. Neither does the job finding rate, nor the job quality always increase,
and sometimes the unemployed rather exit to inactivity. For instance, Klepinger (1998), McVicar
(2008) and Cockx and Dejemeppe (2012b) find that monitoring enhances the job finding rate. By
contrast, Ashenfelter et al. (2005) find that tighter search requirements have insignificant effects
on transitions to employment, and Klepinger et al. (2002) even find negative effects. In addition,
Petrongolo (2009) reports negative impacts on the job quality (mainly earnings and employment
duration) and, together with Manning (2009), she reports evidence that tighter search requirements
lead to abandoning the UB claimant status.
In this paper, we show that these ambiguous findings on the effectiveness of job search moni-
toring need not be incompatible if the unemployed behave as agents with hyperbolic time prefer-
ences. This is because the decision to comply with the imposed job requirements does not depend
on the long-run utility of these agents, but rather on the short-run utility of the current self for
whom the benefits of enhanced search are shown to be smaller. Consequently, even if job search
requirements are set at a sub-optimal, i.e. too low, level from the perspective of the future selves,
unemployed procrastinators may nevertheless stop complying because the search requirements are
too demanding from their perspective. Hence, it is shown that increasing job search requirements
to a level that is optimal from the perspective of the future selves or from the perspective of soci-
ety may after all still lead to a sub-optimal level of search effort and a long-run utility that is even
lower than it was in the absence of job search requirements. Furthermore, we show that imper-
fections in the monitoring technology induced by caseworker discretion or by measurement error
reinforce this problem.
The policy implication of this analysis is that job search monitoring may improve social wel-
fare unambiguously only if the job search requirements are not set at too high a level. Moreover,
it is shown that if, as a consequence of measurement error, benefit claimants always face a strictly
positive sanction probability, job search monitoring may not be socially efficient. This means that
other policies, such as job search assistance, may be more efficient socially than a system impos-
ing job search requirements on hyperbolic unemployed benefit claimants. In the end, determining
whether this is the case is an empirical matter.
The model extends the basic partial equilibrium job search model (Mortensen, 1986) in three
directions. First, we introduce hyperbolic discounting as in PDV. We consider agents with sophis-
ticated hyperbolic preferences. The case of agents with naive preferences is relegated to the Sup-
plementary Appendix in Chapter B. Second, we include a perfect job search monitoring scheme in
this model, in a very similar way to what Manning (2009) and Petrongolo (2009) do for individuals
with exponential preferences. Finally, we allow for imperfections in the monitoring technology
by allowing, first, caseworkers to have some discretion regarding whom they sanction and, sec-
ond, search effort to be measured with error (see e.g. Boone et al., 2007; Cockx et al., 2011).
We contribute to the literature on hyperbolic discounting by developing a graphical exposition of
the impact of hyperbolic preferences on the choice of job search effort and the reservation wage.
This graphical exposition contributes to a better intuitive understanding of the main results of this
paper.
Chapter 3 106
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the basic model. In this
model, the monitoring technology is assumed to be perfect. We describe the assumptions and no-
tations, the optimization problem of the sophisticated agent and present the first-order conditions
of the solution. We devote a separate section to the graphical analysis of the solution. In Section
3.4, we discuss why raising the job search effort of benefit recipients with hyperbolic preferences
can be socially efficient and how non-compliance affects this property. In Section 3.5, we gener-
alize the model by incorporating an imperfect monitoring technology. First, we consider the case
in which the caseworker has discretionary power as to whether a non-complying benefit claimant
should be sanctioned or not. Second, we allow job search effort to be measured with error. In
Section 3.6, we briefly contrast monitoring search with job search assistance. A final section con-
cludes. All propositions are proved in the Appendix to this paper, while the case of a naive agent
is treated, as mentioned, in the Supplementary Appendix (see Chapter B).
3.2 The Basic Model
3.2.1 Assumptions and Notations
We develop a partial equilibrium job search model under hyperbolic preferences in a stationary
discrete-time setting. Infinitely-lived unemployed workers choose their reservation wage x and a
scalar search-effort intensity σ to maximize their expected discounted lifetime utility. We denote
c(σ) the cost of effort and make the standard assumptions that c(0) = 0, c′(σ) > 0 and c′′(σ) > 0.
Unemployed workers are entitled to a flat unemployment benefit (UB) with no time limit. The total
income while unemployed, yb > 0, is equal to the UB plus any other external income (e.g. income
from a partner). The payment of the UB is conditional on a search requirement σ¯ > 0. In our
stylized benchmark representation, we assume that monitoring is perfect, meaning that job search
effort is observed with perfect precision and that, if search effort falls below the requirement σ¯, a
sanction is imposed with probability one. This stylized representation of a monitoring scheme has
also been adopted by other researchers (Manning, 2009; Petrongolo, 2009, e.g.). In Section 3.5, we
study the consequences of measurement error in the monitoring technology. If the benefit claimant
does not comply with the search requirement, the UB is withdrawn permanently. The exogenous
income of sanctioned individuals is their external income plus, depending on the institutional
context, income provided by charities and/or a (means-tested) assistance benefit. The exogenous
income of sanctioned individuals is denoted yz , with by assumption yz < yb. The job search of
sanctioned individuals is no longer monitored and is therefore chosen freely. As is standard in
the job search literature, we assume risk-neutral agents2 and a separable instantaneous utility in
income and search effort yu − c(σ) for u ∈ {b, z}.
In each period, job offers arrive with a probability λ(σ) > 0 increasing with job search effort.
We assume that λ(0) = 0, λ′(σ) > 0 and λ′′(σ) ≤ 0. The net wage associated with a job
2(Cockx et al., 2013) show that the setting and its predictions can be generalized to the case of risk-averse individu-
als.
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offer is randomly drawn from an exogenous cumulative wage offer distribution F (w) defined
on [w, w¯] ∈ R+. The disutility of the effort in employment is normalized to zero, so that the
instantaneous net utility in employment is the net wage w. Employed individuals are laid off with
an exogenous probability q ∈ (0, 1).
The timing within a period is as follows. First, search effort is chosen by the insured un-
employed. Under perfect monitoring, the unemployed then know for sure whether they will be
sanctioned or not. Next, a job offer may arrive. If an offer arrives and is accepted, the employment
spell starts at the beginning of the next period and the job search effort for the current period is
not monitored. If instead the offer is rejected or no offer is received, the monitoring takes place.
If search effort is too low, the sanction applies instantaneously, meaning that the income is yz in
the current period.3 The income yb instead accrues to the unemployed whose search efforts are
deemed sufficient and to the job seekers who have found a job.
In order to capture hyperbolic preferences, we need to distinguish between the lifetime utility
of the unemployed current self (referred to by superscript c) and the lifetime utility of the unem-
ployed and employed future selves viewed from the perspective of the current self (referred to
by superscript f ). The discount factor from the current period to the next one is βδ, while the
discount factor between two successive future periods is δ ≤ 1, with 0 < βδ ≤ δ ≤ 1. In the case
of an agent discounting at an exponential rate, β = 1. For a procrastinator, β < 1. We consider
a homogenous population, but let β take any value in [0, 1].4 For any level of search effort σ, the
Bellman equation defining the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed current self (or short-run
utility) and the expected lifetime utility of the unemployed future selves (or long-run utility) Uf
verifies:
W
(
σ, Uf | yu, βδ
)
≡ yu − c(σ) + βδ
{
λ(σ)EF
{
max
(
V f , Uf
)}
+ (1− λ(σ))Uf
}
(3.1)
The current net income, yu−c(σ), depends on whether the agent complies with the requirement σ¯
(yu = yb) or not (yu = yz). With probability λ(σ), a job offer is received. If it is accepted, at the
beginning of the subsequent period a job spell starts yielding the long-run utility V f . Otherwise,
the unemployment spell continues. The second term on the right-hand side of (3.1) measures the
discounted expected lifetime utility in the subsequent period. EF designates the expectation over
the wage offer distribution F (.). This second term depends on whether the current self complied
or not. If the current self did not comply, the continuation value in unemployment Uf is denoted
Zf . If the current self did comply, then she believes that she will comply in the next period as
well, so that the continuation value Uf is denotedBf . This is because the agents act in a stationary
environment. Moreover, sophisticated agents are aware that their future selves are impatient and
will set their search effort to the same level as the current self.
3(Cockx et al., 2013) develop the analysis under the alternative assumption that the UB is only withdrawn from the
period after detection. The assumption made here simplifies the exposition.
4In reality, people have different propensities to procrastinate and labor market policies can hardly discriminate
between them. This makes their design complex.
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3.2.2 The Optimization Problem
We first consider the optimization problem of the current self as a function of the continuation
payoffs of the future selves. Subsequently, we state the optimization problems of the future selves.
An unemployed worker maximizes her expected lifetime utility with respect to three choices in the
following order: (i) the decision to comply or not with the search requirement σ¯; (ii) the job search
intensity σ to set; and (iii) to accept or not, if a job is offered. These choices involve very different
intertemporal trade-offs. Both the decision to comply and the choice of the search intensity induce
an instantaneous increase in search costs that should be balanced out by the expected future benefit
stream to which one remains entitled by not being sanctioned. Accepting a job or continuing the
search does not impose immediate costs or generate immediate benefits, but it affects the stream
of benefits and costs during the future working life. This means that the first and the second
choice involve a comparison between short- and long-term pay-offs, whereas the last one consists
in trading off long-term utility streams only. Short-term impatience β matters for the first two
decisions, but not for the last one. This difference has important implications for the optimal
behavior of impatient agents.
The aforementioned choice problem can be formalized by the following optimization problem.
Bc(σ¯) = max
σ≥σ¯
W
(
σ,Bf (σ¯) | yb, βδ
)
(3.2)
Zc = max
σ
W
(
σ, Zf | yz, βδ
)
(3.3)
Ωc = max {Bc(σ¯), Zc} (3.4)
Bc(σ¯) (resp., Bf (σ¯)) denotes the optimal short-run (resp., long-run) utility of an unemployed
agent who complies with the job search requirement. In what follows, we will write Bi instead
of Bi(σ¯) (i ∈ {c, f}), except if we explicitly consider the case in which the search requirement
is binding. Zc (resp., Zf ) is the optimal short-run (resp., long-run) utility of a non-complying
(sanctioned) unemployed agent.5 The unemployed worker will comply or not, depending on what
yields the highest short-run utility: Ωc = max {Bc, Zc}. Note that the latter decision clearly
depends on the value of the short-term discount factor β.
The optimization problem of the current self is a function of the continuation payoffs of the
future selves. Since the intertemporal values of the future selves are viewed from the perspective of
the current self, they are all discounted by a factor δ instead of βδ. Consequently, the intertemporal
value in employment, V f , verifies:
V f = w + δ
[
(1− q)V f + qUf
]
(3.5)
from which it is clear that V f varies with the wage but also with Uf ∈ {Bf , Zf}. The expected
lifetime utility of being employed is equal to the wage plus the discounted benefit of the contin-
uation payoff in the next period. With probability 1 − q the agent remains employed, whereas
5Notice that under perfect monitoring, a non-complying agent behaves in the same way as a a sanctioned individual.
Under imperfect monitoring, this will no longer be the case.
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with probability q she is laid off. In the case of a layoff, we assume that, if the individual was
never sanctioned in the past, the eligibility to the UB is restored irrespectively of the length of the
employment spell.6 By contrast, we assume that a dismissed worker is not entitled to the UB if the
individual did not comply with the search requirements and was sanctioned in the past. In other
words, we ignore the “entitlement effect”. We make this assumption, since it is not essential and
simplifies the derivations. Note that these assumptions are implicit in the continuation payoff in
the case of a layoff in (3.5), i.e. Uf = Bf in the first case and Uf = Zf in the second one.
Turning to the intertemporal value of the unemployed future selves, sophisticated agents are
aware that they will procrastinate in the future and set their search effort like their current selves.
So,
Uf = W
(
σu, U
f | yu, δ
)
(3.6)
where for Uf = Bf and yu = yb (resp., U
f = Zf and yu = yz) σu = σb (resp., σu = σz) denotes
the optimal search effort solving (3.2) (resp., (3.3)).
3.2.3 The First-Order Conditions of the Optimization Problem
The acceptance and search effort decisions are now characterized by first-order conditions. Next,
we combine these conditions with the compliance decision to characterize the behavior of unem-
ployed workers.
Using (3.5), we can write
V f − Uf =
w − (1− δ)Uf
1− δ(1− q)
, Uf ∈ {Bf , Zf} (3.7)
As the right-hand side is strictly increasing in w, the indifference condition V f − Uf = 0 defines
a unique reservation wage xu (u ∈ {b, z})
xu = (1− δ)U
f , Uf ∈ {Bf , Zf} (3.8)
Any job offer above (resp., below) xu is accepted (resp., rejected). Using this reservation wage
property, we can rewriteW
(
σ, Uf | yu, βδ
)
as follows (see Appendix 3.8):
W
(
σ, Uf | yu, βδ
)
= yu − c(σ) + βδ
{
λ(σ)
1− δ(1− q)
Q
(
(1− δ)Uf
)
+ Uf
}
(3.9)
where
Q
(
(1− δ)Uf
)
≡
∫ w¯
(1−δ)Uf
[
w − (1− δ)Uf
]
dF (w) (3.10)
with Q′(x) = −F¯ (x) < 0: if a job is found, the expected wage gain Q declines with the
reservation wage. Inserting (3.9) with β = 1 in (3.6), the first-order condition (3.8) becomes:
yu +
δλ (σu)
1− δ(1− q)
Q (xu) = c (σu) + xu, u ∈ {b, z} (3.11)
6This is a simplifying assumption, as in reality the entitlement to the UB usually depends on the past record of
insurance contributions while employed. However, our assumption is not too restrictive: Paserman (2008) shows that
the findings do not crucially depend on this assumption.
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The left-hand side of (B.1) is equal to the benefit of continuing search for one more period rather
than accepting a job offer at the reservation wage. This benefit is the instantaneous income in
unemployment yu plus the expected discounted wage gain in the case of continued search. This
sum is equal to the cost of continued search on the right-hand side, i.e. the direct cost of job search
plus the foregone income due to rejecting a job offer at the reservation wage.
Inserting (3.9) in (3.2) and (3.3), and differentiating with respect to σ, yields the first-order
condition of job search effort:
βδλ′ (σu)
1− δ(1− q)
Q (xu) + µu = c
′ (σu) and µu (σu − σ¯) = 0, u ∈ {b, z} (3.12)
where µb ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraint σ ≥ σ¯ in (3.2)
and where µz = 0, since the constraint σ ≥ σ¯ is absent in (3.3). Equation (B.2) states that
the marginal benefit of search should equal its marginal cost, unless the constraint is binding. In
the latter case, σb = σ¯ and the marginal cost of search exceeds the marginal benefit. The agent
would then like to decrease search effort, but cannot, since she would then violate the job search
requirement.
3.3 A Graphical Representation of the Solution
In the previous subsection, we characterized the solution of the optimization problem by the first-
order conditions of the reservation wage and the job search effort chosen by agents with hyperbolic
time preferences. Here, we discuss the properties of this solution. We describe in particular how
the differential discounting of the future affects the solution.
The graphical characterization introduced below fosters a more intuitive understanding of the
results proven by PDV. In addition, it helps to explain how the solution changes as job search
requirements are imposed through a monitoring scheme, a complication ignored in the analysis
of PDV. More specifically, it clearly explains the point at which agents stop complying with the
search requirement and illustrates how this point is affected by the time preferences of the agents.
It will be shown that, as for the decision regarding job search intensity, the decision to comply or
not involves a conflict between the current and future selves.
We define the implicit function R (σ, x | yu) = 0 (resp., S (σ, x | β) = 0) to represent first-
order condition (B.1) (resp., (B.2) when µ = 0) in a (σ, x)-space:
R (σ, x | yu) ≡ yu +
δλ(σ)
1− δ(1− q)
Q(x)− c(σ)− x = 0, (3.13)
S (σ, x | β) ≡
βδλ′(σ)
1− δ(1− q)
Q(x)− c′(σ) = 0 (3.14)
We assume that this system of equations admits an interior solution (σu, xu) ∈ R
+
0 × R
+
0 .
7 The
decision to comply or not to the job search requirements only shifts the first-order condition of the
7Theorem 1 of PDV shows that the solution is unique. Cockx et al. (2013) generalize the proof to the case of
risk-averse agents.
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reservation wage (3.13). If the unemployed worker complies, Uf = Bf and yu = yb. If she does
not comply, Uf = Zf and yu = yz . S (σ, x | β) is not directly affected by the level of yu. It is
also easily seen that β only plays a direct role in the condition (3.14) characterizing search effort.
Let x = r(σ | yu) and x = s(σ | β) denote the explicit relationship between the reservation
wage and search effort described by the implicit equations R (σ, x | yu) = 0 and S (σ, x | β) = 0.
Proposition 1 shows that s(σ | β) is always decreasing in σ. Since the job arrival rate displays
decreasing returns and the job search effort increasing marginal costs, the net marginal return to
job search effort is a decreasing function of σ for any given reservation wage x. Consequently, in
order to compensate for this lower return, the reservation wage should be lowered, because this
increases the expected wage gain if a job is found (Q′(x) < 0), and thereby ensures that the net
marginal benefit of job search does not fall, i.e. that S (σ, x | β) = 0. The costlier the job search,
the steeper the x = s(σ | β) curve.
Proposition 1 also demonstrates that r(σ | yu) is increasing (decreasing) in σ for all σ smaller
(greater) than the optimal job search effort σeu of an exponential agent verifying the system (3.13)-
(3.14) for β = 1. This property means that the reservation wage and, hence, by (3.8), the long-run
utility are maximized if job search effort is set to the optimal level for an exponential agent. This
makes sense, since only the long-run discount factor δ matters for setting the reservation wage.
The x = r(σ | yu) relationship is therefore hump-shaped and reaches a maximum where it crosses
the x = s(σ | 1) curve.
Proposition 1. The relationship x = s(σ | β) implicitly defined by (3.14) is downward sloping.
A rise in β shifts this relationship upwards in the (σ, x) space. The relationship x = r(σ | yu)
implicitly defined by (3.13) reaches a maximum when it crosses the x = s(σ | 1) curve, i.e. at the
level of search optimally chosen by an exponential agent. A rise in yu shifts the humped-shaped
curve x = r(σ | β) upwards.
Proof. See Appendix 3.9.
Before considering the sophisticated procrastinator, let us briefly consider the exponential
agent. If the job search requirement σ¯ is not binding, the interior solution (σeb , x
e
b) can be found by
solving the first-order conditions (3.13) and (3.14) in which β = 1 and yu = yb. Graphically, this
corresponds to the intersection of the curves r(σ | yb) and s(σ | 1) at point A in Figure 3.1. Note
that, in line with Proposition 1, this intersection occurs at the maximum of r(σ | yb). Assume now
that the job search requirement starts to be binding and the agent complies. Search effort equals
σ¯ > σeb and the first-order condition with respect to search is no longer satisfied. So, the solution
is now characterized by the pair (σ¯, r(σ¯ | yb)), i.e. one moves along the curve r(σ | yb) to the
right of A. By (3.8), the reservation wage r(σ¯ | yb) is proportional to the intertemporal utility
level. So, by moving to the right of A, the lifetime utility of the complier shrinks. The agent will
stop complying as soon as the search requirement σ¯ is set so high that her expected utility falls
below the level she would obtain if she were sanctioned. Since the optimal solution for a sanc-
tioned exponential agent (σez, x
e
z) is located at the intersection of the curves r(σ | yz) and s(σ | 1),
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i.e. at point C in Figure 3.1, the maximum search requirement with which the exponential agent
complies is denoted σ¯e (point F) and is formally defined by the following equality:
r(σ¯e | yb) = r(σ
e
z | yz) (3.15)
Beyond σ¯e, the exponential unemployed agent withdraws from the register of claimants preferring
to devote a lower level of search effort σez .
Turning to the sophisticated procrastinator, let us first consider an agent for whom the job
search requirement σ¯ is not binding. The interior solution (σb, xb) solves the first-order conditions
(3.13) and (3.14) for β < 1 and yu = yb. Graphically, this corresponds to the intersection of
the curves r(σ | yb) and s(σ | β < 1) at point O in Figure 3.1. As expected and already shown
by PDV, a hyperbolic agent searches less intensively than an exponential one. Since she is aware
that she will also procrastinate in the future, her reservation wage is also lower than that of an
exponential agent. Following a similar reasoning, we find that the sophisticated agent who does
not comply chooses (σz, xz) at point L in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: The Solution for the Exponential Agent and the Sophisticated Hyperbolic Agent in the Case of
Perfect Monitoring. x = reservation wage; σ = search effort.
As the job search requirement σ¯ is raised above σb, it starts to t be binding. A sophisticated
agent knows that she has a self-control problem. So, her long-run utility (and hence her reser-
vation wage) strictly increases with the requirement up to xeb (at point A) and strictly decreases
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afterwards. However, the decision to comply depends on short-run utility. From (3.1), (3.2) and
(3.6), it should be clear that in Figure 3.1 the short-run utility Bc(σ¯) lies below Bf (σ¯) for any
σ¯. When the search requirement is binding (σ¯ ≥ σb), it should also be understood that B
c(σ¯)
(resp., Bf (σ¯)) are equal toW
(
σ¯, Bf (σ¯) | yu, βδ
)
(resp.,W
(
σ¯, Bf (σ¯) | yu, δ
)
). Similarly to the
long-run, the short-run utility, Bc(σ¯), also initially increases with the requirement starting from
σb, because it increases in the long-run utility and because σb is optimally chosen from the per-
spective of the current self, so that close to the right of σb the marginal cost of search is only
slightly higher than the marginal benefit. However, as the search requirement is raised further and
approaches the optimal level σeb of the exponential agent, the net marginal cost of search increases
at an increasing rate, while the expected utility of the future selves decreases at a decreasing rate.
Proposition 2 below formally shows that the short-run utility attains a maximum strictly between
σb and σ
e
b . The inverse U-shaped curve in Figure 3.1 with a maximum at G (whose abscissa is σ
∗)
represents the short-run utility.
The unemployed agent complies with the search requirement as long as her short-run utility
does not fall below that of the non-complying current self. The maximum search requirement σ¯s
beyond which the unemployed stops complying is the abscissa of point M, defined by the equality
Bc(σ¯s) = Zc, i.e. by using (3.2), (3.8) and (3.9):
yb − c(σ¯
s) + βδ
{
λ(σ¯s)
1− δ(1− q)
Q [r(σ¯s | yb)] +
r(σ¯s | yb)
1− δ
}
= Zc, (3.16)
where Zc has been characterized by (3.3) and is obviously lower than Zf in Figure 3.1. The
level of σ¯s above which a sophisticated agent stops complying depends on functional forms and
parameter configurations. However, we can bracket the threshold σ¯s (see the proof of Proposition
2). First, it can be checked that Bc(σz) > Z
c. For, yb > yz and r(σz | yb) > r(σz | yz).
Therefore, we are sure that σ¯s > σz . Second, let σ˜ verify B
c(σ˜) = Bc, i.e. the equality between
the short-run utility levels of the constrained and the unconstrained agent (σ˜ is the abscissa of point
I in Figure 3.1; σ˜ > σb). As the unemployed agent freely chooses search effort σb, because of the
inverse U-shaped profile of Bc(σ¯), it should be clear that any search effort requirement between
σb and σ˜ cannot induce the unemployed agent to withdraw from the register.
8 Third, let σ¯smax
verify Bf (σ¯smax) = Z
f , i.e. it is the highest acceptable search requirement if the current self is as
patient as the future ones (σ¯smax is the abscissa of point J in Figure 3.1; σ¯
s
max > σb). In sum,
σ¯s ∈ (max {σz, σ˜} , σ¯
s
max), (3.17)
which implies that a rise in the search requirement eventually leads to a drop in search effort when
the benefit claimant stops complying and is sanctioned (since σz < σ¯
s). The following proposition
summarizes these results:
Proposition 2. When the search requirement starts to be binding, the sophisticated hyperbolic un-
employed agent first complies because by doing so she increases her short-run utility. Raising the
8In Figure 1 σ˜ > σz , but note that we cannot generally exclude that σ˜ < σz .
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search requirement further eventually leads to a decline in her short-run utility. The unemployed
agent stops complying when the search requirement reaches a level σ¯s which is above the max-
imum of two search intensities: free choice if she stops complying (σz), and the search intensity
yielding the same short-run utility as in the absence of any search requirement (σ˜). The require-
ment σ¯s must always be lower than the highest acceptable one if the current self is as patient as
the future selves (σ¯smax). Any further increase above σ¯
s induces search effort to discretely fall to
the level σz .
Proof. See Appendix 3.10.
3.4 Can Monitoring the Search Effort Be Socially Efficient?
In the previous section we have shown that, although job-seekers with time-consistent preferences
always loose if binding job search requirements are imposed, the lifetime utility of both the current
and future selves of unemployed benefit claimants with sophisticated hyperbolic preferences may
increase together with the search requirement. For the current self, this occurs up to point G
in Figure 3.1 and for the future selves up to point A. PDV were the first to demonstrate this. In
addition, they have shown that the increase in lifetime utility can go hand in hand with a higher job
finding rate. Indeed, they have shown that, under mild conditions on the wage offer distribution,
the direct positive effect on the exit rate to employment of the enhanced job search effort induced
by a stricter search requirement dominates the indirect negative effect of the higher reservation
wage induced by this more intensive search.9 This finding suggests that imposing job requirements
on impatient unemployed job seekers may be Pareto improving, since it simultaneously raises the
welfare of the unemployed and the employed, who need to contribute less to finance the UI if the
unemployed find jobs more rapidly. Based on simulations, Paserman (2008) indeed shows that job
search monitoring can simultaneously improve workers’ long-run utility, reduce unemployment
duration, and lower government expenditures.
Since the cost of monitoring is negligible relative to the cost of the UI (e.g. Boone et al., 2007;
Cockx et al., 2011), this suggests that it is socially efficient to impose job search requirements
on hyperbolic unemployed benefit claimants. This view can, however, be challenged. First, our
analysis shows that the lifetime utility of the current self stops increasing at lower levels of search
effort and, hence, at lower levels of savings on UB payments, than that of the future selves. In
Figure 3.1, the Pareto-efficient range of search requirements from the perspective of the current
self lies between σ∗ and σ˜ (on the line segment between G and I), to the left of the corresponding
frontier for the future selves, between the abscissas of points A and H. Point H is defined by the
level of search requirement at which the long-run utility of a complying individual is equal to that
of a benefit recipient on whom no requirement has been imposed. Moreover, in the Supplementary
Appendix (Chapter B) we show that, identically to an agent with exponential preferences, the
9Cockx et al. (2013) have shown that this result applies for an even wider range of wage offer distributions than
those considered by PDV and that it also remains valid if job seekers are risk averse.
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current self of a naive procrastinator incurs a welfare loss as soon as the search requirement is set
above the optimal freely chosen level. Based on a Pareto efficiency criterion that requires that the
welfare of all period selves be raised, the social efficiency gains are therefore much reduced or
even nonexistent if hyperbolic job seekers have naive instead of sophisticated time preferences.
However, referring to Akerlof (1991)’s view on procrastination, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)
argue that the aforementioned welfare criterion is too strong for welfare analysis. This is because
the preferences of the current self are biased. The current self faces a self-control problem and, if
she is naive, a misperception problem in addition (Gruber and Köszegi, 2000, 2001). The prefer-
ences of the sophisticated future selves are, by contrast, not biased. The authors therefore claim
that the preferences of the future sophisticated selves are more appropriate to base a welfare anal-
ysis on. This view is confirmed by Noor (2011), who argues that normative judgments cannot be
based on revealed preferences but instead on what he calls normative preferences, that is, prefer-
ences which reflect the choices the individual thinks she should make. Consequently, according
to this view, irrespectively of whether the hyperbolic job seeker is naive or sophisticated, Pareto
efficiency should only be considered from the perspective of the future selves, so that this first
criticism on the social efficiency of the imposition of search requirements is not relevant from a
welfare analysis point of view.
Even if the current self is not relevant to base a welfare analysis on, the behavior of job seekers
is, nevertheless, determined by the current self. Our analysis in the previous section demonstrates
in particular that it is the current self who decides whether or not to comply with the imposed
job search requirement. We have shown that imposing too high a search requirement may induce
unemployed benefit claimants to stop complying before the Pareto-efficient frontier AH in Figure
3.1 is attained, and that in the case of non-compliance, job search effort is reduced and the utility
decreases, because a sanction is imposed. In Proposition 2 we have, nevertheless, shown that the
maximum search requirement with which the exponential agent complies σ¯e is lower than σ¯smax.
Hence, benefit claimants do not necessarily stop complying before the socially efficient range is
reached. This depends on preferences and the search technology, i.e. the cost of search and the
job arrival function. This result analytically confirms the findings of a simulation that Paserman
(2008) conducted, based on his estimation results of a structural job search model in which job
seekers display hyperbolic preferences. Depending on the type of worker and the level of effort
requirement, Paserman found that workers would comply and experience a gain in long-run utility,
or they would opt out of the UI and experience a substantial loss in utility. In the next section we
show that if imperfections in the monitoring technology are taken into account, the likelihood that
monitoring can entail social efficiency is further reduced.
3.5 The Consequences of an Imperfect Monitoring Technology
Up to this moment, we assumed that the monitoring technology was perfect. This has the two
following implications. First, if a benefit claimant does not comply with the search requirement,
she is sanctioned for sure. Second, if she does comply, she is sanctioned with probability zero.
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In this section, we relax these assumptions. First, we consider a case in which only the second
assumption is maintained, while the non-complier is sanctioned with an exogenous probability.
This first case could proxy a situation in which caseworkers have discretion in determining which
non-complying agents are sanctioned. In this decision, caseworkers would typically take other
criteria, such as social need, into account. Since such decisions may be very heterogeneous and
lack systematics, the non-complying benefit claimant may perceive that the sanction is to a certain
extent randomly imposed, independently of her behavior and characteristics. We label this “im-
perfection due to caseworker discretion”. Second, we assume that search effort is measured with
error. If the range of measurement errors is sufficiently broad, it turns out that the benefit claimant
is always sanctioned with a certain probability, irrespectively of whether she complies or not with
the requirement. This second part also considers the case of a more limited range of errors, which
shares features with the two previous cases.
3.5.1 Imperfection Due to Caseworker Discretion
The monitoring technology can in this case, for any σ¯ > 0, formally be described as follows:10
p(σ) =
{
p0 ∈ (0, 1) for σ < σ¯ and
0 for σ ≥ σ¯.
(3.18)
If the agent complies with the search requirement (σ ≥ σ¯), the Bellman equation defining the
short-run utility for any level of search effort σ and long-run utility Bf corresponds to the one
considered for a perfect monitoring technology, i.e. to (3.1) for yu = yb and U
f = Bf . However,
in the case of non-compliance (σ < σ¯), the Bellman equation becomes:
Wp
(
σ,EUf0 | Ey0, βδ
)
≡ Ey0−c(σ)+βδ
{
λ(σ)EF
{
max
(
V f , EUf0
)}
+ (1− λ(σ))EUf0
}
(3.19)
where Ey0 ≡ p0yz+(1−p0)yb, EU
f
0 ≡ p0Z
f +(1−p0)N
f andNf denotes the long-run utility
in the case of non-compliance after the monitoring in the current period has taken place and no
sanction has been imposed. Note that Nf replaces Uf in the definition (3.5) of V f .
The optimization problem of the current self is therefore given by (3.2) and the following
equations:
N c = max
σ<σ¯
Wp
(
σ,EUf0 | Ey0, βδ
)
(3.20)
Ωcn = max {B
c(σ¯), N c} (3.21)
Following a similar reasoning as in the case of perfect monitoring, we prove in Appendix 3.11
10Abbring et al. (2005) have considered this type of monitoring technology to capture the fact that “any sanction
policy needs to be backed up by explicit rules and individuals can appeal against sanctions”. This does not justify,
however, a constant sanction probability below the threshold σ¯: the higher the actual search effort, the easier it is
to prove compliance. This is why we believe that this monitoring technology may be better suited to describing the
aforementioned caseworker discretion.
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that:
Wp
(
σ,EUf0 | Ey0, βδ
)
≡ yb − c(σ) + βδ
{
λ(σ)Q
(
(1− δ)Nf
)
1− δ(1− q)
+Nf
}
− p0
{
yb − yz + βδ
[
1− h
(
σ, (1− δ)Nf
)]
(Nf − Zf )
}
(3.22)
where h
(
σ, (1− δ)Nf
)
≡ λ(σ)F¯
(
(1− δ)Nf
)
, i.e. the probability of finding a job in the current
period. Using this expression, similarly to the case of perfect monitoring, we can derive the
implicit functions representing the first-order conditions of σ < σ¯ and x for a non-complying
agent:
Rn(σ, x | Ey0, p0) ≡ Ey0 +
δλ(σ)Q(x)
1− δ(1− q)
− x− c(σ)− p0
δ
(1− δ)
[1− h (σ, x)] (x− xz) = 0
(3.23)
Sn(σ, x | β, p0) ≡
βδλ′(σ)
1− δ(1− q)
Q(x) + p0
βδ
(1− δ)
λ′(σ)F¯ (x)(x− xz)− c
′(σ) = 0 (3.24)
Not complying with the job requirement is less costly than in the case of perfect monitoring,
since the sanction is no longer imposed with certainty: Ey0 > yz . This increases the benefit of
continued search. There is also an additional cost to continued search. If one does not find a job
by the end of the period (which explains the weighting by [1− h (σ, x)]), one risks the capital loss
of the sanction in the next period (x − xz)/(1 − δ). This additional cost must, however, always
be smaller than the additional benefit, since otherwise x − xz < 0 for any given σ, and then the
additional cost in (3.23) would become a benefit, which is a contradiction. So, we can deduce
from (3.23) that xz < x < xb for any given σ and 0 < p0 < 1. Consequently, since x > xz ,
the non-complying job seeker is more selective in her job acceptance decision than in the perfect
monitoring case.
On the other hand, the considered imperfection in the monitoring technology raises the job
search incentive in the case of non-compliance. This is because the unemployed agent may avoid
the (possible) sanction if she finds a job before the end of the period. This additional marginal
benefit of search is equal to p0
βδ
(1−δ)λ
′(σ)F¯ (x)(x−xz) in (3.24). Consequently, in Figure 3.2, the
x = sn(σ | β, p0) curve (i.e. the explicit relationship between the reservation wage and search
effort described by the implicit equation Sn(σ, x | β, p0) = 0) lies to the right of the corresponding
x = s(σ | β) curve under perfect monitoring.
Observe that the first-order conditions tend towards those of perfect monitoring if p0 → 1
or p0 → 0. If p0 → 1, Ey0 → yz and the additional terms drop out, since then x − xz → 0.
If p0 → 0, Ey0 → yb, and the additional terms also shrink to zero. So, in the limit, the system
(3.23)-(3.24) provides the optimality conditions for the behavior of an unemployed agent on whom
no job search requirement is imposed (p0 = 0) or who is sanctioned for sure (p0 = 1).
In Figure 3.2, we illustrate the behavior of an impatient UB claimant for a given p0 ∈ (0, 1).
From what is mentioned above, it should be clear that for any σ we have the following ranking in
the (σ, x) space: r(σ | yz) < rn(σ | Ey0, p0) < r(σ | yb) where rn(σ | Ey0, p0) is the explicit
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Figure 3.2: The Solution in the Case of Imperfection Due to Caseworker Discretion for p0 such that the
Curves Sn(σ | β < 1, p0) and Sn(σ | β = 1, p0) Are Downward-Sloping.
relationship between the reservation wage and search effort described by the implicit equations
Rn(σ, x | Ey0, p0) = 0. The optimal solution in the case of perfect compliance is given at point
O. The ordinate of point O’, below point O, indicates the (monotonic transformation of) the short-
run utility level at this optimum, i.e. (1 − δ)Bc. As σ¯ is gradually raised above the optimal free
level σb, the short-run utility first increases up to point G, falls thereafter until point T, at which
it attains the short-run utility level for a non-complier, at the ordinate of P’. The search effort σ¯p0
on the abscissa of point T and implicitly defined by Bc(σ¯p0) = N c is the maximum level of the
search requirement with which the benefit claimant complies. Let (σn, xn), point P, denote the
search effort and reservation wage combination solving (3.23)-(3.24). Whenever σ¯ is set higher
than σ¯p0 , job search effort falls discontinuously to σn and search effort stays at that level until
the individual is sanctioned with probability p0. Then the job search effort level jumps to σz . In
Figure 3.2, σz > σn. However, as shown in the proof of Proposition 4, if p0 is sufficiently close to
one, it is possible that σz ≤ σn. But observe that in the case of non-compliance, (σn, xn) always
lies to the right of the x = s(σ | β < 1) curve (OL), because of the additional returns to job search
present in the aforementioned first-order condition (3.24) if 0 < p0 < 1.
From Figure 3.2, it is clear that a UB claimant stops complying with the search requirement
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at a lower search effort level (at the abscissa of T) than in the case of perfect monitoring (at the
abscissa of M): σ¯p0 < σ¯s. This is because the benefit claimant is not sanctioned with probability
one if she does not comply, so that her short-run utility is strictly higher in this case: the (mono-
tonic transformation of) the long-run utility rn(σ | Ey, p0) in the imperfect monitoring case lies
strictly above r(σ | yz) in the case of perfect monitoring. Similarly, we can demonstrate along
the lines of the proof of Proposition 2 that the maximum search effort requirement above which
an unemployed benefit claimant stops complying is strictly smaller than in the perfect monitoring
case: σ¯p0max < σ¯smax (point S lies to the left of J), where σ¯
p0
max verifies Bf (σ¯
p0
max) = Nf . In sum,
Proposition 3. In the case of imperfect monitoring due to case worker discretion as de-
scribed by (3.18), a UB claimant stops complying with the search requirement at a lower
search effort level than in the case of perfect monitoring. In addition, it is less likely that the
Pareto-efficient frontier AH is attained.
If agents have naive instead of sophisticated time preferences, it can even be shown that, if p0
is not too large, some points of the Pareto-efficient frontier can never be reached.11 We therefore
conclude that the considered imperfection in the monitoring technology reduces the likelihood that
social efficiency can be attained by imposing a job search requirement.
In Figure 3.2, we illustrated the behavior of the benefit claimant for a particular value of p0.
In Proposition 4 and Figure 3.3, we describe how the optimal search effort and reservation wage
combination (σn, xn) of a non-complying agent, the solution to (3.23)-(3.24), varies with p0. We
demonstrate that σn should increase in p0 for p0 close to zero, but also that it should decrease in
p0 for p0 close to one. This reflects that the aforementioned additional benefit to job search in
(3.24), induced by the fact that a job seeker may avoid a sanction if she finds a job before being
monitored, is not only small if the sanction probability is low (p0 → 0), but also if the expected
gain in the case of job acceptance, i.e. x − xz , is small. This gain is small if p0 → 1, since
x − xz = 0 if p0 = 1. By continuity, this means that the σn will be maximal at some value of p0
strictly between zero and one, at point V in Figure 3.3. It is obvious that the optimal reservation
wage lies somewhere between the x = r(σ | yb) and the x = r(σ | yz) curves. However, since
r(σ | yb) is increasing in σ and σn is increasing in p0 for p0 close to zero, we cannot exclude that
xn is increasing in p0 close to zero. But eventually xn must decrease in p0. In sum, the OL line in
Figure 3.3 displays how the behavior of the non-complying agent qualitatively changes when p0
varies between 0 and 1.
Proposition 4. If, in the case of non-compliance, the monitoring technology is described by
(3.18), the optimal search effort σn strictly increases (decreases) in p0 for p0 → 0 (p0 → 1),
and the optimal reservation wage strictly decreases in p0 for p0 → 1.
Proof. See Appendix 3.12.
11This occurs if the maximum of the x = rn(σ | Ey, p0) curve, i.e. the level at which a naive agent stops complying,
exceeds the OH-line.
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Figure 3.3: The Range of Solutions in the Case of Imperfect Monitoring as the Sanction Probability Raises
from Zero to One: Non-Complying Agents in Sub-Section 3.5.1 and any UB Claimant in Sub-Section 3.5.2.
Contrary to what happens under perfect monitoring, the behavior of the non-complier differs
from that of a sanctioned unemployed agent. We have seen that a non-complier has a higher reser-
vation wage. As far as search effort is concerned, the non-complier searches less than a sanctioned
individual if the search requirement is sufficiently close to σb and the sanction probability p0 is
sufficiently low. If the search requirement and p0 are instead sufficiently high, then the search
effort of a non-complier is above σz . As these qualitative conclusions also hold in the following
sections, we will not repeat this comparison with the sanctioned job seeker.
3.5.2 Imperfection Due to Measurement Error
In this subsection, we allow for imperfect measurement of job search effort.12 We follow the
formalization along the lines of Boone et al. (2007), but assume a log-linear instead of a linear
measurement error, since this is more natural for an error on a non-negative variable. If σ0 denotes
the search effort observed by the caseworker and ε the measurement error on the logarithm of
12We assume that the search requirement σ¯ is clearly defined. Cockx et al. (2011) consider instead that it is a random
variable from the perspective of the unemployed. We do not discuss this case explicitly here, since it can be shown to
be very similar to the case of measurement error with unbounded support discussed below.
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actual search effort, we can write:
log σo = log σ + ε (3.25)
where ε ∈ [−ε, ε] for −ε < 0 < ε, and G(ε) denotes the cumulative distribution function of ε.
Since the evaluation of job search effort now depends on the observed search effort level, which
is no longer deterministically related to the actual effort level, the sanction is imposed with a
probability p (σ¯/σ) which is directly related to the distribution of the measurement error:
p
( σ¯
σ
)
≡ Prob (σo < σ¯) = Prob (log σo < log σ¯) = Prob
[
ε < log
( σ¯
σ
)]
= G
[
log
( σ¯
σ
)]
,
(3.26)
This probability clearly decreases with σ:
∂p
(
σ¯
σ
)
∂σ
= −
g
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
σ
< 0, (3.27)
where g(.) denotes the density function of ε. So, in contrast to the previously discussed imperfec-
tion, measurement error implies that the sanction probability strictly decreases with search effort.
Nevertheless, if the measurement error has a bounded support, the sanction probability may still
be constant for low or high actual levels of search effort σ:13
p
( σ¯
σ
)
≡

1 for σ ≤ σ¯ exp(−ε)∫ log( σ¯σ )
−ε g(ε)dε for σ¯ exp(−ε) < σ < σ¯ exp(ε)
0 for σ ≥ σ¯ exp(ε)
(3.28)
Definition (3.28) shows that measurement error raises the level of the actual search requirement:
σ¯ exp(ε) > σ¯ for ε > 0. Indeed, if the actual search intensity σ is below this level, the individual
faces a strictly positive sanction probability. This means that an individual who actually complies
(σ = σ¯) still faces a strictly positive sanction probability: p(1) = G(0) > 0. Moreover, an
individual who actually does not comply with the requirement (σ < σ¯) is not sanctioned for
sure as long as her search effort is greater than the lower bound of the actual search requirement,
σ > σ¯ exp(−ε), where σ¯ exp(−ε) < σ¯ for ε > 0. Therefore if ε > 0 or ε > 0, i.e. as soon
as there is some measurement error, a third regime emerges, alongside with full compliance and
full non-compliance. If σ¯ exp(−ε) < σ < σ¯ exp(ε), we say that the unemployed agent partially
complies with the job search requirement in the sense that she is sanctioned with an endogenous
probability strictly between zero and one.
3.5.2.1 The Benchmark Case: Unbounded Support for the Measurement Error
We consider first the benchmark case in which the measurement error has an unbounded support.
We assume throughout that the density of measurement error satisfies the following properties:
∀σ, σ¯ ∈ (0,+∞) : g
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
> 0, lim
ε→−∞
g(ε) = lim
ε→+∞
g(ε) = 0, lim
ε→−∞
g′(ε) > 0, and
13We use the fact that log (σ¯/σ) ≥ ε ⇔ σ ≤ σ¯ exp(−ε) and that log (σ¯/σ) ≤ − ε ⇔ σ ≥ σ¯ exp(ε).
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lim
ε→+∞
g′(ε) < 0.14 These properties are satisfied for a wide range of densities, among which the
Normal one.
With these assumptions, it is clear that an unemployed worker can never fully comply or fully
fail to comply. As soon as the search requirement σ¯ is set above zero, the sanction probability
rises above zero and will never attain one, irrespectively of how high the actual search intensity
σ is set: 0 < p(σ¯/σ) < 1, where the limit values 0 and 1 are important to characterize the so-
lution (see Proposition 5). In this benchmark case therefore only the partial compliance regime
applies. Consequently, the Bellman equation defining the short-run utility Wp
(
σ,EUf | Ey, βδ
)
takes the same form as the one defined by Equation (3.19) for the non-complier in the previ-
ous subsection. Only arguments EUf0 and Ey0 are replaced by EU
f and Ey, where EUf ≡
p
(
σ¯
σ
)
Zf +
(
1− p
(
σ¯
σ
))
P f and Ey ≡ p
(
σ¯
σ
)
yz +
(
1− p
(
σ¯
σ
))
yb. P
f denotes the expected life-
time utility of the partially complying future selves after monitoring in the current period has taken
place. P f also replaces Uf in the definition (3.5) of V f .
The optimization problem of the current self therefore becomes:
P c = max
σ
Wp
(
σ,EUf | Ey, βδ
)
(3.29)
Let (σp, xp) designate a solution to this problem. Observe that the decision to comply or not is no
longer discrete, but incremental. The degree of compliance is measured by the sanction probability
p
(
σ¯
σ
)
. This probability is optimally set by trading off the benefits and costs of marginal increments
of the decision variables σ and x. Consequently, since we assume that the first-order conditions
define a global maximum, these decision variables are sufficient to characterize the solution. A
consequence is also that the constraint σ ≥ σ¯ is no longer required in the optimization problem.
In Appendix 3.11, we prove that that:
Wp
(
σ,EUf | Ey, βδ
)
≡ yb − c(σ) + βδ
{
λ(σ)Q
(
(1− δ)P f
)
1− δ(1− q)
+ P f
}
− p
( σ¯
σ
){
yb − yz + βδ
[
1− h
(
σ, (1− δ)P f
)]
(P f − Zf )
}
(3.30)
Using this expression, the first-order conditions of x and σ for a partially complying agent are:
Rp(σ, x | Ey, σ¯) ≡ Ey +
δλ(σ)Q(x)
1− δ(1− q)
− x− c(σ)− p
( σ¯
σ
) δ
(1− δ)
[1− h (σ, x)] (x− xz) = 0
(3.31)
Sp(σ, x | β, σ¯) ≡
βδλ′(σ)
1− δ(1− q)
Q(x)−
∂p(σ¯/σ)
∂σ
{
yb − yz +
βδ
(1− δ)
[1− h (σ, x)] (x− xz)
}
+ p
( σ¯
σ
) βδ
(1− δ)
λ′(σ)F¯ (x)(x− xz)− c
′(σ) = 0 (3.32)
These expressions differ from (3.23)-(3.24), defined in the previous subsection, in that p
(
σ¯
σ
)
re-
places p0, and that there is an additional marginal returns to job search:
14We also implicitly assume that the first-order conditions are not only necessary, but also sufficient conditions for
a maximum. These conditions are made explicit in the proof of Proposition 5. They require the natural assumption in
particular that p(σ¯/σ) is concave in σ, or at least not too convex in σ.
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−∂p(σ¯/σ)∂σ
{
yb − yz +
βδ
(1−δ) [1− h (σ, x)] (x− xz)} > 0. Indeed, the unemployed agent can re-
duce the sanction probability by marginally increasing her search effort. The term between braces
in (B.13) is the sum of the instantaneous benefit sanction and the discounted capital loss as from
the following period. The latter is only incurred if the individual did not find a job before being
monitored. This explains the weighting by [1− h (σ, x)]. Observe also that this capital loss de-
creases as p(σ¯/σ) tends to one, since then x− xz tends to zero. Note in addition that the sanction
probability is now endogenous. Now p0 is no longer the exogenous parameter, but σ¯ is. We hence-
forth assume that any variation in σ¯ is followed by a less than proportional adjustment in optimal
search effort, so that a rise in σ¯ has a net positive effect on p(σ¯/σ).
Given (3.27) and since in this benchmark case lim
ε→−∞
g(ε) = lim
ε→+∞
g(ε) = 0, it follows that,
as in the previous subsection, the first-order conditions (B.12)-(B.13) converge to (3.13)-(3.14) for
a perfect monitoring technology if p (σ¯/σ) converges to zero or to one. In addition, from Proposi-
tion 5 below, it is clear that the set of optimal combinations of search effort and reservation wage
(σp, xp) in this benchmark case evolves qualitatively in a very similar way to the search require-
ment σ¯ (and, hence, with p (σ¯/σ)) as (σn, xn) with p0 in the previous subsection (cf Proposition
4). This all means that Figure 3.3 which was introduced in the previous subsection also character-
izes the solution in this benchmark case with measurement error, but the interpretation differs.
As in the case of perfect monitoring, point O characterizes the solution (σb, xb) if no job search
requirement is imposed. As soon as the requirement is raised above zero, the benefit claimant
faces a strictly positive sanction probability even if she actually complies with the requirement:
σb > σ¯. As a consequence of the measurement error, the individual can indeed only comply
partially. This is a major difference with Subsection 3.5.1, where in particular Figure 3.3 described
the adjustment of the non-complying agent only. As explained below, the OL line in Figure 3.3
now shows how the behavior of the procrastinator qualitatively varies when σ¯ rises, such that
p(σ¯/σ) increases from zero to one. When σ¯ is raised above zero, search effort is enhanced. The
reservation wage as well, but at a lower rate than in the perfect monitoring case, because the
unemployed cannot comply perfectly, so that the reservation wage (and, hence, long-term utility)
is strictly lower than r(σ | yb). As the search requirement is further increased, the optimal solution
shifts further to the right along the OV line segment. At some point, the cost of the higher search
intensity and the higher sanction probability start to dominate the gain in long-run utility that
enhanced search effort induces for an impatient individual, and the reservation wage starts to fall.
At point V, search effort attains its maximum. Beyond that point, the additional marginal returns
to job search reflected in the first-order conditions (B.12)-(B.13) start to decrease because (1)
the sanction probability becomes so high that the expected capital gain, which is proportional to
(x−xz), eventually falls so much (it tends to zero for p (σ¯/σ)→ 1) that it dominates the gain from
the decrease in the sanction probability induced by the enhanced search effort, and (2) the sanction
probability eventually decreases in σ at a decreasing rate, so that the additional returns, which are
proportional to −∂p (σ¯/σ) /∂σ, eventually fall.15 From point V, the solution then converges to L,
15This is because ∂
2p
[∂σ]2
=
g[log( σ¯
σ
)]+g′[log( σ¯
σ
)]
σ2
< 0 if σ¯ → ∞, since we assume that lim
ε→+∞
g(ε) = 0 and
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the free choice of a sanctioned individual, but never attains this point unless the unemployed agent
is actually sanctioned.
Observe that in this benchmark case with measurement error, the unemployed job benefit
claimant always faces a strictly positive sanction probability. Consequently, for any level of σ,
the long-run utility is always strictly lower than in the case of perfect monitoring. This means
that, irrespectively of preferences or job search technology, the Pareto-efficient frontier AH can no
longer be attained. This demonstrates that the social benefit of imposing job search requirements
on impatient unemployed benefit claimants is further reduced if search effort is measured with
error.
Proposition 5. If the sanction probability is expressed by (3.28) and the support of mea-
surement error is unbounded, then both the optimal search effort σp and reservation wage
xp strictly increase (resp., decrease) in σ¯ for σ¯ → 0 and, hence, p(σ¯/σp) → 0 (resp.,
σ¯ → +∞ and, hence, p(σ¯/σp) → 1). Furthermore, the Pareto-efficient frontier AH can no
longer be attained.
Proof. See Appendix 3.13.
3.5.2.2 The Case of a Bounded Support for Measurement Error
We now turn to the case in which the support of measurement error is bounded. This is an in-
teresting case, because its solution exhibits features of both the perfect monitoring case and the
benchmark with measurement error, which are both limiting cases: perfect monitoring is attained
if both ε→ 0 and ε→ 0, while in the benchmark both ε→∞ and ε→∞. We will demonstrate
that in this case perfect compliance and non-compliance are again possibilities, alongside with
partial compliance.
To ensure that the solution does not differ too much from the benchmark case, we assume in
addition to the bounded support that ∀σ¯ > 0, ∀σ ∈ [σ¯ exp(−ε), σ¯ exp(ε)] : g
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
> 0,
g′(−ε) ≥ 0, and g′(ε) ≤ 0. These assumptions are satisfied if the distribution of measurement
error is for instance Uniform (in which case g′(−ε) = g′(ε) = 0) or truncated Normal (in which
case g′(−ε) > 0 and g′(ε) < 0). With these assumptions, Proposition 5 applies, except for the
fact that the reservation wage may be decreasing in σ¯ for a sanction probability close to zero
(σ → σ¯ exp(ε)) if g(−ε) is sufficiently large.16
The assumptions that g (−ε) > 0 and g (ε) > 0 have consequences on the solution when the
probability of being sanctioned tends to zero and to one. This follows from the first-order condition
(B.13) where the additional marginal returns to job search effort proportional to−∂p(σ¯/σ)/∂σ =
g [log (σ¯/σ)] /σ remain strictly positive in this case, even if the sanction probability tends to zero
or to one. Consequently, when σ → σ¯ exp(ε) so that p(σ¯/σ) → 0, the solution in the case of
lim
ε→+∞
g′(ε) < 0.
16Sufficiently large in a sense defined in the proof of Proposition 5, where the case of a bounded support of measure-
ment error is explicitly discussed.
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partial compliance (σp, xp) no longer converges to the solution (σb, xb). At the other extreme,
when σ → σ¯ exp(−ε) so that p(σ¯/σ) → 1, (σp, xp) no longer converges to (σz, xz). This
means that in these limiting cases, search effort must be strictly greater than σb, respectively σz .
Moreover, notice that the first-order condition for the reservation wage (B.12) is not affected in
these limiting cases. In Figure 3.3, these results imply that the solution converges to point W to
the right of O on the x = r(σ | yb) curve, as search effort converges to σ¯ exp(ε). Similarly, the
solution converges to point X to the right of point L on the x = r(σ | yz) curve, as search effort
converges to σ¯ exp(−ε).
Let us now describe how the solution evolves as the search requirement is increased. If the
search requirement is raised above zero, the search effort σb is initially unaffected as long as σb
is greater than the actual search requirement σ¯ exp(ε). As soon as the actual search requirement
exceeds σb, the unemployed will choose between full and partial compliance depending which
yields the highest short-term utility. Based on the reasoning in the previous paragraph, we know,
however, that for a sanction probability close to zero in the case of partial compliance, the optimal
search level σp must be be strictly higher than σb, so that the benefit claimant fully complies for
a range of actual search requirements above σb up to the abscissa of point W in Figure 3.3. If
the search effort is set marginally higher than the latter, the short-run utility in the case of partial
compliance strictly exceeds the utility in the case of full compliance. Therefore, from point W, the
benefit claimant starts complying partially. Subsequently, the optimal search effort σp qualitatively
evolves with σ¯ as in the benchmark. It continues to increase at first up to point V’ after which it
declines up to point X. At this point, the sanction probability attains one and the short-run utility of
a partial complier equals that of a sanctioned individual. If then σ¯ is further increased, the optimal
search effort discontinuously falls to σz at point L, which is the optimal solution for a sanctioned
individual.
Notice that as the support of measurement error is reduced, the abscissas of points W and X
will move closer together, and V’ will also lie less to the right of these points. In the limit, when
both ε → 0 and ε → 0, the abscissas of these three points coincide and the solution corresponds
to the one in case of perfect monitoring. This means that the abscissa of these points becomes
σ¯s in Figure 3.1. If the search requirement increases above this level, search effort falls to σz (at
point L). If, by contrast, the support of measurement error is further widened, g(−ε) and g(ε)
must eventually decrease, so that W tends to O and X tends to L. In the limit, when both ε → ∞
and ε → ∞, these points will coincide as they did in the benchmark in which measurement error
had unbounded support.
From the aforementioned analysis it is clear that in the case of a measurement error with
bounded support, we cannot in general exclude that one can attain the Pareto-efficient segment
AH on the x = r(σ | yb) curve by imposing a search requirement on impatient benefit claimants.
Indeed, we cannot exclude in general that W is located to the right of A. From the discussion it
is clear that this depends in part on the magnitude of the density of the measurement error on the
lower bound of the support. One may expect that the magnitude of this density is roughly inversely
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proportional to the width of the support of measurement error,17 so that loosely speaking the more
precisely search effort is measured, the likelier the social efficiency of search requirement. In the
limiting case of an unbounded support, social efficiency cannot be attained. Since search effort is
not directly observable, it is difficult to measure precisely, so that the latter hypothesis may not be
so far from reality.
3.6 Monitoring Search versus Job Search Assistance
In this section, we briefly evaluate the social efficiency of imposing job search requirements on
procrastinating unemployed benefit claimants relative to job search assistance (JSA). To keep the
analysis simple, we here assume that the monitoring is perfect. JSA typically raises the returns
to job search by increasing search efficiency (i.e. by increasing λ′(σ) for any given level of σ)
and/or by reducing the marginal cost of search (i.e. by reducing c′(σ) for any given level of σ).
This shifts the x = s(σ | β) curve in Figure 3.1 to the right and thereby raises job search effort
closer to the Pareto frontier AH. As such, the effects of JSA resemble those of imposing a search
requirement. However, JSA also reduces the search cost level and/or increases the level of the job
arrival rate. Consequently, the x = r(σ | yb) curve shifts at the same time upwards. It can be
shown that both search effort and reservation wage increase.
This ignores that JSA is costly. A way to make these implementation costs apparent in our
analysis is to assume that the unemployed are charged for these expenses. As a consequence (see
the first-order condition), the current income yb decreases, inducing the x = r(σ | yb) curve to
shift downwards. Since the implementation costs are typically higher than the reduction in the
search costs for the job seeker, this downward shift will typically dominate the aforementioned
upward shift of the x = r(σ | yb) curve. Moreover, the marginal implementation cost per unit of
search effort of a monitoring job search in the case of perfect monitoring technology are negligible
(assumed zero in the analysis) relative to those of JSA,18 so that at first sight monitoring job search
seems socially more efficient than JSA.
Our analysis shows, however, that such a conclusion is deceptive. First, it does not take into
account the fact that by imposing a job search requirement, a procrastinating benefit claimant
may decide to stop complying at lower levels of search effort than an unemployed agent with
exponential time preferences, and that in that case both welfare and search effort may eventually be
much lower than they would have been had an alternative policy, such as JSA, been implemented.
Second, this analysis ignores that job search effort is measured imprecisely. This is a hidden cost
that induces the x = r(σ | yb) to shift downwards more than what may be expected based on the
negligible directly observable implementation costs of a monitoring scheme.
A fair comparison of the two policies requires, however, that imperfections in JSA be also
17It is exactly inversely proportional in the case of a Uniform distribution.
18Notice that monitoring exhibits increasing returns to scale, since the cost of verifying search is close to fixed, so
that the cost of increasing the search requirement decreases at an increasing rate. By contrast, the implementation costs
of JSA typically exhibit decreasing returns.
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taken into account. For JSA to work, the unemployed job seeker should be willing to devote time
to this assistance, which could take the form of classroom training, counseling sessions, help to
write resumes, etc. This therefore imposes, as job search effort, instantaneous costs and delayed
rewards. A job seeker with hyperbolic preferences is therefore likely to underinvest in the offered
JSA. That is why JSA may have to be imposed to make it work. Obviously, in this case, the
aforementioned imperfections apply. Nevertheless, an important difference is that participation in
JSA is much easier to verify than job search effort. Hence, measurement error is much smaller and
this, as we have shown, increases the likelihood of perfect compliance. In any case, determining
which policy is more efficient is clearly an empirical issue.
3.7 Conclusion
Given the size of the insured unemployed population and the financial pressure on public budgets,
many governments have intensified the monitoring of unemployed benefit recipients’ job search
effort. If unemployed workers have exponential time preferences, this intensification does not
unambiguously enhance social welfare, since, even if it raises the exit rate from unemployment
and thereby reduces outlays on benefit payments, it hurts the unemployed, both by the higher ef-
fort level that this monitoring imposes and by the lower expected job quality, because reservation
wages are reduced. However, if the unemployed procrastinate, DellaVigna and Paserman (2005)
and Paserman (2008) have shown that imposing job search requirements may even be Pareto im-
proving, at least if the unemployed are sophisticated procrastinators who realize that they exert
too little search effort if they are not monitored. In this research, we have first confirmed this
conclusion, based on a graphical analysis that aims at clarifying this result. In addition, we have
argued that, even if the utility of the current self does not increase in the case when the unem-
ployed are naive procrastinators, social welfare may unambiguously increase, if, as argued in the
literature, the welfare of the unemployed is evaluated according to a social preference function
that disregards the biases induced by self-control and misperception problems.
These conclusions with regards to the optimality of a monitoring scheme for hyperbolic dis-
counting unemployed benefit recipients are, however, inconsistent with empirical studies that re-
port the ambiguous effects of the monitoring of job search effort on the job finding rate and on
job quality, and find that this monitoring may sometimes induce exits out of the labor force and,
hence, lead to lower welfare levels for the unemployed. We have argued in this paper that this
mixed evidence can nevertheless be compatible with the hypothesis that the unemployed procras-
tinate. This is because the aforementioned optimality results are derived under two strong and
unrealistic assumptions. First, the unemployed can only exit towards employment. In reality, they
can in particular withdraw from the claimant register and live from welfare benefits, or from the
help of family members or charities. Taking this alternative into account, and assuming that job
search effort is no longer monitored then, we have shown that social efficiency may no longer be
attainable. Raising job search requirements to a level that is optimal from the perspective of the
future selves or from the perspective of society may therefore eventually lead to a sub-optimal
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level of search effort and a long-run utility that is even lower than in the absence of job search
requirements. A second oversimplifying assumption is that monitoring is perfect. Imperfections
can be induced by caseworker discretion or measurement error. In any case, the utility of non-
complying then increases, because the imperfection induces a strictly positive probability that the
sanction is not imposed. Moreover, in the case of measurement error, the welfare of a complier
is reduced, because she may still face a strictly positive sanction probability even if actual search
effort satisfies the search requirement. Therefore, an imperfect monitoring technology raises the
likelihood of non- or partial compliance, and, hence, lowers the likelihood that social efficiency
is attained by imposing search requirements on procrastinating unemployed benefit claimants. If
in particular whatever the search effort level, there still is a non-zero risk of being sanctioned, our
analysis demonstrates that social efficiency cannot be achieved then. Consequently, even if the un-
employed procrastinate, other policy instruments, such as job search assistance, could improve on
monitoring schemes from a social welfare point of view. Whether this is indeed the case remains
to be determined in future empirical research.
This analysis has been conducted in a stationary framework. In reality, unemployment benefits
expire after a finite duration. Everything else equal, this reduces the intertemporal value of claim-
ing benefits as the time limit draws closer, and hence the value of complying with search effort
requirements. Consequently, this reduces the efficiency of imposing a job search requirement, as it
not only decreases the welfare of the unemployed, but it also lowers the likelihood that the benefit
claimant complies with the requirement, at least if it is set above the search effort level that an un-
employed individual would freely choose (the latter being at most the one chosen by a sanctioned
agent). This suggests that monitoring job search should rather be considered as a substitute for
a UI scheme with a time limit than as a complementary policy. Such a comparison remains for
further research. A different source of non-stationarity appears if the monitoring of search effort
no longer takes place at the end of each time period, but at some future time which is known in
advance, as in the analysis of Cockx et al. (2011) for unemployed agents with exponential time
preferences. Looking at the behavior of procrastinators in such an environment is however outside
the scope of this paper.
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3.8 Appendix A. Derivation of W
(
σ, U
f
j | yu, βδ
)
in Equation (3.9)
Proof. Using the reservation wage property, the expectation term in (3.1) can be expanded to give:
W
(
σ, Uf | yu, βδ
)
= yu − c(σ) + βδ
{
λ(σ)
[∫ (1−δ)Uf
w
UfdF (w) +
∫ w¯
(1−δ)Uf
V fdF (w)
]
+ (1− λ(σ))Uf
}
Substituting V f from (3.5), the previous equality becomes:
W
(
σ, Uf | yu, βδ
)
= yu − c(σ) + βδ
{
λ(σ)
∫ w¯
(1−δ)Uf
w − (1− δ)Uf
1− δ(1− q)
dF (w) + Uf
}
(3.33)
which is (3.9).
3.9 Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In (3.14), shift c′(σ) to the right-hand-side. Then, take the log of both sides of this rear-
ranged condition. Next, log differentiate this equality taking into account that x = s(σ | β). This
immediately proves that:
∀σ ∈ R+ :
∂ log s(σ | β)
∂ log σ
=
[
∂ logQ [s(σ | β)])
∂ log s(σ | β)
]−1(d log c′(σ)
d log σ
−
d log λ′(σ)
d log σ
)
< 0.
Given that x = r(σ | yu), partially differentiating (3.13) with respect to σ, and using the
definition of S (σ, r(σ | yu) | β) in (3.14) yields:
S (σ, r(σ | yu) | 1) +
[
δλ(σ)
1− δ(1− q)
Q′ [r(σ | yu)]− 1
]
∂r(σ | yu)
∂σ
= 0 (3.34)
From (3.10), Q′ [r(σ | yu)] = −F¯ [r(σ | yu)]. Inserting this in (3.34) and rearranging gives:
∂r(σ | yu)
∂σ
= S [σ, r(σ | yu) | 1]
1− δ(1− q)
[1− δ(1− q) + δh [σ, r(σ | yu)]]
, (3.35)
where h [σ, r(σ | yu)] ≡ λ(σ)F¯ [r(σ | yu)] is the probability of leaving unemployment (F¯ [.] ≡
1 − F [.]). Since the second term of the product is strictly positive, ∂r(σ|yu)∂σ has the same sign
as S (σ, r(σ | yu) | 1). As this corresponds to the first-order condition of search effort for an
exponential agent, we have that S (σeu, r(σ
e
u | yu) | 1) = 0 and is positive (negative) for σ < σ
e
u
(σ > σeu). So,
∀σ S σeu :
∂r(σ | yu)
∂σ
T 0. (3.36)
Given that x = s(σ | β), partially differentiating (3.14) with respect to β and x, and recalling
that Q′ [r(σ | yu)] < 0 yields
∂s(σ | β)
∂β
= −
Q [r(σ | yu)]
βQ′ [r(σ | yu)]
> 0 (3.37)
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It is obvious that s(σ | β) is independent of yu. Given that x = r(σ | yu), partially differentiating
(3.13) with respect to yu, and following the same steps as earlier in this proof yields:
∂r(σ | yu)
∂yu
=
[1− δ(1− q)]
[1− δ(1− q) + δh [σ, r(σ | yu)]]
> 0 (3.38)
3.10 Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
First we prove the inverse U-shaped profile of Bc(σ¯):
∃ σ∗ ∈ (σb, σ
e
b) such that ∀σ¯ S σ∗ and σ¯ > σb :
∂Bc(σ¯)
∂σ¯
T 0.
Knowing this, it is obvious that raising the search requirement σ¯ somewhat above σb will improve
the short-run utility of the claimant. Above σ¯ = σ∗, the short-run utility shrinks. Second, we
show that the level of search at which the claimant stops complying, σ¯s, lies in the following
open interval: (max {σz, σ˜} , σ¯
s
max). If the search requirement σ¯ is set higher than σ¯
s, the agent
withdraws from insured unemployment and chooses the pair (σz, xz).
Proof. 1. As ∂Bc/∂σ¯ = 0 if the free choice σb is strictly greater than σ¯, let us focus on the
case where σ¯ ≥ σb. Partially differentiating the left-hand side of (B.26) with respect to σ¯
yields:
∂Bc(σ¯)
∂σ¯
= S (σ¯, r(σ¯ | yb) | β) + βδ
[(1− δ) (1− h [σ¯, r(σ¯ | yb)] + δq)]
[1− δ(1− q)](1− δ)
∂r(σ¯ | yb)
∂σ¯
First, consider σ¯ = σb. Then, ∂B
c(σ¯)/∂σ¯ > 0, since S (σb, r(σb | yb) | β) = 0 and, by
(3.36), ∂r(σ¯ | yb)/∂σ¯ > 0 when σ¯ < σ
e
b . Now, consider σ¯ = σ
e
b . Then, ∂B
c(σ¯)/∂σ¯ <
0, since S (σ, r(σ | yb) | β) < 0 for all σ > σb and, by (3.36), ∂r(σ¯ | yb)/∂σ¯ = 0 if
σ¯ = σeb . As ∂B
c
s(σ¯)/∂σ¯ is a continuous function, the following proposition must hold:
∃ σ∗ ∈ (σb, σ
e
b) such that ∀σ¯ S σ∗ and σ¯ > σb :
∂Bc(σ¯)
∂σ¯ T 0.
2. The second part of the proof is divided into four steps:
(a) Using (3.2), (3.6), (3.8) and (3.9), and restricting the analysis to the cases where σ¯ ≥
σb, we obtain
∀σ¯ : Bf (σ¯)−Bc(σ¯) =
δ(1− β)
[1− δ(1− q)]
{
λ(σ¯)Q(r(σ¯|yb)) +
[1− δ(1− q)]r(σ¯|yb)
(1− δ)
}
> 0
(3.39)
Following a similar reasoning, we find
Zf − Zc =
δ(1− β)
[1− δ(1− q)]
{
λ(σz)Q(xz) +
[1− δ(1− q)]xz
(1− δ)
}
> 0. (3.40)
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(b) To transform Q(xz) in the last expression, consider definition (3.10) and assume two
values x1, x2 of the argument of Q such that x1 < x2. Q(x1) can be rewritten as
follows:
Q(x1) =
∫ x2
x1
[w − x1] dF (w) +Q(x2) + F¯ (x2) [x2 − x1]
= Q(x2) + F¯ (x1) [x2 − x1]− {x2 − x1 − E [w − x1|x1 ≤ w < x2]}
×
[
F¯ (x1)− F¯ (x2)
]
(3.41)
Recall that σ¯smax is defined by B
f (σ¯smax) = Z
f . Since ∀σ¯ ∈ [σz, σ¯
s
max) : r(σ¯|yb) >
xz , we can apply the above transformation and rewrite (3.40) as:
Zf − Zc =
δ(1− β)
[1− δ(1− q)]
{
λ(σz)Q(r(σ¯|yb)) + h(σz, xz)[r(σ¯|yb)− xz] + xz
1− δ + δq
1− δ
−λ(σz){r(σ¯|yb)− xz − E[w − xz|xz ≤ w < r(σ¯|yb)]}[F¯ (xz)− F¯ (r(σ¯|yb))]
}
(3.42)
(c) Subtracting (B.9) from (3.39) then yields for any σ¯ ∈ [σz, σ¯
s
max):
Bf (σ¯)−Bc(σ¯)− Zf + Zc =
δ(1− β)
[1− δ(1− q)]
{
Q[r(σ¯|yb)][λ(σ¯)− λ(σz)]
+[r(σ¯|yb)− xz]×
[(1− δ)(1− h(σz, xz)) + δq]
(1− δ)
+λ(σz){r(σ¯|yb)− xz − E[w − xz|xz ≤ w < r(σ¯|yb)]}[F¯ (xz)− F¯ (r(σ¯|yb))]
}
> 0
Therefore,
∀σ¯ ∈ [σz, σ¯
s
max) : B
f (σ¯)− Zf > Bc(σ¯)− Zc (3.43)
Since Bf (σ¯smax) = Z
f , (3.43) implies that Bc(σ¯smax) < Z
c. So, σ¯smax is an upper
bound of the interval of search requirements that do not induce a withdrawal from the
register of the insured unemployed. Because, Bc(σz) > Z
c (see the discussion after
(B.26)) and Bc(·) is a continuous function, it must be that σz < σ¯
s < σ¯smax.
(d) Let σ˜ make the constrained current self as well off as the unconstrained one, i.e.
Bc(σ˜) = Bc. As Bc > Zc, it follows that Bc(σ˜) > Zc.
Therefore, σ¯s > max{σz, σ˜}.
3.11 Appendix D. Derivation of Wp
(
σ,EU f | Ey, βδ
)
Proof. In this proof p is generic and stands either for p0 or for p
(
σ¯
σ
)
. In the first case Uf = Nf
and in the second Uf = P f . Using the reservation wage property, the expectation term in (3.1)
can be expanded to give:
Wp
(
σ,EUf | Ey, βδ
)
= Ey − c(σ) + βδ
{
λ(σ)
[∫ (1−δ)Uf
w
EUfdF (w) +
∫ w¯
(1−δ)Uf
V fdF (w)
]
+(1− λ(σ))EUf
}
(3.44)
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Substituting (3.5) in this equation yields:
Wp
(
σ,EUf | Ey, βδ
)
= Ey−c(σ)+βδ
{
λ(σ)
[∫ w¯
(1−δ)Uf
[
w + qδUf
1− δ(1− q)
− EUf
]
dF (w)
]
+ EUf
}
(3.45)
Substituting EUf = Uf − p(Uf − Zf ) and Ey = yb − p(yb − yz) then results in:
Wp
(
σ,EUf | Ey, βδ
)
= yb − c(σ) + βδ
{
λ(σ)Q
[
(1− δ)Uf
]
1− δ(1− q)
+ Uf
}
− p
{
yb − yz + βδ
[
1− h
[
σ, (1− δ)Uf
]]
(Uf − Zf )
}
(3.46)
where h
[
w, (1− δ)Uf
]
≡ λ(σ)F¯
[
(1− δ)Uf
]
.
3.12 Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. This proposition is essentially a special case of Proposition 5 (next appendix) in which
p = p0, all derivatives of p with respect to σ and σ¯ are set to zero, p0 replaces σ¯ as exogenous
variable, rn(σ | Ey0, p0) replaces rp(σ | Ey, σ¯) and sn (σ | β, p0) sp (σ | β, σ¯). This means that
a1 to a4 and D have the same signs as in Proposition 5. However, a5 and a6 should be replaced
respectively by:
−
∂Rn(σ | Ey0, p0)
∂p0
= yb − yz +
δ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
> 0 (3.47)
−
∂Sn (σ | β, p0)
∂p0
= −
βδλ′F¯ (x)(x− xz)
1− δ
≤ 0 (3.48)
where the last derivative tends to zero if p0 tends to one. This means that −
∂Rn(σ|Ey0,p0)
∂p0
has the
same sign as a5 in the proof of Proposition 5, but −
∂Sn(σ|β,p0)
∂p0
has the same sign as a6 only for
p0 sufficiently close to zero. In terms of the signs of the derivatives of the optimal choices σn and
xn with respect to p0 the only consequence is that in this case
∂xn
∂p0
is now ambiguous instead of
strictly increasing for p0 → 0.
3.13 Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The proof does not only derive the partial derivatives of the optimal choices σp and xp
with respect to σ¯, but also the partial derivatives of rp(σ | Ey, σ¯) and sp(σ | β, σ¯) with respect
to σ and σ¯. We provide this information, since, as in the perfect monitoring case, the optimal
choices for any given σ¯ are determined by the intersection between the x = rp(σ | Ey, σ¯) and
x = sp(σ | β, σ¯) curves. These partial derivatives allow to determine the slope of these curves for
different values of σ¯ and in which direction these curves are shifted for marginal changes in σ¯. It
allows in particular to determine that the x = sp(σ | β, σ¯) curve has a negative slope for σ¯ → 0
(and, hence, p(σ¯/σ)→ 0) and shifts upwards if σ¯ is marginally raised close to that point, and that
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it has, for σ¯ → +∞ (and, hence, p(σ¯/σ) → 1), a positive slope and is shifted downwards if it
is marginally lowered close to that the point. For the purpose of not overloading the figures and
the discussion in the main text, we neither displayed these curves in the graphical analysis, nor
mentioned them in the main text.
The first-order conditions (B.12) and (B.13) define a system of two equations in two unknowns
as a function of σ¯ > 0. Totally differentiating this system yields:[
a1 a2
a3 a4
][
dx
dσ
]
=
[
a5
a6
]
dσ¯ (3.49)
where, without recalling the arguments of λ, c, p, f, F¯ , Q, h and their derivatives,
a1 = −
δλF¯
1− δ(1− q)
− 1− p
δ
1− δ
[λf(x− xz) + 1− h] < 0 (3.50)
a2 =
δλ′Q
1− δ(1− q)
− c′ −
∂p
∂σ
{
yb − yz +
δ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
+ p
δλ′F¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
= Sp(σ, x | 1, σ¯) (3.51)
a3 = −
βδλ′F¯
1− δ(1− q)
−
∂p
∂σ
βδ
1− δ
[λf(x− xz) + 1− h]
+ p
βδ
1− δ
λ′
[
F¯ − f(x− xz)
]
(3.52)
a4 =
βδλ′′Q
1− δ(1− q)
−
∂2p
[∂σ]2
{
yb − yz +
βδ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
+ 2
∂p
∂σ
βδλ′F¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
+ p
βδλ′′F¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
− c′′ (3.53)
a5 =
∂p
∂σ¯
{
yb − yz +
δ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
(3.54)
a6 =
∂2p
∂σ∂σ¯
{
yb − yz +
βδ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
−
∂p
∂σ¯
βδλ′F¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
(3.55)
Solving system (B.12) and (B.13) gives[
∂x
∂σ¯
∂σ
∂σ¯
]
=
1
D
[
a4 −a2
−a3 a1
][
a5
a6
]
(3.56)
where D ≡ a1a4 − a2a3.
In order to sign these partial derivatives, we make a couple of observations. First, using the
definition of p in (3.28), we have that on the interior of its support:
∂p
∂σ¯
=
g
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
σ¯
= −
∂p
∂σ
σ
σ¯
≥ 0 (3.57)
∂2p
∂σ2
=
g
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
+ g′
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
σ2
(3.58)
∂2p
∂σ∂σ¯
= −
g′
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
σσ¯
(3.59)
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By inserting (3.57) in (3.54), it follows that a5 ≥ 0. Also, by inserting (3.58) into (3.53), it can
be seen that a4 < 0 if g
′
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
is positive or not “too negative”. We make this assumption
throughout.
Second, ∀β < 1 : a2 > 0 and if β = 1, then a2 = 0 in the neighborhood of the solution
(σp, xp). This is because a2 = Sp (σ, x | 1, σ¯) and the FOC with respect to search effort equates
this expression to zero if β = 1. Since the search effort of a procrastinating individual is always
set too low compared to the optimal value of an exponential agent, the marginal benefit of search
will always exceed the corresponding benefit for an exponential agent in the neighborhood of
the solution. Hence, Sp (σ, x | 1, σ¯) > 0 in this region. To formally prove this, observe that
Rp (σ, x | Ey, σ¯) does not depend on β and that the Sp (σ, x | β, σ¯) = 0 curve monotonically
shifts to the right with β in the (σ, x)-plane:
∂σ
∂β
∣∣∣∣
Sp(σ,x|β,σ¯)=0
= −
∂Sp
∂β
∂Sp
∂σ
> 0 (3.60)
which is strictly positive because
∂Sp
∂β =
δλ′Q
1−δ(1−q)−
∂p
∂σ
δ
(1−δ)(1−h)(x−xz)+p
δ
1−δλ
′F¯ (x−xz) > 0
and
∂Sp
∂σ = a4 < 0. The solution of the procrastinating agent being at the intersection of the
Rp (σ, x | Ey, σ¯) = 0 and Sp (σ, x | β < 1, σ¯) = 0 curve will therefore always be to the left of
the Sp (σ, x | 1, σ¯) = 0 curve, so that Sp (σ, x | 1, σ¯) = a2 > 0.
Third, we assume throughout that the first-order conditions define a unique maximum. Con-
sequently, a1 < 0, a4 < 0 and D > 0. The first condition is automatically satisfied and the
second conditional on the aforementioned assumption that g′
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
should be positive or not
too negative. Since D = a1a4 − a2a3, and a1 < 0, a4 < 0 and a2 > 0, D is > 0 if a3 is negative
or not too positive.
Finally, we insert (3.27), (3.57) and (3.59) in (3.52) and (3.55) and rearrange to observe that
a3 and a6 cannot in general be signed:
a3 = −
βδ
(1− δ)
{
λ′F¯
[(1− p)(1− δ)− pδq]
[1− δ(1− q)]
+ pλ′f(x− xz)−
g
σ
[λf(x− xz) + (1− h)]
}
(3.61)
a6 = −
g′
σσ¯
{
yb − yz +
βδ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
−
g
σ¯
βδλ′F¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
(3.62)
The sign is, however, unambiguous for the limiting cases in which p tends to zero or to one. In the
following, we successively consider the environment where the support of the measurement error
ε is unbounded and the one where it is bounded.
Case 1: p→ 0
We will show that in this case a3 < 0 and a6 < 0. In the benchmark when the measurement error
has an infinite support, p → 0 only if σ¯ → 0 and therefore log (σ¯/σ) → −∞. We have assumed
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that lim g(ε)
ε→−∞
= 0 and lim g′(ε)
ε→−∞
> 0. Inserting this in (3.61) and (3.62) yields
a3 → −
βδλ′F¯
1− δ(1− q)
< 0 (3.63)
a6 → −
g′
σσ¯
{
yb − yz +
βδ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
< 0 (3.64)
Now, consider the case in which the measurement error has a finite support. Then, the limiting
case for which p = 0 is attained if log (σ¯/σ) = −ε. In Subsection 3.5.2.2, we assume in this case
g (−ε) > 0 and g′ (−ε) ≥ 0. Therefore, we obtain that a6 < 0 by substitution in (3.62), but
a3 = −
βδλ′F¯
1− δ(1− q)
+
βδg
(1− δ)σ
[λf(x− xz) + (1− h)] ⋚ 0 (3.65)
which is negative if g is not “too large”.
Case 2: p→ 1
Since x− xz → 0 for p→ 1, (3.61)-(3.62) simplify to
a3 →
βδ
(1− δ)
{
λ′F¯
pδq
[1− δ(1− q)]
+
g
σ
(1− h)
}
> 0 (3.66)
a6 → −
g′
σσ¯
{yb − yz} ≥ 0 (3.67)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that lim g′(ε)
ε→+∞
< 0 in the benchmark when the
measurement error has an infinite support, and g′(ε) = 0 in the case of a finite support.
To sum up, we found that a1 < 0, a2 > 0, a4 < 0, a5 ≥ 0,D > 0, while a3 < 0 and a6 < 0 if
p→ 0 and a3 > 0 and a6 ≥ 0 if p→ 1. By continuity, there exists at least one p˜ ∈ (0, 1) at which
a3 = 0 and for the benchmark case at least one pˆ ∈ (0, 1) at which a6 = 0. If the measurement
error has finite support pˆ = 1.
Using these results and partially differentiating (B.12), we obtain:
∂rp(σ | Ey, σ¯)
∂σ
= −
a2
a1
> 0 (3.68)
∂rp(σ | Ey, σ¯)
∂σ¯
=
a5
a1
≤ 0 (3.69)
where the latter is strictly negative only iff g
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
> 0.
The following partial derivatives change signs at least once as p is raised from zero to one.
∂sp (σ | β, σ¯)
∂σ
=−
a4
a3
(3.70)
∂xp
∂σ¯
=
a4a5 − a2a6
D
(3.71)
∂σp
∂σ¯
=
a1a6 − a3a5
D
(3.72)
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∂sp(σ|β,σ¯)
∂σ is strictly negative for p close to zero and increases to a strictly positive value for p close
to one. Since a5 = 0 for g = 0 in the benchmark case,
∂xp
∂σ¯ is at first positive for p close to zero
and negative as p approaches one. In the finite support case, the sign of this derivative is at first
ambiguous close to p = 0, since then a5 > 0. In both environments,
∂σp
∂σ¯ is strictly positive for p
close to zero, but strictly negative for p close to one. Finally,
∂sp (σ | β, σ¯)
∂σ¯
=
a6
a3
(3.73)
This partial derivative is strictly positive both when p is close to zero (p < min(p˜, pˆ)) and close
to one (p > max(p˜, pˆ)). At p = p˜ the derivative becomes infinite and changes signs. At p = pˆ
the derivative becomes zero and changes a second time. In general, we do not know whether pˆ is
greater or smaller than p˜. In the case of a finite support, however, pˆ = 1 > p˜ > 0 and the derivative
changes only once for sure. In the other cases, the derivative changes signs at least twice.
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Overall Conclusions
This dissertation investigates the scarring effects of early unemployment on the labor market ca-
reer of Flemish youth. This is relevant from a policy perspective, as if unemployment at the start
of the career does not entail long-lasting impacts on the subsequent labor market career, workers
are capable to offset by themselves any adverse effect on their career and hence no policy inter-
ventions should be advocated. By contrast, if early unemployment inflicts scars on workers’ labor
market careers, policies targeting the reduction of unemployment should be promoted. In this dis-
sertation we find evidence on favour of the latter hypothesis.
In the first chapter we study the long-term effects of graduating in economic downturns on the
labor market career of low and high educated youth. While the labor market conditions at gradu-
ation are found to have a persistent negative effect on earnings for both groups, the low educated
experience higher unemployment, whereas the high educated downgrade towards lower-paying
jobs. This results are explained by the labor market rigidities affecting differently the labor market
of the white and blue collar workers. Moreover, the results of the second chapter corroborate the
hypothesis of the first chapter by showing that the early experience of non-employment entails
long-run effects on the labor market of low educated youth.
At a micro level, one can think of specific curative policies to reduce the impact of experi-
encing early non-employment, depending on the channel through which the scar materializes. For
instance, the scar may be originated by the human capital depreciation occurring in the unem-
ployment spell, by the foregone human capital that would have been accumulated in case of early
work-experience, or because early non-employment is interpreted as a signal of low quality. If
the first mechanism is the main driver of the scar, training schemes targeting young unemployed
would be an appropriate cure. If instead the main cause of the scar is the loss of early work expe-
rience, policies that foster the integration of youth in the labor market should be advocated, such
as wage subsidy programs. However, if the cause of the scar is rather the bad signals conveyed
by the status of unemployment, it is not sure that entering in subsidized programs would improve
the perception of the youth unemployed by the employers. More reflection on the actual channel
should be needed to come up with a specific policy to target the Flemish youth.
From a more global perspective, however, the results of the first chapter suggests that the
penalties of unemployment are not only limited to those who experience it. That is, already a
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higher risk of unemployment at graduation - without necessarily experiencing it - is sufficient to
provoke a scar. These penalties are explained by the labor market rigidities of the Belgian labor
market. This suggests that the aforementioned scars could be diminished by policy measures that
target a reduction of unemployment. We argue that this could be addressed by a flexicurity system,
where flexibility in the labor market goes hand in hand with a generous insurance system that
provides for the unemployed.
On the one hand, flexibility should be enhanced to encourage employers to take the en-
trepreneurial risks and create more jobs. This is because labor market rigidities such as excessive
employment protection may hamper productivity growth if they prevent workers reallocation or
new hirings due to high expected future firing costs in future downswings. In this view, employ-
ment protection should be limited to promote job creation and these protections should increase
with tenure. On the other hand, if workers bear a higher risk of unemployment because of the in-
creased flexibility in the labor market, they should be protected by a more generous unemployment
insurance system. To the extent that the inflow in employment is also enhanced in flexible labor
markets, the experience of unemployment should be temporary for most of the workers. However,
less employable individuals may be long-term unemployed. This group could be supported by
active labor market programs as well as training schemes to improve their employability and help
them to find a good match. Moreover, a generous unemployment insurance system entails a moral
hazard problem that may result in insufficient job search by the unemployed. This inefficiency
should be appropriately tackled in the context of flexicurity. A popular measure is to condition the
provision of unemployment benefits to job search requirements and monitor the job search of the
unemployed to verify compliance, eventually imposing a sanction in case of non-compliance. This
is the topic of the third paper, in which we discuss the welfare implications of job search monitor-
ing as a way to restore the incentives to search under unemployment insurance. Note that, from a
flexicurity perspective, the moral hazard in the context of a generous unemployment insurance sys-
tem may represent a source of rigidity since it reduces the turnover rate in the labor market, i.e. the
unemployed are less likely to leave unemployment, which may also influence the likelihood that
employers open up vacancies. Hence, measures that counteract reducing the efficiency-insurance
trade-off of the unemployment insurance system play an important role in the design of flexicurity.
Thus, a flexicurity system entails three different dimensions (flexibility, security and the asso-
ciated moral hazard), each of them crucial for the functioning of the entire system. As a conse-
quence, its implementation requires a number of reforms affecting different aspects of the labor
market: (i) eliminating the rigidities resulting from excessive jobs protection; (ii) shifting from job
protection towards workers protection by means of a generous insurance system; (iii) addressing
the moral hazard associated to unemployment insurance to restore the incentives to search for jobs.
In what follows we discuss each of these dimensions in the Belgian context.
• Flexibility: The Belgian labor market is characterized by a number of rigidities that, accord-
ing to the results of this dissertation, have caused substantial penalties for both low and high
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educated youth. First, in the period under investigation, Belgium was characterized by a
flexible EPL for blue collar workers and a rigid EPL for white collar workers. This encour-
aged the high educated who graduated in period of low demand to downgrade and accept
mismatched jobs. Since the beginning of 2014, however, a single employment contract has
been introduced stipulating the same EPL for white and blue collar workers. Therefore, this
controversial discrimination between these two types of workers has been finally removed.
Second, the short-term work compensation program for blue collar workers represents an
additional source of rigidity, as it ties the employers to the employees during downturns.
This may have similar consequences to a strict EPL to the extent that it prevents workers
reallocation or new hirings due to high expected future firing costs in future downswings. A
last source of rigidity is represented by the very high level of minimum wages. According
to our findings, a reduction of this level may facilitate the absorption of low educated new
graduates, for which minimum wages are binding.
• Security: In Belgium a generous unemployment insurance system represents an important
safety net for the unemployed. The Belgian unemployment insurance system is more gen-
erous in comparison to many other countries for two main reasons. First, there is no time
limit on the payment of unemployment benefits. Second, the eligibility for the provision
of unemployment benefits is granted not only to unemployed workers with sufficient em-
ployment records, but also to unemployed school-graduates with no employment records,
conditional on a waiting period.
• Tackling moral hazard: Of course, the problem of moral hazard entailed by the unemploy-
ment insurance system should be appropriately tackled to restore the incentives to search
for jobs. Since 2004 a job search monitoring scheme has been introduced in Belgium, tar-
geting the long-term unemployed (at least 13 months unemployed). Despite the fact that
this measure has been shown to effectively raise the job finding rate on this specific group
of long-term unemployed (Cockx and Dejemeppe, 2012),19 other dimensions such as the
quality of subsequent employment have not yet been considered. In our third theoretical
chapter we demonstrate that, from welfare perspective, job search monitoring reaches effi-
ciency under limited conditions and that, allowing for (more realistic) imperfections in the
monitoring technology, efficiency may not be achieved. Therefore, we suggest that other
policies such as job search assistance may be socially more efficient. However, whether this
is the case remains an open question, which should be answered empirically. We leave this
for future work.
19Bart Cockx, Muriel Dejemeppe, “Monitoring job search effort: An evaluation based on a regression discontinuity
design”, Labour Economics, Volume 19, Issue 5, October 2012, Pages 729–737.
A
Supplementary Appendix to “Scars of Recessions
in a Rigid Labor Market”
A.1 Variables Construction
This analysis exploits data from different sources: (i) individual and family background variables
are taken from the Sonar dataset, which is a survey-based dataset that follows a representative
sample of three birth cohorts (born in 1976, 1978 or 1980) living in Flanders at age 23. The
surveys were conducted when respondents were aged 23, 26 or 29 and register retrospectively
and on monthly basis their most important activity - among which education - from the beginning
of secondary education.1 These observations are matched with the following administrative data
of Belgian Social Insurance institutions centralized at the Cross Roads Bank of Social Security
(CBSS, hereafter, Data Warehouse): (ii) yearly data on the province of residence, obtained by the
Regional Register of Belgium; these data are available from the year in which individuals turn age
18 (i.e. year 1994, 1996 and 1998 for cohort born in 1976, 1978 and 1980, respectively) up to
year 2010; (iii) quarterly data on individual labor market performances for the period 1998-2010,
provided by the Regional Social Security office (RSZ), the Regional Social Security office of
Provincial and Local Administration (RSZPPO) and the Regional Institute for the Social Security
of the Self-employed (RSVZ). Finally, (iv) the URates series are provided by the Labor Force
Survey (LFS). In what follows we describe the data and the construction of the variables for each
of these datasets.
1For details, see SONAR (2003, 2004a,b).
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A.1.1 Sonar Dataset: Educational Variables and the Moment of Graduation
The Sonar database is exploited to construct the following educational measures: (a) the moment
of graduation, (b) the years of successfully attained education at age 17 (hereafter, “completed
education at age 17”), (c) the total years of successfully attained education until graduation (here-
after, “completed education”). Based on the latter, we divide the sample into (d) low and high
educated.
(a): The moment of graduation - The moment of graduation (month and year) is defined as the
first exit from schooling after the completion of compulsory education (age 18 in Belgium). This
variable is based on the monthly individual status provided by Sonar, which reports on a monthly
basis whether the individual is studying, working, studying and working at the same time, or not
working (and in case for which reason), from December of the year in which one turns 17 until at
least the year in which one turns age 26.2 According to our definition, individuals are considered
out of education whenever they are not observed in regular education (i.e. if they are observed
working, unemployed or not working). Note that those reporting as being in regular education and
working at the same time are still considered as in education. In December of the year in which
they turn age 17 all individuals in the sample are observed in education.3 Whenever we cannot
observe directly the transition from education to employment or unemployment, the exit from
education is defined as not being in education for more than 4 subsequent months, independently
of the destination (working, unemployment, not working, missing).
Imputation procedure for censored observations in Sonar - This procedure allows us to define
the age of first exit from school for 96.5% of the sample. Among the observations for which the
age of first exit is not defined, some individuals are censored at age 23 or 26 while still in ongo-
ing education (3%): for these individuals, the age of first school exit is inferred (when possible)
by exploiting the socio-economic position as reported at the end of each quarter for the period
1998-2010 by the Data Warehouse.4 Intuitively, this is done assuming that, from the moment of
censoring in the Sonar dataset, these observations remain in regular education until the moment in
which they appear in the labor market according to the Data Warehouse. We cannot apply this pro-
cedure to individuals whose socio-economic position is never observed by the Data Warehouse:
these individuals are dropped (0.11%). In some other cases, individuals are observed as workers
- even before censoring - according to the Data Warehouse data. Among these cases we retain
only individuals who are observed as employed in student jobs, while still in full-time education
according to Sonar (2.75%). In contrast, we drop those who result employed in regular jobs while
still in full-time education according to Sonar (0.13%), because of inconsistency between Sonar
and Data Warehouse. Student jobs are defined according to the following criteria: (1) we exploit a
2That is, in each month, an individual can be observed in full-time education, education and working at the same
time, employment, unemployment, or non-employment. For the 1978 wave, information is only collected until age 26.
For the other waves, it is gathered until October or November of the year one turns 29, depending on the date of the
survey.
3We drop few observations who quit education before the end of compulsory education.
4Participation to the labor market is defined as being employed or looking for a job; inactive status is not considered
since could as well be in education.
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variable provided by the Data Warehouse that identifies jobs that are “typically" undertaken while
studying. (2) In case (1) is satisfied, we ensure that the time-worked in this potential student job
does not exceed the maximum time a child is allowed to work, for his parents not to lose the family
allowance that they receive for their children: this threshold amounts to 240 hours (i.e. roughly
30 days) per quarter except in the summer quarter, during which a child is allowed to work more.
Hence, a potential student job is defined as student job if the individual has worked at most 30
days for each quarter except the summer.
For all other censored observations, the age of first exit from school is imputed by assuming
that the individuals remain in education until the moment in which they are observed for the
first time as active in the labor market, i.e. either as employed or as unemployed looking for a
job. Accordingly, the moment of first exit from education is set just before the moment when
they are first observed in the labor market. Note that the age of first exit from school is imputed
differently depending on whether the individuals are first observed in the labor market as employed
or unemployed looking for a job. The reason is that an individual is observed as unemployed when
he first receives the unemployment benefits (UB), but in Belgium the receipt of these UB implies
a waiting period that varies between 9 and 12 months from the registration to the unemployment
agency, depending on the age; this means that, for the unemployed, the actual moment of entry in
the labor market is at the moment of registration to the unemployment agency rather than at the
moment of receiving the UB. Accordingly, the age of first school exit for the unemployed take into
account this waiting period.
Check inconsistencies between Sonar and Data Warehouse - Recall that the year of graduation
is defined mostly on information reported in Sonar, i.e. on survey-data. We verify the reliability
of this information by exploiting the consistency with the (high-quality) administrative data by
Data Warehouse: in particular, we check whether individuals are observed in the labor market
according to the Data Warehouse in the years when they report to be still in full-time education
in Sonar. Among the cases for which graduation is defined, 19.2% of the individuals are indeed
observed in the labor market before their graduation year. Consistently with the aforementioned
“student job” criterion, these observations are considered consistent if they are employed in student
jobs. Inconsistent observations are dropped from the sample (4%).
(b):Completed education at age 17 - The Sonar dataset contains detailed information about
the educational path of the individuals since secondary education: in each year, one can observe
the type of education in which one is enrolled (e.g. full-time or part-time vocational), the type
of program (general, vocational, artistic, technical, apprenticeship), the grade and the result at the
end of each grade (successfully passed or not). This information is exploited to build completed
education at age 17. This variable starts counting from the beginning of the first year of secondary
education, and increases every time one passes a year, until the academic year in which one turns
17 (included). In the analysis, this variable is expressed so to give information about the educa-
tional progression of the individual at age 17 with respect to the theoretical years of schooling: 0
means that the individual is on time, positive numbers indicate the number of repeated grades, and
−1 indicates that the individual has skipped one academic year. Note that this contains exactly the
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same information as completed education at age 17.
(c): Completed education - This is constructed similarly to “completed education at age 17”. It
counts the years of schooling successfully attained from the beginning of the secondary education.
For individuals who are censored in Sonar database at 23 or 26 years old while still in ongoing
education - and hence for which graduation is not observed in Sonar - completed education is
corrected so that it is consistent with the imputed graduation, which is inferred using information
from the DataWarehouse, as explained above. For these cases, it is assumed that, from the moment
of censoring, all years in education were successfully passed until graduation. In each case, we
ensure the consistency between completed education and the year of graduation, dropping few
individuals for which the imputed completed education is unrealistically too high with respect to
the year of graduation.
(d): Low and High Educated - The sample is divided into 2 educational groups based on “com-
pleted education”: low-educated are individuals who completed secondary education, that is who
graduated at age 18, or at age 19 if enrolled in vocational program in secondary education (this is
because secondary education ends after seven years for the vocational track and after 6 years for
all other educational tracks.). High-educated are those who graduated later. In the main analysis
these 2 groups are always studied separately.
A.1.2 Data Warehouse - Individual Labor Market Outcomes
Individual labor market outcomes are constructed by exploiting quarterly data from RSZ and
RSZPPO database, as well as yearly data from RSVZ, for the period 1998-2010. RSZ and
RSZPPO databases collect information on salary, earnings and time worked in dependent em-
ployment in the private and public sector, respectively; RSVZ database reports the registration
in self-employment for the period 1998-2010 and yearly earnings from self-employment for the
period 1998-2007. In the main analysis earnings from self-employment are not exploited as out-
comes of interest since they are self-reported data, and hence, likely to be under-reported.5 Based
on these data, we construct the following yearly labor market outcomes: (a) log of earnings, (b)
log of hours worked and (c) log of hourly wage in salaried employment;6 (d) a working status as
salaried employed (defined by strictly positive earnings and not being self-employed); (e) a self-
employment status (if registered as such part of the year, irrespectively of being a salaried worker
in the same year); (f) a working status comprising both salaried and self-employment. Descriptive
statistics of these individual labor market outcomes is reported in Table A.2 and A.1 below, for
low and high educated, respectively.
(a): Earnings - It is based on gross earnings, which for both RSZ and RSZPPO is defined as the
sum of all remunerations that are subject to social contributions (including holiday allowances),
excluding the allowances from contract termination: RSZ excludes premia from the definition,
5However, a worker is considered as self-employed if a given year he is registered as self-employed according to
RSVZ, or if he is not registered as such but reports positive earnings from self-employment to RSVZ.
6The notion of hours worked accounts for part-time versus full-time work. Hourly wage is constructed by dividing
yearly earnings by the total number of hours worked in a year. For details, see below.
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whereas RSZPPO includes premia and the Christmas bonus.
Earnings from salaried employment are provided in classes of 100 Euros, so that the earn-
ings class equal to 0 refers to earnings between 1 and 100 Euros. We transform yearly earnings
multiplying by 100, and adding 50 - the midpoint of the interval of each class - in order not to
underestimate real earnings. In addition to quarterly earnings by separated sources, the Ware-
house Data provide us with the sum of all earnings in a year (adding up yearly earnings from
RSZ, RSZPPO and RSVZ). Hence, for the cases in which the individuals are not working as self-
employed, we use this sum as a measure of annual earnings from dependent employment, while
for the years in which individuals are also self-employed, we compute by ourselves the sum of
earnings from RSZ and RSZPPO - hence without considering the earnings from self-employment.
Note that in this case, yearly earnings from RSZPPO and RSZ are first transformed from classes
of 100 Euros in real earnings, and then summed up to obtain a yearly measure of earnings from
dependent employment.
(b): Hours worked - The RSZ provides us with the number of working days in case of full-
time work and the number of working hours in case of part-time work, while RSZPPO give us the
number of working hours both for full-time and part-time work. To clean the data, we compute
the total number of working days in case of full-time work - in RSZ and RSZPPO, separately
- and drop the yearly observations whose values are above 312 working days per year, which
corresponds to the maximum number of working days in case of full-time work in a 6 days per
week regime. The equivalent number under a 5 days per week regime is 260. Then, for annual
observations corresponding to full-time workers who work between 260 and 312 days per year,
we assume a working regime of 6 days per week, while for the other cases we assume a working
regime of 5 days per week. We decide to focus on hours worked in order to take into account also
part-time work. Hence, for full-time work in RSZ, we convert working days in working hours,
assuming a working regime of 8 (7.6) hours per day for the period 1998-2002 (2003-2010); this
is because, in Belgium, the 7.6 hours per day regime for full-time work was introduced by law in
January 2003 to replace the 8 hours per day regime. Accordingly, for full-time work in RSZ we
transform the yearly working days in yearly working hours, by multiplying the former by 8 (7.6)
until (strictly after) 2002. Then, we add up the yearly working hours for full-time and part-time
work, and across sources (RSZ and RSZPPO) - in order to get a measure of the total number of
hours worked in a year in dependent employment.
(c):Average Hourly Wage - Average hourly wage for dependent employment is obtained by
dividing annual earnings by the annual number of hours worked, i.e. (a)/(b).
Cleaning procedure for (a),(b) and (c) - For variables (a),(b) and (c), we check the presence of
outliers according to the following procedure. Given the presence of minimum wages in Belgium,
we detect bottom outliers by comparing the average hourly wage (c) with the corresponding hourly
minimum wage.7 The official monthly minimum wages are provided by the Conseil Regional du
7As a conservative measure - i.e. in order not to detect too many outliers - for this specific comparison we assume
that earnings are at the top of each earnings-class instead of at the midpoint: i.e., multiply by 100 earnings in classes of
100 Euros and add 100 rather than 50 (as in the procedure explained in the text).
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Travail of Belgium for each year. These numbers are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index
(using the first quarter of 2011 as reference) and by age, as different percentages of the official
minimum wage are applied for workers below age 21.8 Then, for each minimum wage, year and
age category, we construct the corresponding hourly minimum wages as follows: (i) compute the
total annual earnings of a full-time worker paid at the minimum wage - by multiplying the monthly
minimum wage times 12. (ii) Compute the total number of working hours in full-time work under
the 5 and 6 days per week regimes, assuming the 8 (7.6) hours per day regime for the period
1998-2002 (2003-2010). This corresponds to 2496 (2080) annual working hours for the period
1998-2002 under the 6 (5) days per week regime, and 2371.2 (1976) annual working hours after
2003 under the 6 (5) days per week regime. (iii) Divide the total annual earnings calculated in
(i) by the alternative results in (ii) to obtain the hourly minimum wages in full-time work under
the 6 and 5 days per week regime for the period 1998-2002 and 2003-2010, respectively. (iv)
For full-time workers that were observed in the 6 days per week regime, we apply the hourly
minimum wage computed in (iii) under a 6 days per week regime; for all other workers we use the
hourly minimum wages computed in (iii) under the 5 days per week regime. We detect as bottom
outliers the annual observations in which the average hourly wage is below the corresponding
hourly minimum wage: in this case, annual hours worked, annual earnings and average hourly
wage are all replaced to missing.
Next, we check for the presence of outliers in the upper part of the distribution of annual
earnings, average hourly wages and annual hours worked. As a general rule, we consider as
top outliers the top percentile in the distribution of each of these variables. For average hourly
wage and annual hours worked, we look at the distribution pooling all years together. For annual
earnings, we identify as outliers the last percentile of the distribution of annual earnings by age,
under the assumption that earnings do not differ systematically across years, but change over age.
Similarly to the procedure used for bottom outliers, we replace to missing each of the variables
(a), (b) and (c) whenever a top outlier in any of these three variables is detected. In total, according
to this procedure 3% of the annual observations are detected as outliers. Finally, annual earnings,
annual hours worked and average hourly wages are log-transformed.
(d): Salaried Employment Rate - The dummy for working in dependent employment is built
upon the variable on annual earnings from salaried employment (a): the dummy is 1 when annual
earnings are positive (i.e. if the worker has received a wage from salaried employment for at least
1 day in the year) or when earnings are missing because outliers. This is because outliers should be
considered as employed individuals for whom one cannot calculate earnings or the time worked.
Note that this outcome considers workers who in a given year worked (only) as salaried workers
and never registered as self-employed.
(e): Self-employment Rate - Workers are defined self-employed if they are registered in the
8Workers aged 17, 18, 19 and 20 receive 76%, 82%, 88% and 94% of the official monthly minimum wage, respec-
tively. Workers aged 21 or more receive the entire official monthly minimum wage (Moulaert and Verly, 2006). As a
conservative choice, we consider the minimum wage of the previous age, i.e. we take the minimum age of those aged
17 in the year in which one turns 18.
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self-employment register in a given year. Workers who combined in the same year both salaried
and self-employment are considered self-employed (and not salaried employed).
(f): Overall Employment Rate - This dummy considers working in both salaried and self-
employed: it is the sum of (d) and (e).
A.1.3 Data Warehouse - Firm Permanent Characteristics and Firm Mobility
The Data Warehouse gives us access to data on firm characteristics where the individuals are
working in the observation period, as well as the firm identification number. We use the latter
to come up with a measure of firm mobility. Among firm characteristics, quarterly data on the
median daily wage paid out on June 30 in recruiting firms are exploited to build an indicator of
permanent firm quality. Descriptive statistics of these data outcomes is reported in Table A.2 and
A.1 below, for low and high educated, respectively.
Firm Mobility - This variable exploits the changes in the quarterly firm identification number.
Transitions between self-employment and salaried employment are included in the definition of
firm mobility, as we assign to self-employment a specific firm identifier. An individual is defined
to change firm in year t if he is observed in a different firm in at least two quarters of the year t, or
if the first firm in which he was employed in year t differs from the last firm in year t− 1.
Permanent Firm Quality - In order to obtain this indicator of permanent firm quality we apply
the following procedure, which is very close to Oreopoulos et al. (2012). (i) Quarterly nominal
values of median daily wages paid by the firm are deflated by using two indexes of nominal wage
trend from Belgostat (base year 1997) for white and blue collar workers, respectively; these are
then converted in real terms by using the CPI (base year 2011). (ii) The data are log-transformed.
(iii) Seasonal effects are taken out by regressing the quarterly time-varying data on dummies for
quarters. (iv) The residuals from this regression are averaged by firm over the observed quarters, as
many quarters as median daily wages are observed for each firm. Note that, due to this procedure,
permanent characteristics are expressed in deviation from the average: for instance, a negative
(positive) value of the median salary paid by the firm in a given quarter means that the firm paid less
(more) compared to the average. (v) Since individuals may have changed firm within a calendar
year, for each individual we average over the quarters of year t the permanent characteristics
corresponding to the firms where an individual is observed working in t. This allows to get an
annual indicator of the permanent characteristics of the average firm where an individual was
employed.
A.1.4 Data Warehouse - Geographical Mobility
Geographical mobility is based on the province of residence, which for year t is measured in
December of year t − 1. The definition of the variable is as follows: an individual is defined to
move in year t, if he lives in another province at the end of year t than where he lived at the end of
year t− 1. Note that, differently from all other outcomes which are observed for the period 1998-
2010, residence is observed for the year in which individuals turn age 18 (which corresponds
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to year 1994, 1996 and 1998 for individuals born in 1976, 1978 and 1980, respectively) until
year 2010. Therefore, using our definition we are able to define the province of residence from
experience 1 onwards for low (high) educated, for all graduation cohorts - in particular for low-
educated who graduates in the period 1994-1996, whose first year of experience occurs before
1998 (period at which the other outcomes are not observed). Note that this extra-availability of
data on residence does not make a difference for high educated, as the first year of experience
for the first graduation cohort occurs in 1998. Descriptive statistics of geographical mobility is
reported in Table A.2 below.
A.1.5 LFS - Provincial URate
We use the 1994-2010 provincial unemployment rate series of the working population aged 15-64
(considering both men and women) based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), since these series
use the internationally accepted ILO definition of unemployment. In order to check the reliability
we compared these series to the administrative ones provided by the National Employment Office
of Belgium (RVA - Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening) also available from 1994 onwards. In
the latter series the unemployment rate is defined as the ratio of the number of unemployment ben-
efit recipients searching for jobs to the number of individuals insured against unemployment. In
general this results into higher unemployment rate figures than those of the LFS, but the evolution
over time is overall very similar. Nevertheless, for the province Limburg, the two series displayed
a very different pattern between 1994 and 1997. In those of the LFS the unemployment rates were
increasing during these years while they were evolving downwards in the series of RVA. Since
the unemployment rates in the other provinces were moving down in this period according to both
data sources, we believe that a serious measurement error biases the LFS unemployment rate of
Limburg severely during these years. Based on the RVA data, we therefore adjusted the LFS series
of the unemployment rate of Limburg for the period 1994-1997. The details of the adjustment
procedure can be obtained from the authors on request.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Individual Labor Market Outcomes, Permanent Firm Quality and Mobility: High Educated.
Variable Missings Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Label
Annual Discrete Individual Labor Market Outcomes
salaried 0 14490 0.830 0.375 0 1 1 if earnings>0 from salaried empl. in year t(& not self-empl.)
self-empl 0 14490 0.142 0.349 0 1 1 if registered as self-empl. in t
overall empl. 0 14490 0.972 0.165 0 1 1 if either salaried or self-empl. in t
Annual Continuous Individual Labor Market Outcomes§
earnings 1979 12511 29705.360 10424.370 150 65550 gross earnings if salaried empl. in t (level)
hours worked 1979 12511 1778.674 431.405 5 2256 hours worked (FT+PT) if salaried empl. in t (level)
hourly wage 1979 12511 16.708 4.490 6.667 33.093 average hourly wage if salaried empl. in t (level)
FT hours 1979 12511 1633.485 655.300 0 2256 Full-Time hours worked if salaried empl. in t (level)
PT hours 1979 12511 145.189 378.582 0 2252 Part-Time hours worked if salaried empl. in t (level)
log earnings 1979 12511 10.191 0.603 5.011 11.091 log gross earnings if salaried empl. in t (logarithm)
log hours worked 1979 12511 7.409 0.535 1.609 7.721 log hours worked if salaried empl. in t (logarithm)
log hourly wage 1979 12511 2.782 0.258 1.897 3.499 log average hourly wage if salaried empl. in t(logarithm)
Annual Permanent Firm Quality (raw values)
median daily wage‡ 1780 12710 134.2078 33.50615 36.143 394.07 avg over quarters of median daily wage paid in recruiting firm in t
Annual Mobility
firm mobility‡‡ 676 13814 0.217 0.412 0 1 1 if change firm compared to last observed quarter in t− 1 or within t
geographical mobility†† 34 14456 0.032 0.175 0 1 1 if change province of residence in year t compared to t− 1
This table is based on the sample of high-educated graduating in the period 1997-2007, i.e. the sample studied in Chapter 1.
§ Outliers in any of the continuous outcomes are replaced to missings (for all countinuos outcomes) and still considered as salaried employed with not reliable info in terms of working hours, hourly wage
and earnings. Continuous outcomes in level are related as follows: earnings=hours worked*hourly wage; FT hours+PT hours=hours worked. Log-transformed continuous variables are linearly related as
follows: log earnings=log hours worked+log hourly wage.
‡We do not report descriptive statistics based on the variable used in the main analysis, since it is based on residuals (see Section A.1.3 for details) and therefore its values are not informative of permanent
firms’ quality. In contrast, to get some descriptive statistics we construct this variable according to the following “naive" procedure, which maintains the original values of the data. (i) Quarterly nominal
values of median daily wage are deflated by using two indexes of nominal wage trend from Belgostat (base year 1997), for white and blue collar workers respectively, and then converted in real terms by
using the CPI (base year 2011). (ii) Quarterly values are averaged by firm over all quarters in the observation period to get a measure of permanent characteristics of each firm (in the main analysis we
additionally take out seasonal trends in a regression-based procedure). (iii) Average over quarters to get permanent characteristic of the average firm when a worker works in more than one firm in t.
‡‡ Firm mobility is a dummy=1 in year t if he is observed in a different firm in at least two quarters of the t, or if the first firm in which he was employed in t differs from the last firm in t− 1. Transitions
between self-employment and salaried employment are included in the definition.
†† Geographical mobility is a dummy=1 in year t if an individual lives in another province at the end of t than where he lived at the end of t− 1. Note that the missings in geographical mobility refer to
missing residence in year 2011, which is used to look at geographical mobility for the last calendar year (2010). These observations were not dropped because year 2011 was not used in the main analysis.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of Individual Labor Market Outcomes, Permanent Firm Quality and Mobility: Low Educated.
Variable Missings Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Label
Annual Discrete Individual Labor Market Outcomes
salaried 0 20507 0.833 0.373 0 1 1 if earnings>0 from salaried empl. in year t(& not self-empl.)
self-empl. 0 20507 0.128 0.335 0 1 1 if registered as self-empl. in t
overall empl. 0 20507 0.961 0.194 0 1 1 if either salaried or self-empl. in t
Annual Continuous Individual Labor Market Outcomes§
earnings 2993 17514 22667.740 8627.685 50 64550 gross earnings if salaried empl. in t (level)
hours worked 2993 17514 1619.597 472.970 5 2264 hours worked (PT+FT) if salaried empl. in t (level)
hourly wage 2993 17514 13.931 3.217 6.579 32.895 average hourly wage if salaried empl. in t (level)
FT hours 2993 17514 1474.114 644.758 0 2264 Full-Time hours worked if salaried empl. in t (level)
PT hours 2993 17514 145.483 359.528 0 2252 Part-Time hours worked if salaried empl. in t (level)
log earnings 2993 17514 9.891 0.686 3.912 11.075 log gross earnings if salaried empl. in t (logarithm)
log hours worked 2993 17514 7.281 0.647 1.609 7.725 log hours worked if salaried empl. in t (logarithm)
log hourly wage 2993 17514 2.610 0.213 1.884 3.493 log average hourly wage if salaried empl. in t (logarithm)
Annual Permanent Firm Quality (raw values)
median daily wage‡ 2898 17609 116.1369 34.23114 7.0392 727.32 avg over quarters of median daily wage paid out in recruiting firm in t
Annual Mobility
firm mobility‡‡ 1362 19145 0.246 0.431 0 1 1 if change firm compared to last observed quarter in t− 1 or within t
geographical mobility†† 35 21636 0.015 0.120 0 1 1 if change province of residence in year t compared to t− 1
This table is based on the sample of low-educated graduating in the period 1994-2001, i.e. the sample studied in Chapter 1.
§ Outliers in any of the continuous outcomes are replaced to missings (for all countinuos outcomes) and still considered as salaried employed with not reliable info in terms of working hours, hourly wage
and earnings. Continuous outcomes in level are related as follows: earnings=hours worked*hourly wage; FT hours+PT hours=hours worked. Log-transformed continuous variables are linearly related as
follows: log earnings=log hours worked+log hourly wage.
‡We do not report descriptive statistics based on the variable used in the main analysis, since it is based on residuals (see Section A.1.3 for details) and therefore its values are not informative of permanent
firms’ quality. In contrast, to get some descriptive statistics we construct this variable according to the following “naive" procedure, which maintains the original values of the data. (i) Quarterly nominal
values of median daily wage are deflated by using two indexes of nominal wage trend from Belgostat (base year 1997), for white and blue collar workers respectively, and then converted in real terms by
using the CPI (base year 2011). (ii) Quarterly values are averaged by firm over all quarters in the observation period to get a measure of permanent characteristics of each firm (in the main analysis we
additionally take out seasonal trends in a regression-based procedure). (iii) Average over quarters to get permanent characteristic of the average firm when a worker works in more than one firm in t.
‡‡ Firm mobility is a dummy=1 in year t if he is observed in a different firm in at least two quarters of the t, or if the first firm in which he was employed in t differs from the last firm in t− 1. Transitions
between self-employment and salaried employment are included in the definition.
†† Geographical mobility is a dummy=1 in year t if an individual lives in another province at the end of t than where he lived at the end of t− 1. Note that, differently from all other outcomes which are
observed for the period 1998-2010, this variable is observed from the year in which individuals turn age 18 (1994, 1996, 1998 if born in 1976, 1978 and 1980, respectively) until 2010. Thus the residence is
observed from experience 1 also for low educated who graduated in 1994, 1995, 1996, whose residence is observed in calendar year 1995-1997. Missings in geographical mobility refer to missing
residence in 2011, which is used to look at geographical mobility for 2010. These observations were not dropped because year 2011 was not used in the main analysis.
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Table A.3: Employment Status Decomposition.
Low educated High educated
freq. % freq. % freq. % freq. %
not working 800 3.9 407 2.81
overall employment 19,707 96.1 14,083 97.19
of which:
salaried employed 17073 83.25 12,030 83.02
self-employed 2634 12.84 2,053 14.17
total 19,707 96.1 14,083 97.19
total 20,507 100 14,490 100
Not working refers to situations of unemployment, education, or being out of the labor market. Salaried employment and
self-employment add up to overall employment.
Table A.4: Availability of Firms’ Characteristics.
Individual Continuous Labor Market Outcomes If Salaried
Low educated High educated
Firm’s Characteristics Missings Obs Total Missings Obs Total
Missings 2,453 505§ 2,958 1,582 235§ 1,817
Obs 540† 17,009 17,549 397† 12,276 12,673
total 2,993 17,514 20,507 1,979 12,511 14,490
§ These observations are outliers in earnings. These individuals are still considered as salaried employed, but their corresponding
earnings, hours worked and hourly wages are replaced to missing because the information is not reliable. For this reason firms’
characteristics may be available also for outliers in earnings.
† For these observations firms’ characteristics are missings even if the individuals are working as salaried employed.
A.2 Sample selection
The original Sonar sample contains 8958 individuals between men and women. From this sample
we exclude the following observations, so to have a homogeneous sample: individuals who did
not complete compulsory education, i.e. those who quit compulsory education by 31 December of
the year one turns age 17 (0.17% of original Sonar sample);9 individuals who are not Flemish, i.e.
either do not have Belgian nationality or do not use to speak Dutch at the parental house (5.10%);
individuals who attend special needs education (0.92%). Moreover, we focus on men (50.85%),
since female labor supply is likely to differ from the male one due to mothering. We drop individ-
uals with missing values in the following individual control variables, since this involves a small
number of observations (2.19%): number of brothers, number of sisters, cohort, educational track
at age 17 and completed education at age 17.
9In the remainder of this section the percentages of observations are computed relative to the size of the original
Sonar sample, i.e. out of 8958 individuals.
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Imputation procedure for parental education - Father and mother education are defined as
completed school-leaving age minus 12, so that these variables give the number of years of school-
ing attained from the beginning of secondary education. Missing values are about 10.69% and
8.86% for father and mother respectively. In order to maximize the size of the sample used in
the analysis, these missing values have been imputed, according to a regression based procedure,
which adds a randomized residual to the predicted variables.10 The imputation procedure exploits
the individual controls listed above - i.e. controls with no missing - and mother and father edu-
cation - which have missings. Intuitively, the imputation is performed such that, for observations
with missing values in one parent’s education but not in the education of his/her partner, the linear
prediction for the missing values exploits also the information on his/her partner’s education, in
addition to the information provided by the controls with no missings. In contrast, for observations
with missing value in both mother and father education, the linear predictions for each parental
education exploits only information provided by the controls with no missings. An error term
extracted from a logistic distribution is added to the linear predictions. Then, the probability of an
outcome is computed, by transforming the corresponding predictions by the inverse logit function.
Finally, to each missing we assign the outcome for which the predicted probability is maximum.
Imputation procedure for residence - Data on the province of residence are collected from the
year in which individuals turn age 18 (which corresponds to year 1994, 1996 and 1998 for co-
hort born in year 1976, 1978 and 1980, respectively). Considering all the observation period, this
information is missing in at least 1 year for 3.45%. In order to maximize the size of the sample
used in the analysis, missings in residence are imputed if the following two conditions are met: (i)
the socio-economic position of the individual is known in the year in which residence is missing
(i.e. if he is employed, unemployed or inactive according to the socio-economic position variable
provided from the Data Warehouse): this is an indication that he still resided in Belgium in that
particular year; (ii) the residence does not change the year before and the year after missing(s).
That is, missings in residence are not imputed if individuals have unknown socio-economic posi-
tion in the year of missing residence (which means that they are abroad in that year), or if their
residence changes before and after missing. Note that condition (i) is directly available from the
socio-economic position variable, which attributes value 4 if the position in unknown (values 1, 2
or 3 are assigned to employed, unemployed or inactive status respectively). This procedure allows
us to impute and hence retain 2.22% missing observations.
We further restrict to individuals residing in Flanders in the moment of graduation (1.1%) and
drop individual graduating from age 25 onwards (2.15%). This selection leaves us with a sample
of 3624 male individuals graduating at age 18-24. Last, to avoid complications in the estimation
procedure, we restrict the sample to the following graduation periods: graduation year 1994-2001
for low-educated and graduation year 1997-2004 for high-educated. The final sample consists of
3514 male individuals. Descriptive statistics of the individual control variables for the final sample
10The addition of the error term aims at improving the regression-based imputation, which alone shows the following
drawbacks: (i) distortion of variance, with respect to the trade-off between variance and bias; (ii) normative decision of
the covariates for the predictions (Frick and Grabka, 2003; Kalwij and van Soest, 2005; Särndal and Lundström, 2005).
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are reported in Table 1.1 of Appendix 1.8.
Finally, we consider 12 years of experience for the low educated and 10 years of experience
for the high educated: low educated are followed longer since they graduate earlier. We make
this selection based on the availability of the labor market outcomes, because we want to observe
at least 4 graduation cohorts for a particular number of years of experience. The reason for that
is that there needs to be some variation in the unemployment rate to identify the effect of the
unemployment rate at graduation. Given that labor market outcomes are observed until year 2010
and we consider graduation year 1994-2001 (1997-2004) for low (high) educated, it follows that
experience 12 (10) is observed for low (high) educated for the graduation cohorts 1994-1998
(1997-2000).
A.3 Description of the Final Sample
Table A.5: Final Sample by Graduation Year and Birth Cohort: Entire Sample.
Number of Individuals Fraction of sample
grad_year c76 c78 c80 Total grad_year c76 c78 c80 Total
1994 143 0 0 143 1994 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04
1995 209 0 0 209 1995 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06
1996 168 149 0 317 1996 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.09
1997 154 240 0 394 1997 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.11
1998 185 203 187 575 1998 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.16
1999 191 137 242 570 1999 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.16
2000 115 163 163 441 2000 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.13
2001 0 153 154 307 2001 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.09
2002 0 138 142 280 2002 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.08
2003 0 0 172 172 2003 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05
2004 0 0 106 106 2004 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
Total 1,165 1,183 1,166 3,514 Total 0.33 0.34 0.33 1.00
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Table A.6: Dividing the Sample between Low and High Educated.
completed education§ low educated high educated Total
2 39 0 39
3 89 0 89
4 113 0 113
5 185 0 185
6 1,096 0 1,096
7 363 224 587
8 0 53 53
9 0 710 710
10 0 371 371
11 0 236 236
12 0 34 34
13 0 1 1
Total 1,885 1,629 3,514
§ Completed education refers to the number of years of education successfully attained from the beginning of secondary education,
i.e. at age 12. Low educated are those who graduated with at most secondary education, which consists in 6 years of education (7
years in case of vocational track; 6 years for all other educational tracks). Therefore, low educated are those with at most 6 years of
completed education if enrolled in general, technical, Part-Time vocational/apprenticeship program, and 7 years if enrolled in
vocational education. High educated are those with higher completed education.
Table A.7: Final Sample: Number of Individuals by Graduation Year and Province of Residence at Gradu-
ation.
Low educated High educated
grad_year prov1 prov2 prov3 prov4 prov5 Total prov1 prov2 prov3 prov4 prov5 Total
1994 30 9 31 48 25 143
1995 47 22 44 48 48 209
1996 84 45 65 85 38 317
1997 78 41 65 67 36 287 29 14 24 19 21 107
1998 111 46 78 90 61 386 49 29 50 44 17 189
1999 99 42 47 64 47 299 56 54 61 63 37 271
2000 57 18 30 28 31 164 74 66 42 63 32 277
2001 26 8 11 17 18 80 62 39 45 48 33 227
2002 89 53 53 53 32 280
2003 54 35 24 33 26 172
2004 32 19 17 25 13 106
Total 532 231 371 447 304 1,885 445 309 316 348 211 1,629
The analysis considers the graduation period 1994-2001 and 1997-2004 for low and high educated, respectively. Provinces are in the
following order from 1-5: Antwerp, Flemish Brabant, Western Flanders, Eastern Flanders, Limburg. Each combination of graduation
year and province of residence at graduation represents a cluster gp in the main analysis. The number of individuals in each cluster
corresponds to the cluster size.
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Table A.8: Average Years of Completed Education by Graduation Year & Birth Cohort.
Low educated High educated
grad_year all cohorts c76 c78 c80 all cohorts c76 c78 c80
1994 5.02 5.02
1995 5.91 5.91
1996 5.61 6.03 5.14
1997 5.84 6.04 5.77 8.09 8.41 7.00
1998 5.43 5.95 6.04 4.80 8.78 9.05 7.12
1999 6.10 6.15 6.16 6.08 9.13 9.58 8.55 7.00
2000 6.19 6.50 6.25 6.18 9.23 9.79 9.10 7.05
2001 6.19 5.80 6.21 9.40 9.86 8.53
2002 9.45 9.85 9.06
2003 9.76 9.76
2004 10.33 10.33
Total 5.75 5.76 5.75 5.74 9.28 9.28 9.23 9.31
The analysis considers the graduation period 1994-2001 and 1997-2004 for low and high educated, respectively. Completed
education refers to the number of years of education successfully attained from the beginning of second education, i.e. at age 12.
Table A.9: Prevalent Function§ Undertaken in the Observation Period.
Low educated High educated
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
blue-collar 1,297 68.81 68.81 177 10.87 10.87
white-collar 432 22.92 91.72 1,306 80.17 91.04
fonctionnaire 78 4.14 95.86 81 4.97 96.01
missing 78 4.14 100 65 3.99 100
Total 1,885 100 1,629 100
§ “Prevalent function” means the function that is undertaken more than 50% of the time in the observation period. 69% of the low
educated are prevalently employed as blue collar workers, while for the high educated this figure is only 11%. Therefore, there is
clear correspondence between low (high) educated and blue (white) collar workers.
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A.4 Firm Mobility by Potential Experience.
Table A.10: Firm Mobility by Potential Experience.
Low Educated High Educated
Pot. exp: Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 1,089 0.43 0.49 0 1 1,472 0.35 0.48 0 1
2 1,396 0.35 0.48 0 1 1,524 0.27 0.45 0 1
3 1,598 0.30 0.46 0 1 1,548 0.24 0.43 0 1
4 1,753 0.28 0.45 0 1 1,557 0.23 0.42 0 1
5 1,761 0.25 0.43 0 1 1,558 0.22 0.41 0 1
6 1,765 0.24 0.43 0 1 1,557 0.18 0.38 0 1
7 1,769 0.22 0.42 0 1 1,459 0.17 0.37 0 1
8 1,767 0.21 0.41 0 1 1,299 0.17 0.37 0 1
9 1,778 0.21 0.40 0 1 1,032 0.16 0.36 0 1
10 1,687 0.19 0.39 0 1 808 0.13 0.33 0 1
11 1,537 0.17 0.38 0 1
12 1,245 0.17 0.37 0 1
overall 19,145 0.25 0.43 0 1 13,814 0.22 0.41 0 1
The analysis considers the graduation period 1994-2001 and 1997-2004 for low and high educated, respectively.
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Table A.11: Cumulative Firm Mobility by Experience (Proportion).
Low educated Potential experience years
cumulative firm mobility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total
0 0.63 0.44 0.36 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 3.16
1 0.37 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20 3.35
2 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 2.09
3 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 1.41
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.92
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.52
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.28
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.17
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 12.00
changed > 2 out of 5 y§ 0.25
changed > 3 out of 5 y 0.10
changed > 4 out of 5 y 0.02
changed > 2 out of 10 y 0.46
changed > 3 out of 10 y 0.31
changed > 4 out of 10 y 0.18
High educated Potential experience years
cumulative firm mobility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
0 0.71 0.56 0.45 0.37 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.17 3.45
1 0.29 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.26 3.28
2 0.00 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.24 1.83
3 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.85
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.40
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.15
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 10.00
changed > 2 out of 5 y§ 0.12
changed > 3 out of 5 y 0.03
changed > 4 out of 5 y 0.00
changed > 2 out of 10 y 0.32
changed > 3 out of 10 y 0.16
changed > 4 out of 10 y 0.07
The analysis considers the graduation period 1994-2001 and 1997-2004 for low and high educated, respectively. Moreover, the
sample of low educated in this case is restricted to individuals who are observed continuously from experience 1 to 12. Note that in
the sample of analysis not all low educated individuals are observed continuously throughout 12 years of experience because of
availability of the data: labor market outcomes are provided for the period 1998-2010, while graduation period ranges 1994-2001 for
low educated. This means that only individuals graduating from 1997 are observed from experience 1, which occurs in year 1998; in
contrast, those for instance graduating in 1994 are observed from experience 4 (1994+4=1998). For high educated this is not a
problem as the first graduation cohort graduates in 1997.
§ This statistic means “proportion who changed job in more than 2 out of the first 5 years after graduation”: it is computed by
summing up the cells in column 5 of the above matrix from row 3 until the last one. The other statistics are computed similarly.
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A.5 Testing for the Endogeneity of the Graduation Cohort
A.5.1 Is the Timing of Graduation Endogenous?
According to economic theory the effect of economic conditions on the timing of graduation is am-
biguous. On the one hand, a recession decreases the expected labor market income and, hence, the
opportunity cost of education. On the other hand, it also reduces the expected returns to education
and liquidity of the parents to finance education, so that early school leaving is enhanced. Existing
empirical evidence is also mixed, but usually finds that unemployment raises the enrollment rate
(see e.g. Card and Lemieux, 2001 and Clark, 2011). Micklewright et al. (1990) by contrast find
that the regional unemployment rate tends to reduce the demand for schooling. Petrongolo and
San Segundo (2002) and more recently Tumino and Taylor (2013a) report that the youth unem-
ployment rate, as proxy for the opportunity cost, raises the probability of remaining in education,
while the adult unemployment rate, as proxy for the returns, reduces this probability.
For our purpose it is important to rule out that the adult unemployment rate affects the timing
of graduation. If this were the case, then it would affect the composition of the graduation cohort
over the business cycle and any association between the unemployment rate and some labor market
outcome could just reflect this variable composition rather than a causal effect. To test this we
check whether the age of graduation is related to the provincial unemployment rate in that year.
Since in Belgium education is compulsory until age 18, we can implement this test by estimating a
discrete duration model in which we regress an indicator of graduating since age 17 on birth cohort
dummies, individual characteristics xi and the province of living measured at age 17, the elapsed
duration in education since age 17, and the unemployment rate in each potential year of graduation
(interacted with the elapsed duration), and by subsequently testing whether the coefficients of
latter interactions are jointly significantly different from zero. We deal with selectivity induced by
unobserved heterogeneity. The data are clustered in 15 clusters according to the birth year b (1976,
1978 or 1980) and the five provinces p of living at age 17. Problems of inference induced by the
small number of clusters are solved in a similar two step approach as in the main analysis.11
We follow Kiefer (1988) and Jenkins (1995) to estimate the discrete duration model as a se-
quence of (yearly) binary choices from age 17 until age 24 (a ∈ {17, 18, ..., 24}).12 In order to
obtain correctly sized standard errors, we first regress the discrete-time hazard rate of graduating
at a particular age on xi and the group-age fixed effects µ
h
bpa∗ , where superscript h allows distin-
guishing these effects from the µgpt in the main analysis and a
∗ ≡ a − 17. In a second step the
estimated µˆhbpa∗ are then linearly regressed on the covariates that vary at the group-age level, one
of which is the provincial unemployment rate.
In the first step, the conditional discrete-time hazard hibpa∗(xi, ǫ
h) is assumed to take on the
11Notice that the size of all groups always satisfy the aforementioned rule of Cochran (1954), so that the asymptotic
inference should work in this case.
12In order to maintain the same data as those that are used in the main analysis as well as to avoid problems of
inference induced by too small cell sizes, we right censor duration at the end of the year in which individuals become
24.
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complementary log-log specification:
hibpa∗(xi, ǫ
h) ≡ P (A∗ibp = a
∗|A∗ibp ≥ a
∗;xi, ǫ
h) = 1− exp
[
− exp
(
µhbpa∗ + x
′
iδ
h + ǫh
)]
(A.1)
where A∗ibp is the random age (minus 17) at which individual i of birth cohort b and living at age
17 in province p graduates and ǫh is realization of a random individual unobserved heterogeneity
term Eh that is independently distributed from xi, b and p.
This model is estimated by maximum likelihood. To form the likelihood, note that the discrete
survival rate at age a∗ is simply
∏a∗
s=1
(
1− hibps(xi, ǫ
h)
)
. Consequently, if ci denotes an indicator
that is equal to zero in case of right censoring, i.e. in case that individual i is still in education at
the start of the calendar year in which he becomes 25 (a∗ = 25 − 17 = 8), and one otherwise.
Then the log-likelihood function (from which the unobserved heterogeneity is integrated out) can
be expressed as follows:
logL =
N∑
i=1
log
∫ ∞
−∞
[
hibpa∗(xi, ǫ
h)
]ci a∗−1∏
s=1
(
1− hibps(xi, ǫ
h)
)
dG(ǫh) (A.2)
where N denotes the total number of observations and G(ǫh) is the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity. We perform a sensitivity analysis in which (i) ǫh = 0, (ii) ǫh is Normally distributed
with mean zero, or (iii) exp(ǫh) is Gamma distributed with mean one.
In the second step, the following linear regression is estimated by FGLS according to the
methods described in Section 2.4.4:
µˆhbpa∗ = γ
h
a∗ + β
h
a∗upt + η
h
p + λ
h
b + v
h
bpa∗ (A.3)
where t ≡ b + a is the year of potential graduation, γha∗ is an age specific fixed effect describing
the evolution of the baseline hazard, ηhp a provincial specific effect, λ
h
b a birth cohort fixed effect,
and vhbpa∗ = e
h
pba∗ + (µˆ
h
bpa∗ − µ
h
bpa∗) is completely analogously defined as in Section 2.4.4. The
parameters of interest are βha∗ . They measure the effect of the provincial unemployment rate upt
on the hazard rate of graduating in that year. We test their joint significance.
Appendix A 161
Table A.12: Test for Exogenenous Timing of Graduation: Second Step FGLS.
(1) (2) (3)
Unobserved heterogeneity (UH) without UH Gamma distributed Normally distributed
Top panel: βha∗ restricted to be equal for all ages
βha∗ 0.0239 0.0497 0.0438
(0.0299) (0.0347) (0.0369)
Parameters in second step 14 14 14
Obs in second step 105 105 105
P-value of chi2 test 0.2983 0.7168 0.9251
Bottom panel: βha∗ allowed to vary over ages
βha∗ at a*=1 -0.0039 -0.0021 0.0033
(0.0488) (0.0547) (0.0640)
βha∗ at a*=2 0.1172** 0.1401** 0.1513**
(0.0504) (0.0575) (0.0642)
βha∗ at a*=3 0.0319 0.0705 0.0683
(0.0524) (0.0559) (0.0581)
βha∗ at a*=4 0.0486 0.0647 0.0540
(0.0613) (0.0653) (0.0671)
βha∗ at a*=5 -0.0646 -0.0498 -0.0545
(0.0619) (0.0656) (0.0675)
βha∗ at a*=6 0.0452 0.0878 0.0794
(0.0529) (0.0592) (0.0617)
βha∗ at a*=7 -0.0908 -0.0377 -0.0514
(0.0807) (0.1048) (0.1019)
Parameters in second step 20 20 20
Obs in second step 105 105 105
P-value of chi2 test 0.423 0.800 0.948
Test of joint significance of βha∗ (P-val)
†: 0.334 0.075 0.118
log variance of UH (first step)§ - -0.0041 1.3160***
- (0.0827) (0.2398)
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. The table shows the effect of increasing
the provincial unemployment upt by one pp on the hazard rate of graduating in that year. Since the event starts from age 18 and is
right-censored after age 24, the baseline hazard a∗ = age− 17 ranges from 1-7. The top panel reports the estimate of βha∗ in (A.3);
the bottom panel reports the estimates of βha∗ obtained from estimating (A.3) in which the provincial unemployment rate upt is
interacted with age specific FE of the baseline hazard. The estimates are obtained from a two-step FGLS described in detail in
Section 2.4.4 and briefly below. First step: (A.1) is estimated by maximum likelihood, either neglecting the unobserved heterogeneity
(UH) (column 1), or assuming that the UH is Gamma or Normally distributed (column 2 and 3). Second step: (A.3) is estimated by
FGLS, where the inverse of the variance matrix of the µˆh
bpa∗
in the first step is used as weight. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic
rejects the model (P-value>0.05), standard errors clustered at the bp level are reported; otherwise conventional ones. These
estimations are computed on the entire sample, i.e. without distinguishing between low and high educated.
† For the bottom panel it tests the null hypothesis that all βha∗ are equal to zero.
§ The estimated log of the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity is obtained from the first step.
Table A.12 presents the outcome of the test regarding the exogeneity of the timing of gradu-
ation. We report for all three duration models (without, Gamma and Normally distributed unob-
served heterogeneity) the parameters of interest in the second step FGLS regression of Equation
(A.3), i.e. the coefficients γha∗ of the provincial unemployment rate upt, and the log of the vari-
ance of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (if applicable). In the top panel we report the
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results of the models in which we restrict all γha∗ to be equal over age, while the bottom panel the
results of the unrestricted models are displayed.
According to the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistics none of the six specifications can be rejected
against the saturated model, so that the conventional standard errors are reported. The unrestricted
model assuming Normally distributed unobserved heterogeneity provides the best fit to the data. In
line with theory, the estimated coefficients in the models accounting for heterogeneity are in most
cases larger in absolute value than in the models neglecting it. In the restricted models none of the
parameters of interest are significantly different from zero. In the unrestricted models, a higher
unemployment rate highly significantly accelerates school leaving at age 19 (a∗ = 2). However,
the coefficients at other ages are never significant, do not display any systematic pattern and can
even have the opposite sign. Moreover, we do not have any clear explanation for this finding. We
therefore argue that the significant result is obtained by chance. The fact that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that all γha∗ are equal to zero (see the bottom line of bottom panel in Table A.12), is
in line with this interpretation. We therefore conclude that the timing of graduation is exogenous
to the business cycle. Further evidence for this conclusion is reported in Section A.9, where we
show that our main findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of the completed number of years of
education as a control variable.
A.5.2 Is the Province of Residence at Graduation Influenced by Local Labor Mar-
ket Conditions?
Our identification strategy requires that youths (or their parents, if youth still live at their parents’
house) do not move prior to graduation to provinces where the unemployment rate falls relatively
to other provinces. For then the composition of recent graduates in provinces would be correlated
with local labor market conditions, and it would no longer be possible to disentangle the effects
of the latter from the former. To check whether this is a threat to identification, we measured the
fraction of youth in our sample that has changed residence between the first year that our data
inform about the place of living, i.e. on December 31 of the year in which the individual turns 17,
and the moment at which the unemployment rate at graduation ugp, our main regressor of interest,
is measured, i.e. at the start of the year of graduation. Since only 0.44% of the individuals in the
sample changed residence in that period, the issue can be safely ignored.
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A.6 Complete Estimation Results for Low Educated
Table A.13: First Step Estimation: Low Educated.
Outcomes: discrete continuous
salaried self-empl. log wage log hours FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
live in single-parent 0.0284 -0.0460 -0.0152 0.0481 -6.4318 34.1092
(0.0516) (0.0520) (0.0177) (0.0639) (56.9915) (24.6182)
not live with parents 0.0537** -0.0436* -0.0217 -0.0488 -54.1461 19.8639
(0.0265) (0.0251) (0.0143) (0.0460) (41.9977) (17.0054)
HH members aged 0-11 -0.0142 0.0136 0.0015 -0.0566** -40.4398** 1.7354
(0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0060) (0.0241) (18.8287) (7.4735)
HH members aged 12-17 0.0147 -0.0138 -0.0043 0.0132 8.8881 1.0011
(0.0111) (0.0102) (0.0058) (0.0142) (16.6629) (7.6926)
HH members aged 18-29 -0.0008 0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0167 -16.9359 3.8838
(0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0052) (0.0130) (14.8053) (6.4400)
HH members aged 30-64 0.0037 -0.0114 0.0013 0.0561 46.8355 -3.4421
(0.0457) (0.0466) (0.0137) (0.0557) (45.1878) (17.7092)
HH members aged 65+ 0.0132 -0.0106 -0.0041 0.0773** 64.2378* -18.0643
(0.0356) (0.0347) (0.0133) (0.0306) (37.0874) (21.8596)
father education -0.0027 0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0038 -6.4999* 3.7912**
(0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0032) (3.6161) (1.6774)
mother education -0.0107*** 0.0102*** -0.0018 -0.0092** -11.1093*** 3.6916*
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0040) (4.0517) (1.8991)
years of delay in sec.edu 0.0118 -0.0250** -0.0116** -0.0892*** -96.0414*** 20.2979***
(0.0110) (0.0101) (0.0053) (0.0144) (14.9899) (7.1780)
technical edu† 0.0304 0.0189 0.0223* 0.1598*** 137.5642*** -28.0554
(0.0276) (0.0262) (0.0134) (0.0402) (41.6928) (18.6938)
vocational edu† 0.0346 0.0210 -0.0179 0.0706* -2.3482 -3.4916
(0.0281) (0.0267) (0.0134) (0.0401) (41.5358) (18.9772)
apprenticeship/PT voc† -0.0460 0.0814** -0.0187 0.1766*** 89.3406 -20.8304
(0.0430) (0.0402) (0.0186) (0.0580) (59.9006) (27.6646)
birth cohort78†† 0.0084 -0.0220 -0.0135 -0.0991*** -128.2615*** 14.3591
(0.0280) (0.0273) (0.0134) (0.0321) (35.1430) (15.3584)
birth cohort80†† -0.0087 -0.0234 -0.0348** -0.2619*** -305.1146*** 55.8014**
(0.0384) (0.0370) (0.0177) (0.0486) (51.1070) (22.5020)
cluster-time FE§ Not reported
Observations 32,466 34,164 34,164
R-squared 0.7253 0.9928 0.8171
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. The table reports the results from
estimating (3) in Section 2.4.4 on mentioned outcomes. This is the first step regression of the two-step FGLS approach, described in
detail in the aforementioned Section. Since the outcomes satisfy adding-up constraints (salaried
employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours
worked=total hours worked), this first step is estimated from an OLS SUR on the first two outcomes in the sum. For discrete
outcomes in column 1-2, (3) is estimated by Linear Probability Model. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The
individual control variables, measured when the individuals are aged 17, are reported in order: 1 if live with single parent; 1 if not
live with either parents; number of other household members in different age classes; parent’s education; years of delay in secondary
education; choice of educational track in secondary education; birth cohort dummies. These variables are expressed in deviation from
the mean. Cluster-time fixed effects µˆgpt are not reported.
† Choice of educational track in secondary education: reference is general education.
†† Birth dummies: reference is born in 1976.
§ Cluster-time FE identify observations referring to individuals graduating in year g, living in province p at graduation and whose
outcome is measured in calendar year y. The FE included in the regression on discrete outcomes differ from the ones included in the
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regression on continuous outcomes, because different selection rules are applied for discrete and continuous outcomes, and hence
different groups are retained (see Table 1.2 in Appendix 1.8 and Section 2.4.4).
Table A.14: Second Step OLS Estimation: Low Educated.
Outcomes: discrete continuous
salaried self-empl. log wage log hours§ FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
URate_grad -0.0115 0.0328 -0.0080 -0.0119 -24.9982 27.2606
(0.0239) (0.0221) (0.0177) (0.0414) (42.3072) (19.7239)
URate_grad*lin_exp 0.0128** -0.0160*** 0.0000 -0.0093 -10.0671 -2.8690
(0.0057) (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0181) (12.9797) (9.2303)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>3 -0.0158** 0.0131** -0.0016 0.0096 16.1812 -0.8707
(0.0071) (0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0206) (15.0691) (11.9548)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>6 0.0006 0.0051 0.0003 -9.3893 6.8536
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0021) (8.5323) (5.7855)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>9 0.0061 -0.0052 0.0010 0.0008 1.3590 1.8411
(0.0058) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0080) (10.9054) (5.7275)
URate_grad*lin_exp*upturn 0.0021
(0.0114)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>3*upturn 0.0012
(0.0168)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>6*upturn
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>9*upturn 0.0071
(0.0108)
d_exp1 0.7512*** 0.1165** 2.3176*** 6.9075*** 958.9185*** 298.9458***
(0.0457) (0.0457) (0.0356) (0.1224) (126.9019) (94.2751)
d_exp2 0.7461*** 0.1226*** 2.3619*** 7.0090*** 1,123.5383*** 228.2590***
(0.0438) (0.0427) (0.0312) (0.1034) (111.9305) (80.9229)
d_exp3 0.7618*** 0.1226*** 2.4055*** 7.0345*** 1,217.5205*** 164.6059***
(0.0378) (0.0381) (0.0262) (0.0861) (88.0276) (58.8217)
d_exp4 0.7607*** 0.1386*** 2.4389*** 7.0675*** 1,283.7424*** 137.2792***
(0.0352) (0.0373) (0.0230) (0.0673) (73.2986) (42.1305)
d_exp5 0.7707*** 0.1459*** 2.4769*** 7.0772*** 1,307.9451*** 126.0374***
(0.0347) (0.0367) (0.0199) (0.0623) (65.3467) (30.5050)
d_exp6 0.7710*** 0.1474*** 2.5213*** 7.1275*** 1,403.3019*** 83.4630***
(0.0317) (0.0337) (0.0191) (0.0684) (72.0378) (29.6944)
d_exp7 0.7754*** 0.1597*** 2.5574*** 7.1523*** 1,447.5870*** 66.9784
(0.0291) (0.0303) (0.0212) (0.0751) (83.4648) (40.3594)
d_exp8 0.7781*** 0.1707*** 2.6028*** 7.1260*** 1,444.8401*** 64.4567
(0.0306) (0.0290) (0.0249) (0.0971) (105.4114) (55.5343)
d_exp9 0.7633*** 0.1883*** 2.6408*** 7.1943*** 1,508.9936*** 40.3436
(0.0323) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.1112) (126.6040) (74.3594)
d_exp10 0.7637*** 0.1918*** 2.6761*** 7.1655*** 1,495.2992*** 39.0506
(0.0342) (0.0279) (0.0341) (0.1275) (155.2295) (94.9612)
d_exp11 0.7620*** 0.2083*** 2.7130*** 7.1683*** 1,529.4159*** 11.1327
(0.0373) (0.0292) (0.0401) (0.1555) (182.0271) (115.4204)
d_exp12 0.7492*** 0.2204*** 2.7425*** 7.1461*** 1,544.8297*** -12.8784
(0.0437) (0.0318) (0.0467) (0.1729) (207.2307) (133.9152)
current_URate*lin_exp -0.0024 -0.0127 -13.1490 4.6741
(0.0026) (0.0079) (10.2617) (6.0726)
current_URate*lin_exp|exp>3 0.0021 0.0195 18.4495 -5.8028
(0.0047) (0.0140) (17.0719) (9.9964)
current_URate*lin_exp|exp>6 0.0005 0.0056 1.0209 2.1206
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salaried self-empl. log wage log hours§ FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.0040) (0.0117) (13.8847) (6.9309)
current_URate*lin_exp|exp>9 -0.0010 -0.0291** -4.2898 -10.2813
(0.0046) (0.0127) (15.8712) (8.0814)
lin_grad_year 0.0403*** -0.0214 0.0279*** 0.0472 65.4507** -8.6015
(0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0073) (0.0320) (29.6637) (21.6567)
lin_grad_year|trend>3 -0.0240 0.0215 -0.0069 0.0140 15.5502 -11.5497
(0.0179) (0.0169) (0.0054) (0.0249) (25.3218) (14.1348)
lin_grad_year|trend>6 -0.0132 0.0144 -0.0155 0.0307 6.5676 11.5773
(0.0285) (0.0283) (0.0126) (0.0221) (32.5098) (20.9785)
d_y2000 -0.0125 -0.0172 -38.8673 26.1713
(0.0104) (0.0543) (44.5270) (28.7443)
d_y2001 -0.0182 -0.0247 -74.2369 49.9492
(0.0164) (0.0820) (75.5566) (47.9611)
d_y2002 -0.0126 -0.0565 -102.6201 49.9582
(0.0219) (0.0946) (92.2693) (64.9251)
d_y2003 0.0200 -0.0836 -185.5176 68.4335
(0.0287) (0.1172) (116.2514) (85.2820)
d_y2004 0.0018 -0.0544 -187.7900 76.6086
(0.0353) (0.1384) (145.0028) (105.8795)
d_y2005 -0.0177 -0.0954 -231.4900 91.1613
(0.0406) (0.1591) (171.9990) (126.0796)
d_y2006 -0.0366 -0.0984 -263.5384 116.7552
(0.0475) (0.1884) (200.9022) (145.7559)
d_y2007 -0.0440 -0.0899 -257.7645 127.6621
(0.0550) (0.2165) (229.4389) (163.9872)
d_y2008 -0.0730 -0.0695 -272.8240 147.2443
(0.0625) (0.2441) (262.2820) (186.8023)
d_y2009 -0.0610 -0.1343 -359.7139 160.6956
(0.0687) (0.2624) (286.1192) (206.2585)
d_y2010 -0.0785 -0.0978 -348.4011 181.8591
(0.0745) (0.2868) (315.8287) (229.1536)
lin_calend_year|trend>3 -0.0132* -0.0011
(0.0067) (0.0047)
lin_calend_year|trend>6 0.0027 0.0051
(0.0052) (0.0044)
lin_calend_year|trend>9 0.0023 -0.0064
(0.0041) (0.0047)
d_province2 -0.0467* 0.0323 -0.0192 -0.0614 -202.5254** 122.4041***
(0.0254) (0.0225) (0.0220) (0.0772) (98.6645) (39.8929)
d_province3 -0.0599* 0.0782*** 0.0169 0.0557 15.7333 30.6915
(0.0302) (0.0276) (0.0201) (0.0576) (73.9502) (34.2322)
d_province4 -0.0299* 0.0355** 0.0258 0.0107 -49.9896 33.2321*
(0.0169) (0.0155) (0.0169) (0.0361) (41.1422) (17.4238)
d_province5 -0.0578*** 0.0616*** 0.0242 0.1082 48.6183 15.0094
(0.0206) (0.0217) (0.0210) (0.0734) (88.1180) (39.9302)
lin_calend_year_province2 -0.0081*** 0.0086 14.2801 -6.1889
(0.0027) (0.0088) (13.7433) (5.7350)
lin_calend_year_province3 -0.0092*** -0.0036 -2.7219 -3.3067
(0.0029) (0.0065) (8.7463) (3.7209)
lin_calend_year_province4 -0.0027 0.0017 4.1164 -2.1860
(0.0027) (0.0045) (5.8421) (3.3370)
lin_calend_year_province5 -0.0030 -0.0121 -8.2976 -2.0106
Continued on next page
Appendix A 166
Table A.14 – continued from previous page
salaried self-empl. log wage log hours§ FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.0027) (0.0081) (8.9590) (3.5839)
Observations 564 756 756
Amemiya-Nold test† -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0020 -1826.0490 -526.2726
R-squared 0.9941 0.9998 0.9944
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. The table reports the results from
estimating (4) in Section 2.4.4 by OLS on mentioned outcomes. This is the second step regression of the two-step approach described
in detail in the aforementioned Section, where this second step is estimated by OLS. Since the outcomes satisfy adding-up constraints
(salaried employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours
worked+PT hours worked=total hours worked), this second step is estimated from a OLS SUR on the first two outcomes in the sum.
Effects on the third outcome (the sum) are then obtained from the adding-up constraints. Standard errors are clustered at graduation
time-province (gp) level. The dependent variables of the second step are the cluster-time FE µˆgpt estimated in each corresponding
first step regression, given by (3) in Section 2.4.4. The covariates of the second step are described below (in order): URate_grad is
the unemployment rate at graduation ugp. URate_grad ∗ lin_exp is an interaction between ugp and a linear trend in experience.
URate_grad ∗ lin_exp|exp > 3 is ugp interacted with a linear trend in experience that starts from exp>3. The subsequent 2
covariates are defined similarly. Variables URate_grad ∗ lin_exp-URate_grad ∗ lin_exp|exp > 9 specify the linear spline in
potential experience fg(e) that multiplies the provincial unemployment rate at graduation ugp. The slope of the spline changes at
experience 3,6 and 9 for low educated, as explained in (2) in Section 5.1 of the main text. Variables
URate_grad ∗ lin_exp ∗ upturn-URate_grad ∗ lin_exp|exp > 9 ∗ upturn are triple interactions of ugp with fgu(e) and a
dummy=1 if graduation occurs in an upturn. They allows ugp to have a different effect over experience in upturn/downturn.
d_exp1-d_exp12 are experience FE. Since they define constant-terms for each experience level, the constant is omitted in the
specification. current_URate ∗ lin_exp-current_URate ∗ lin_exp|exp > 9 are interactions between the current
unemployment rate utp with ft(e). Variables lin_grad_year-lin_grad_year|trend > 6 is the spline for the graduation year
f0(g). d_y2000-d_y2010 are calendar year FE for the period 1998-2010. Identification requires dropping both year 1998 and 1999:
the first is the reference FE, while the second has to be dropped because of the following accounting identity:
calend_year = exp+ grad_year. In this choice of dropping a second calendar year we followed Oreopoulos et al. (2012).
Calendar year is alternatively specified with a spline, by means of variables
lin_calend_year|trend > 3-lin_calend_year|trend > 9, where the first term of the spline is omitted because of the
aforementioned accounting identity. d_province2-d_province5 are province FE (province 1 is the reference).
lin_calend_year ∗ d_province2-lin_calend_year ∗ d_province5 are province-specific linear time trends. Depending on the
outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be jointly rejected at the 5% level, as follows: the effect of ugp is restricted to be
symmetric in upturn and downturn (for salaried and self-employment, log hourly wage, full-time and part-time hours worked); the
effect of utp is set to be zero (for salaried and self-employment); calendar year FE are specified with a spline (for salaried and
self-employment); provincial time trends are set to be zero (for salaried and self-employment).
§ For log hours worked, it is also imposed βg2 = 0, i.e. the slope of the linear spline remains fixed after 6 years of experience. This
restriction cannot be rejected.
† The Amemiya-Nold test is an estimate of the variance of the cluster-time errors egpt, described in (5) in Section 2.4.4. A negative
statistics is evidence that the unobserved cluster-time shocks are indeed zero. Accordingly, one can implement the FGLS procedure
as in Wooldridge (2006, 2010).
Table A.15: Second Step FGLS Estimation: Low Educated.
Outcomes: discrete continuous
salaried self-empl. log wage log hours§ FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
URate_grad -0.0238 0.0501** 0.0100 -0.0525* -164.8746*** 56.8591***
(0.0220) (0.0236) (0.0154) (0.0275) (39.6889) (16.4111)
URate_grad*lin_exp 0.0063 -0.0144* -0.0055 0.0087 41.1335*** -20.5795***
(0.0063) (0.0075) (0.0037) (0.0092) (8.4565) (5.3600)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>3 -0.0040 0.0087 0.0040 -0.0085 -30.4640*** 18.6047***
(0.0079) (0.0089) (0.0037) (0.0118) (8.9870) (6.7193)
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salaried self-empl. log wage log hours§ FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>6 -0.0026 0.0074* 0.0042** -24.5012*** 10.5285**
(0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0018) (6.8968) (3.9159)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>9 0.0017 -0.0057* -0.0058** -0.0030 19.8884*** -8.1435*
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0079) (6.9654) (4.0476)
URate_grad*lin_exp*upturn -0.0108
(0.0075)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>3*upturn 0.0183
(0.0117)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>6*upturn
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>9*upturn 0.0013
(0.0115)
d_exp1 0.8569*** 0.0796 2.2692*** 7.1194*** 1,225.9931*** 182.0557***
(0.0646) (0.0637) (0.0378) (0.1094) (126.8483) (58.2625)
d_exp2 0.8516*** 0.0793 2.3175*** 7.2186*** 1,415.8790*** 91.2670
(0.0639) (0.0617) (0.0359) (0.0974) (114.1311) (54.6505)
d_exp3 0.8457*** 0.0847 2.3647*** 7.2388*** 1,465.8398*** 73.3560
(0.0623) (0.0600) (0.0350) (0.0838) (105.5893) (50.3020)
d_exp4 0.8543*** 0.0972 2.4002*** 7.2710*** 1,500.8617*** 66.5529
(0.0613) (0.0599) (0.0347) (0.0741) (99.0005) (47.0799)
d_exp5 0.8612*** 0.1073* 2.4316*** 7.2705*** 1,525.3920*** 81.6274*
(0.0609) (0.0595) (0.0343) (0.0647) (91.6504) (44.6073)
d_exp6 0.8524*** 0.1058* 2.4691*** 7.3052*** 1,532.2297*** 94.6461**
(0.0602) (0.0594) (0.0348) (0.0572) (86.7440) (40.3467)
d_exp7 0.8530*** 0.1226** 2.5001*** 7.3216*** 1,543.8087*** 95.9874**
(0.0601) (0.0594) (0.0346) (0.0525) (84.4805) (38.9072)
d_exp8 0.8633*** 0.1165* 2.5330*** 7.3568*** 1,520.6944*** 109.3179***
(0.0605) (0.0602) (0.0354) (0.0570) (87.0377) (36.0375)
d_exp9 0.8576*** 0.1263** 2.5667*** 7.3706*** 1,528.2080*** 141.4640***
(0.0614) (0.0612) (0.0369) (0.0624) (89.3094) (34.8296)
d_exp10 0.8578*** 0.1340** 2.5935*** 7.3918*** 1,530.9900*** 152.9140***
(0.0632) (0.0628) (0.0394) (0.0699) (100.0108) (37.5158)
d_exp11 0.8569*** 0.1404** 2.6227*** 7.4047*** 1,534.6193*** 148.0725***
(0.0652) (0.0652) (0.0425) (0.0844) (112.5650) (39.2476)
d_exp12 0.8533*** 0.1350** 2.6424*** 7.4290*** 1,524.9435*** 148.2635***
(0.0683) (0.0677) (0.0461) (0.0995) (128.1002) (43.1278)
current_URate*lin_exp -0.0008 -0.0073** -2.7920 4.4547*
(0.0011) (0.0035) (3.9967) (2.5871)
current_URate*lin_exp|exp>3 -0.0011 0.0070 4.0244 -7.0951
(0.0021) (0.0065) (8.6607) (5.0969)
current_URate*lin_exp|exp>6 0.0025 -0.0032 8.6961 3.2832
(0.0024) (0.0058) (9.5344) (3.8670)
current_URate*lin_exp|exp>9 0.0020 0.0117* -9.0042 -5.1401
(0.0029) (0.0067) (7.4738) (3.7716)
lin_grad_year 0.0173 -0.0100 0.0396*** 0.0264 19.0216 16.0035
(0.0201) (0.0197) (0.0102) (0.0258) (35.5687) (15.2251)
lin_grad_year|trend>3 -0.0012 0.0030 -0.0235* 0.0277* 21.4500 -10.2731
(0.0221) (0.0218) (0.0124) (0.0164) (37.5160) (14.2848)
lin_grad_year|trend>6 -0.0152 0.0060 0.0087 -0.0004 44.8529 -23.3993**
(0.0283) (0.0270) (0.0157) (0.0200) (37.5199) (11.1892)
d_y2000 -0.0089 -0.0207 -21.8402 0.0906
(0.0066) (0.0233) (23.2243) (10.8590)
d_y2001 -0.0108 -0.0419 -5.2062 -20.1063
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.0116) (0.0399) (38.5634) (17.5764)
d_y2002 -0.0049 -0.0355 10.6677 -53.7633***
(0.0151) (0.0489) (54.0165) (19.3777)
d_y2003 0.0292 -0.0821 -69.3960 -74.0548***
(0.0199) (0.0697) (70.6908) (25.9086)
d_y2004 0.0161 -0.0719 -29.2518 -92.8033***
(0.0242) (0.0818) (85.3414) (30.5642)
d_y2005 -0.0009 -0.0818 -56.0160 -114.5512***
(0.0289) (0.0964) (104.9215) (36.2211)
d_y2006 -0.0117 -0.1070 -16.5626 -126.2454***
(0.0340) (0.1119) (121.1634) (41.2826)
d_y2007 -0.0170 -0.1288 4.0424 -132.1354***
(0.0391) (0.1307) (140.5737) (47.5882)
d_y2008 -0.0315 -0.1495 3.5323 -121.5956**
(0.0453) (0.1484) (159.4959) (54.3311)
d_y2009 -0.0187 -0.1670 -76.4815 -149.4521**
(0.0505) (0.1632) (173.8986) (58.7294)
d_y2010 -0.0378 -0.1970 -54.4050 -155.5810**
(0.0565) (0.1761) (192.4969) (64.9975)
lin_calend_year|trend>3 -0.0057 -0.0005
(0.0063) (0.0059)
lin_calend_year|trend>6 -0.0064 0.0073*
(0.0048) (0.0043)
lin_calend_year|trend>9 0.0027 -0.0025
(0.0045) (0.0039)
d_province2 -0.0448 0.0339 -0.0169 -0.0166 -33.2013 5.9581
(0.0276) (0.0262) (0.0217) (0.0526) (92.8610) (39.2545)
d_province3 -0.0710*** 0.0677*** 0.0423** 0.0635 156.8683** -63.1090**
(0.0228) (0.0223) (0.0206) (0.0504) (68.5089) (30.5171)
d_province4 -0.0391** 0.0319** 0.0434*** 0.0267 29.4486 -24.5258
(0.0167) (0.0155) (0.0148) (0.0412) (56.6118) (24.7125)
d_province5 -0.0382 0.0407 0.0201 0.1331** 198.9715** -26.1553
(0.0272) (0.0262) (0.0181) (0.0598) (76.9946) (32.3431)
lin_calend_year_province2 -0.0052** 0.0035 14.3407* -1.9295
(0.0022) (0.0050) (7.3382) (3.5427)
lin_calend_year_province3 -0.0058*** -0.0115** -14.5633** 6.0920*
(0.0020) (0.0052) (6.0903) (3.4753)
lin_calend_year_province4 0.0004 -0.0030 -5.0574 3.8559
(0.0022) (0.0046) (4.8954) (2.8497)
lin_calend_year_province5 -0.0028 -0.0121** -11.7671* -0.4693
(0.0022) (0.0058) (6.7259) (2.7682)
R-squared 0.9986 0.9999 0.9953
WSSR (2nd step) 331 1289 1519
Obs (2nd step) 375 756 754
Parameters (2nd step) 54 88 86
Test joint signif. all imposed restr.(P-val) 0.286 0.155 0.268
P-value of chi2 test 0.341 0.000 0.000
cluster (at which level) no g*p g*p
Imposed Restrictions:
effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn yes yes yes no yes yes
effect Current Urate over exp=0 yes yes no no no no
spline for calendar year FE yes yes no no no no
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
effect prov-time trends=0 yes yes no no no no
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. The table reports the results from
estimating (4) in Section 2.4.4 by FGLS on mentioned outcomes. This is the second step regression of the two-step FGLS approach
described in detail in the aforementioned Section. Since the outcomes satisfy adding-up constraints (salaried
employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours
worked=total hours worked), this second step is estimated from a FGLS SUR on the first two outcomes in the sum. Effects on the
third outcome (the sum) are then obtained from the adding-up constraints. The dependent variables of the second step are the
cluster-time FE µˆgpt estimated in each corresponding first step regression, given by (3) in Section 2.4.4. A description of the
covariates reported in the Table is in the footnote of Table A.14 above. In this FGLS SUR, the data are weighted by the inverse of the
cluster-robust variance matrix of µˆgpt estimated in the first step. For discrete outcomes, the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of
this matrix is used as weight, to take into account the perfect serial correlation induced by the fact that, for specific clusters, the
outcomes do not vary over time (see Section 2.4.4 for details). Depending on the outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be
jointly rejected at the 5% level: these restrictions are listed in the bottom panel of the table. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects
the model (P-value>0.05), standard errors clustered at the gp level are reported; otherwise conventional ones. For completeness we
report also the weighted sum of squared residuals (WSSR), the number of estimated parameters and the number of observations,
which are used to compute the χ2 test.
§ For log hours worked the following additional restriction (not mentioned in the table) is also imposed: βg2 = 0, i.e. the slope of the
linear spline remains fixed after 6 years of experience. This restriction cannot be rejected.
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A.7 Complete Estimation Results for High Educated
Table A.16: First Step Estimation: High Educated.
Outcomes: discrete continuous
salaried self-empl. log wage log hours FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
live in single-parent -0.0142 0.0185 -0.0108 -0.0948 -58.7515 -23.5552
(0.1065) (0.1089) (0.0494) (0.0769) (97.1894) (38.6768)
not live with parents 0.0055 -0.0545 -0.0066 -0.0186 12.8753 -13.5174
(0.0458) (0.0384) (0.0281) (0.0462) (66.2764) (31.5662)
HH members aged 0-11 -0.0093 0.0050 -0.0024 -0.0281 -59.1713* 24.8043
(0.0202) (0.0194) (0.0117) (0.0220) (30.7132) (16.6696)
HH members aged 12-17 0.0071 -0.0014 0.0117 -0.0212 -34.8318* 14.4708
(0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0080) (0.0134) (20.0060) (10.9179)
HH members aged 18-29 0.0003 0.0014 0.0030 -0.0343** -31.4121* 5.0918
(0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0075) (0.0140) (18.9413) (9.4834)
HH members aged 30-64 0.0055 0.0163 -0.0120 -0.0171 32.9106 -53.7095**
(0.0990) (0.1021) (0.0467) (0.0626) (80.2774) (26.7216)
HH members aged 65+ 0.0113 -0.0076 -0.0168 0.0506* 70.0408 -28.3348
(0.0456) (0.0421) (0.0215) (0.0271) (62.1322) (35.4918)
father education -0.0048 0.0034 0.0048*** -0.0010 4.2756 -4.3901*
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0028) (4.3456) (2.3938)
mother education -0.0043 0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0113*** -16.0538*** 6.2931**
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0019) (0.0033) (4.8368) (2.6061)
years of delay in sec.edu 0.0099 -0.0070 -0.0703*** -0.0562*** -83.9288*** 20.8350
(0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0097) (0.0181) (23.2658) (12.6673)
technical edu† 0.0130 -0.0057 -0.0276** 0.0158 5.8643 2.7490
(0.0217) (0.0211) (0.0117) (0.0208) (30.7576) (16.8961)
vocational edu† 0.0398 -0.0062 -0.0990** 0.0463 -61.2107 90.4418
(0.0846) (0.0822) (0.0417) (0.0741) (146.4928) (84.9388)
apprenticeship/PT voc† -0.6675*** 0.7161*** -0.1879*** 0.0344 -323.0605*** 265.5299***
(0.0551) (0.0537) (0.0341) (0.0450) (73.6523) (41.9571)
birth cohort78†† 0.0193 -0.0259 -0.0873*** -0.0242 -10.6798 -15.6678
(0.0274) (0.0259) (0.0149) (0.0283) (37.6116) (20.8565)
birth cohort80†† 0.0735** -0.0810** -0.1795*** -0.0664* -100.0433* 14.4197
(0.0359) (0.0337) (0.0213) (0.0395) (53.7439) (28.6471)
cluster-time FE§ Not reported
Observations 22,886 24,314 24,314
R-squared 0.7108 0.9951 0.8345
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. The table reports the results from
estimating (3) in Section 2.4.4 on mentioned outcomes. This is the first step regression of the two-step FGLS approach, described in
detail in this Section. Since the outcomes satisfy adding-up constraints (salaried employment+self-employment=overall employment;
log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours worked=total hours worked), this first step is estimated
from an OLS SUR on the first two outcomes in the sum. For discrete outcomes in column 1-2, (3) is estimated by Linear Probability
Model. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The individual control variables, measured when the individuals are aged
17, are reported in order: 1 if live with single parent; 1 if not live with either parents; number of other household members in different
age classes; parent’s education; years of delay in secondary education; choice of educational track in secondary education; birth
cohort dummies. These variables are expressed in deviation from the mean. Cluster-time fixed effects µˆgpt are not reported.
† Choice of educational track in secondary education: reference is general education.
†† Birth dummies: reference is born in 1976.
§ Cluster-time FE identify observations referring to individuals graduating in year g, living in province p at graduation and whose
outcome is measured in calendar year y. Note that the FE included in the regression on discrete outcomes differ from the ones
included in the regression on continuous outcomes, because different selection rules are applied for discrete and continuous
outcomes, and hence different groups are retained (see Table 1.2 in Appendix 1.8 and Section 2.4.4).
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Table A.17: Second Step OLS Estimation: High Educated.
Outcomes: discrete continuous
salaried self-empl. log wage log hours FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
URate_grad -0.0427** 0.0355* -0.0088 -0.0835 -91.4880* 32.3351
(0.0169) (0.0201) (0.0098) (0.0526) (45.3291) (19.2652)
URate_grad*lin_exp 0.0169*** -0.0145** -0.0027 0.0311* 30.9963** -5.5913
(0.0047) (0.0068) (0.0026) (0.0162) (13.3616) (6.8823)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>3 -0.0209*** 0.0199*** 0.0039 -0.0217 -25.9922* -0.2021
(0.0060) (0.0072) (0.0040) (0.0184) (14.6282) (9.9671)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>6 0.0058 -0.0084 0.0017 -0.0224** 4.8011 2.7938
(0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0031) (0.0099) (20.9446) (9.5876)
URate_grad*lin_exp*upturn 0.0129 5.6285
(0.0110) (11.3489)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>3*upturn -0.0351* -10.2750
(0.0205) (23.0995)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>6*upturn 0.0356** -9.1289
(0.0135) (27.8938)
d_exp1 0.9689*** 0.0333 2.3866*** 7.4621*** 1,501.2335*** 230.6942***
(0.0430) (0.0461) (0.0203) (0.1105) (120.6049) (46.0044)
d_exp2 0.9292*** 0.0619 2.4581*** 7.4502*** 1,646.6508*** 136.5209***
(0.0442) (0.0480) (0.0245) (0.0717) (90.1631) (34.4444)
d_exp3 0.9159*** 0.0690 2.5161*** 7.3154*** 1,638.2554*** 79.8997*
(0.0435) (0.0485) (0.0275) (0.0690) (76.6823) (43.6743)
d_exp4 0.8922*** 0.0885 2.5699*** 7.1631*** 1,621.2628*** 25.6041
(0.0483) (0.0524) (0.0339) (0.1158) (98.2383) (70.0681)
d_exp5 0.8657*** 0.1114** 2.6220*** 7.0046*** 1,567.8224*** -17.4379
(0.0497) (0.0529) (0.0431) (0.1781) (142.7774) (102.0089)
d_exp6 0.8294*** 0.1342** 2.6595*** 6.8335*** 1,516.2816*** -54.8387
(0.0527) (0.0552) (0.0517) (0.2477) (193.0891) (135.4781)
d_exp7 0.8024*** 0.1582*** 2.6984*** 6.6729*** 1,442.1611*** -74.7287
(0.0557) (0.0573) (0.0604) (0.3079) (240.9555) (169.6860)
d_exp8 0.7659*** 0.1857*** 2.7469*** 6.5074*** 1,391.0482*** -116.9754
(0.0569) (0.0598) (0.0681) (0.3783) (296.0228) (202.4608)
d_exp9 0.7368*** 0.2091*** 2.7816*** 6.3768*** 1,348.6060*** -142.4168
(0.0603) (0.0632) (0.0767) (0.4463) (352.6231) (236.8329)
d_exp10 0.7055*** 0.2376*** 2.8009*** 6.1864*** 1,253.7807*** -169.8802
(0.0671) (0.0678) (0.0865) (0.5135) (402.3159) (271.3453)
current_URate*lin_exp -0.9215
(6.7461)
current_URate*lin_exp|exp>3 5.4568
(16.1967)
current_URate*lin_exp|exp>6 -5.0503
(13.4528)
lin_grad_year -0.0246 0.0090 0.0514*** -0.1554** -69.1863 -16.0394
(0.0162) (0.0174) (0.0068) (0.0655) (55.3554) (29.6588)
lin_grad_year|trend>3 -0.0051 0.0193 -0.0038 0.0002 22.9224 -17.7204
(0.0209) (0.0222) (0.0124) (0.0144) (30.7012) (22.1972)
lin_grad_year|trend>6 -0.0332* 0.0270 -0.0052 0.0206 42.8455 -21.7279
(0.0195) (0.0176) (0.0118) (0.0214) (31.9825) (18.6639)
d_y2000 -0.0243* 0.2275** 154.9824* 7.2023
(0.0140) (0.1076) (81.1079) (48.7754)
d_y2001 -0.0399* 0.3992** 231.8595 26.4881
(0.0211) (0.1788) (139.5020) (78.2480)
Continued on next page
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Table A.17 – continued from previous page
salaried self-empl. log wage log hours FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d_y2002 -0.0425 0.5822** 290.4235 88.4649
(0.0290) (0.2439) (183.7660) (110.8750)
d_y2003 0.0145 0.6609** 124.6172 187.8584
(0.0360) (0.3013) (235.8363) (144.9946)
d_y2004 -0.0048 0.8437** 208.4257 213.7200
(0.0449) (0.3674) (288.0389) (174.9526)
d_y2005 -0.0203 1.0296** 293.3327 239.4540
(0.0556) (0.4369) (343.7920) (208.1228)
d_y2006 -0.0172 1.2162** 368.0552 275.0646
(0.0649) (0.5033) (395.8863) (241.0492)
d_y2007 -0.0164 1.3988** 466.0036 308.0828
(0.0750) (0.5723) (447.9135) (275.3444)
d_y2008 -0.0346 1.5682** 558.6072 326.8093
(0.0847) (0.6428) (501.5399) (309.9391)
d_y2009 -0.0124 1.7273** 573.8484 379.8259
(0.0951) (0.7092) (558.5416) (343.9877)
d_y2010 -0.0414 1.8996** 658.0239 400.9781
(0.1041) (0.7763) (612.3930) (377.9615)
lin_calend_year|trend>3 0.0215** -0.0131
(0.0104) (0.0097)
lin_calend_year|trend>6 -0.0001 0.0050
(0.0068) (0.0063)
lin_calend_year|trend>9 -0.0015 -0.0057
(0.0065) (0.0059)
d_province2 0.0117 0.0014 -0.0566* -0.0049 74.7160 -28.7352
(0.0176) (0.0169) (0.0309) (0.1011) (73.5696) (28.2519)
d_province3 -0.0345 0.0458 -0.0194 0.0624 13.5300 43.8943
(0.0274) (0.0288) (0.0336) (0.0597) (83.0897) (45.6237)
d_province4 -0.0306* 0.0248 -0.0288 0.0980* 35.6973 57.3384
(0.0169) (0.0151) (0.0218) (0.0530) (81.6450) (41.3521)
d_province5 -0.0196 0.0208 0.0297 -0.0290 -32.0965 7.4747
(0.0141) (0.0138) (0.0231) (0.0694) (101.3922) (45.8290)
lin_calend_year_province2 0.0042 0.0029 -3.2237 1.7653
(0.0027) (0.0102) (8.8182) (3.8674)
lin_calend_year_province3 -0.0040 -0.0082 -3.8914 -2.3396
(0.0036) (0.0064) (11.0287) (5.0573)
lin_calend_year_province4 0.0032 -0.0121** -2.8661 -7.6270*
(0.0028) (0.0057) (8.5770) (3.8364)
lin_calend_year_province5 -0.0061** 0.0016 1.7957 -1.0461
(0.0026) (0.0071) (11.7184) (5.4416)
Observations 482 646 646
Amemiya-Nold test† -0.00243 -0.00211 -0.00035 -0.00231 -5238.837 -1361.398
R-squared 0.9951 0.9999 0.9958
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. The table reports the results from
estimating (4) in Section 2.4.4 by OLS on mentioned outcomes. This is the second step regression of the two-step approach described
in detail in Section 2.4.4, where this second step is estimated by OLS. Since the outcomes satisfy adding-up constraints (salaried
employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours
worked=total hours worked), this second step is estimated from a OLS SUR on the first two outcomes in the sum. Effects on the third
outcome (the sum) are then obtained from the adding-up constraints. Standard errors are clustered at graduation time-province (gp)
level. The dependent variables of the second step are the cluster-time FE µˆgpt estimated in each corresponding first step regression,
given by (3) in Section 2.4.4. The covariates of the second step are described below (in order): URate_grad is the unemployment
rate at graduation ugp. URate_grad ∗ lin_exp is an interaction between ugp and a linear trend in experience.
URate_grad ∗ lin_exp|exp > 3 is ugp interacted with a linear trend in experience that starts from exp>3. The subsequent
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covariate is defined similarly. Variables URate_grad ∗ lin_exp-URate_grad ∗ lin_exp|exp > 6 specify the linear spline in
potential experience fg(e) that multiplies the provincial unemployment rate at graduation ugp. The slope of the spline changes at
experience 3 and 6 for high educated, as explained in (2) in Section 5.1 of the main text. Variables
URate_grad ∗ lin_exp ∗ upturn-URate_grad ∗ lin_exp|exp > 6 ∗ upturn are triple interactions of ugp with fgu(e) and a
dummy=1 if graduation occurs in an upturn. They allows ugp to have a different effect over experience in upturn/downturn.
d_exp1-d_exp10 are experience FE. Since they define constant-terms for each experience level, the constant is omitted in the
specification. current_URate ∗ lin_exp-current_URate ∗ lin_exp|exp > 6 are interactions between the current
unemployment rate utp with ft(e). Variables lin_grad_year-lin_grad_year|trend > 6 is the spline for the graduation year
f0(g). d_y2000-d_y2010 are calendar year FE for the period 1998-2010. Identification requires dropping both year 1998 and 1999:
the first is the reference FE, while the second has to be dropped because of the following accounting identity:
calend_year = exp+ grad_year. In this choice of dropping a second calendar year we followed Oreopoulos et al. (2012).
Calendar year is alternatively specified with a spline, by means of variables
lin_calend_year|trend > 3-lin_calend_year|trend > 9, where the first term of the spline is omitted because of the
aforementioned accounting identity. d_province2-d_province5 are province FE (province 1 is the reference).
lin_calend_year ∗ d_province2-lin_calend_year ∗ d_province5 are province-specific linear time trends. Depending on the
outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be jointly rejected at the 5% level, as follows: the effect of ugp is restricted to be
symmetric in upturn and downturn (for salaried and self-employment, log hourly wage, part-time hours worked); the effect of utp is
set to be zero (for salaried and self-employment, log hourly wage, log hours worked, part-time hours worked); calendar year FE are
specified with a spline (for salaried and self-employment); provincial time trends are set to be zero (for salaried and
self-employment).
† The Amemiya-Nold test is an estimate of the variance of the cluster-time errors egpt, described in (5) in Section 2.4.4. A negative
statistics is evidence that the unobserved cluster-time shocks are indeed zero. Accordingly, one can implement the FGLS procedure
as in Wooldridge (2006, 2010).
Table A.18: Second Step FGLS Estimation: High Educated.
Outcomes: discrete continuous
salaried self-empl. log wage log hours FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
URate_grad -0.0258 0.0087 -0.0184 -0.0565*** -132.7637*** 31.0621**
(0.0183) (0.0165) (0.0114) (0.0207) (28.4491) (13.0104)
URate_grad*lin_exp 0.0096* -0.0076* -0.0046* 0.0214*** 50.7776*** -7.7613*
(0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0024) (0.0067) (8.1339) (4.3468)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>3 -0.0089 0.0104* 0.0042 -0.0248*** -63.7346*** 10.0000**
(0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0031) (0.0071) (8.7159) (4.9163)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>6 -0.0041 -0.0001 -0.0023 0.0046 20.5970** -2.1085
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0021) (0.0066) (8.5333) (1.2834)
URate_grad*lin_exp*upturn -0.0090** -13.0287**
(0.0044) (4.8606)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>3*upturn 0.0186*** 21.0758**
(0.0067) (8.0703)
URate_grad*lin_exp|exp>6*upturn -0.0136** -12.9939*
(0.0066) (6.7360)
d_exp1 0.9697*** 0.0308 2.3992*** 7.4988*** 1,709.5018*** 141.1729***
(0.0568) (0.0557) (0.0334) (0.0572) (101.9240) (31.5225)
d_exp2 0.9408*** 0.0574 2.4429*** 7.5401*** 1,905.9920*** 64.8359***
(0.0553) (0.0543) (0.0333) (0.0388) (74.3620) (21.5103)
d_exp3 0.9331*** 0.0648 2.4848*** 7.5086*** 1,937.7451*** 43.0083**
(0.0540) (0.0533) (0.0334) (0.0326) (69.4179) (20.7862)
d_exp4 0.9258*** 0.0763 2.5181*** 7.4682*** 1,955.6993*** 35.3342
(0.0538) (0.0532) (0.0353) (0.0502) (95.3896) (31.1004)
d_exp5 0.9079*** 0.0945* 2.5499*** 7.4050*** 1,938.0647*** 24.3331
(0.0543) (0.0535) (0.0384) (0.0764) (136.8705) (46.1787)
d_exp6 0.8982*** 0.1083* 2.5708*** 7.3546*** 1,941.3592*** 7.7160
(0.0562) (0.0554) (0.0432) (0.1034) (183.4455) (63.8553)
Continued on next page
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Table A.18 – continued from previous page
salaried self-empl. log wage log hours FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d_exp7 0.8877*** 0.1167** 2.5894*** 7.3062*** 1,937.0128*** 3.6514
(0.0589) (0.0579) (0.0479) (0.1339) (230.4968) (80.2243)
d_exp8 0.8613*** 0.1369** 2.6090*** 7.2465*** 1,907.5481*** 0.4558
(0.0627) (0.0613) (0.0539) (0.1630) (281.2384) (98.1468)
d_exp9 0.8377*** 0.1579** 2.6192*** 7.1994*** 1,891.2816*** 2.2098
(0.0671) (0.0653) (0.0598) (0.1911) (330.2644) (115.9887)
d_exp10 0.8150*** 0.1707** 2.6230*** 7.1421*** 1,852.2196*** 6.1605
(0.0729) (0.0709) (0.0673) (0.2196) (381.8000) (133.9872)
current_URate*lin_exp -7.9607***
(2.4082)
current_URate*lin_exp|exp>3 19.0362***
(4.8666)
current_URate*lin_exp|exp>6 -13.7122***
(4.8368)
lin_grad_year -0.0169 0.0116 0.0353*** -0.0628** -22.8865 -2.8056
(0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0103) (0.0306) (53.1461) (19.2831)
lin_grad_year|trend>3 -0.0042 0.0060 -0.0109 0.0256** -6.0510 14.6038
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0133) (0.0122) (25.7994) (11.0858)
lin_grad_year|trend>6 -0.0362 0.0392 0.0104 0.0366** 80.7248** -51.1515***
(0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0109) (0.0143) (35.2520) (15.2233)
d_y2000 0.0165* 0.0610 -26.6306 -9.5551
(0.0093) (0.0403) (63.6992) (26.7663)
d_y2001 0.0347* 0.1076 -33.6986 1.0926
(0.0180) (0.0690) (118.5847) (43.9962)
d_y2002 0.0544** 0.1799* -6.4181 12.6021
(0.0245) (0.0998) (168.1877) (60.9035)
d_y2003 0.1253*** 0.1695 -91.7889 33.3459
(0.0322) (0.1310) (220.8156) (79.5331)
d_y2004 0.1289*** 0.2448 -70.6336 40.0388
(0.0382) (0.1595) (271.2868) (96.7843)
d_y2005 0.1344*** 0.3112 -78.1185 43.9727
(0.0458) (0.1897) (320.7529) (115.4804)
d_y2006 0.1587*** 0.3620 -60.0532 47.7650
(0.0534) (0.2216) (372.7299) (133.7550)
d_y2007 0.1873*** 0.4257 -13.9987 46.8146
(0.0607) (0.2525) (425.3406) (152.0748)
d_y2008 0.1917*** 0.4870* 14.9304 49.7238
(0.0688) (0.2821) (476.3703) (170.3990)
d_y2009 0.2328*** 0.5344* 12.3347 61.1454
(0.0772) (0.3120) (529.1195) (188.3118)
d_y2010 0.2285** 0.5976* 40.1475 69.7336
(0.0843) (0.3412) (581.2636) (207.3524)
lin_calend_year|trend>3 0.0096 -0.0079
(0.0093) (0.0081)
lin_calend_year|trend>6 -0.0006 0.0044
(0.0050) (0.0044)
lin_calend_year|trend>9 0.0032 -0.0068*
(0.0041) (0.0040)
d_province2 0.0302 -0.0306 -0.0594* 0.0563 116.7313** -36.1011**
(0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0345) (0.0390) (51.7205) (15.2201)
d_province3 -0.0221 0.0208 -0.0293 0.0256 -32.9023 -10.5819
(0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0217) (0.0351) (60.0183) (16.2143)
d_province4 0.0016 -0.0023 -0.0053 0.0567 157.2709*** -39.6587**
Continued on next page
Appendix A 175
Table A.18 – continued from previous page
salaried self-empl. log wage log hours FT hours PT hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0369) (56.3724) (15.3425)
d_province5 -0.0184 0.0186 0.0081 0.0642* 83.7151 -14.2460
(0.0279) (0.0278) (0.0237) (0.0343) (56.5859) (17.6747)
lin_calend_year_province2 0.0009 -0.0055 -11.1725* 4.3444**
(0.0035) (0.0037) (5.5786) (2.0338)
lin_calend_year_province3 -0.0072*** -0.0024 7.9390 -1.8570
(0.0025) (0.0033) (5.9834) (1.8436)
lin_calend_year_province4 0.0013 -0.0045 -10.7012* 0.8637
(0.0030) (0.0037) (5.6221) (1.6140)
lin_calend_year_province5 -0.0034 -0.0042 0.5409 -3.3208*
(0.0028) (0.0035) (5.3448) (1.7501)
R-squared 1.0000 0.9999 0.9988
WSSR (2nd step) 271.55829 1084.3865 1058.984
Obs (2nd step) 310 646 646
Parameters (2nd step) 48 75 78
Test joint signif. all imposed restr.(P-val) 0.494 0.309 0.390
P-value of chi2 test 0.3293804 2.89E-34 4.48E-32
cluster (at which level) no no g*p g*p g*p g*p
Imposed Restrictions:
effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn yes yes yes no no yes
effect Current Urate over exp=0 yes yes yes yes no yes
spline for calendar year FE yes yes no no no no
effect prov-time trends=0 yes yes no no no no
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors between parentheses. The table reports the results from
estimating (4) in Section 2.4.4 by FGLS on mentioned outcomes. This is the second step regression of the two-step FGLS approach
described in detail in Section 2.4.4. Since the outcomes satisfy adding-up constraints (salaried
employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours
worked=total hours worked), this second step is estimated from a FGLS SUR on the first two outcomes in the sum. Effects on the
third outcome (the sum) are then obtained from the adding-up constraints. The dependent variables of the second step are the
cluster-time FE µˆgpt estimated in each corresponding first step regression, given by (3) in Section 5.2 of the main text. A description
of the covariates reported in the Table is in the footnote of Table A.17 above. In this FGLS SUR, the data are weighted by the inverse
of the cluster-robust variance matrix of µˆgpt estimated in the first step. For discrete outcomes, the Moore-Penrose generalized
inverse of this matrix is used as weight, to take into account the perfect serial correlation induced by the fact that, for specific clusters,
the outcomes do not vary over time (see Section 5.2 of the main text for details). Depending on the outcome, we impose restrictions
which cannot be jointly rejected at the 5% level: these restrictions are listed in the bottom panel of the table. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit
statistic rejects the model (P-value>0.05), standard errors clustered at the gp level are reported; otherwise conventional ones. For
completeness we report also the weighted sum of squared residuals (WSSR), the number of estimated parameters and the number of
observations, which are used to compute the χ2 test.
A.8 The Effects of the Control Variables in the First Step
This section discusses briefly the estimated effects of the control variables in the first step estima-
tion, which are reported in Table A.13 and A.16 for low and high educated, respectively.
• Household composition: For both low and high educated, a higher number of young house-
hold members (aged less than 11 when the individual was aged 17) is associated with lower
hours worked in full-time employment, on average. These individuals may allocate more
time in household activities or leisure because of particular preferences or time constraints
due to the presence of younger members in the household.
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• Parental education: (i) For low educated, mother and father education are both negatively
associated with hours worked (and full-time hours worked) and positively related with part-
time hours worked. For high educated the same relationship holds for mother education.
This may capture the effect of unobserved liquidity constraints on time worked, so that less
constrained individuals (associated to higher parental education) work more (less) hours in
part-time (full-time) jobs, and overall less hours in salaried employment. In the same spirit,
low educated individuals with low educated mothers are also more likely to opt for salaried
employment (with expected stable income under long-term contracts), while they are more
likely to engage in (riskier) self-employment if their mothers are high educated. (ii) In
addition, for high educated, father education is positively associated with hourly wages.
This is a standard result: father education may indicate family connections; or, it can be a
proxy for (not observed) father earnings or family wealth, thereby reflecting better initial
conditions or particular values shared in the family (i.e. ambitions). For low educated, this
relation is not significant. This suggests that family background is more important predictor
of individual wages for high than for low educated.13
• Delay in secondary education at age 17: For low educated, the number grades repeated
at age 17 has a negative effect on self-employment, wages, hours worked and full-time
hours worked, while a positive effect on part-time hours worked. For high educated, it
has a negative impact on wages, hours worked and full-time hours worked. The signs of
the effects are expected: students that already repeated a grade at age 17 are likely to be
negatively selected from the population of students and therefore have, on average, worse
labor market performances.
• Educational track compared to general education: For low educated, choosing a technical
track at age 17 is associated with higher wages and more hours worked, especially in full-
time jobs, compared to general education. Therefore, for this group technical education is
the most profitable track. For high educated instead general education is associated with
better labor market performances than the other options. This is also a standard results,
since general education is the typical choice for those who want to access tertiary education.
• Birth cohort 1978 and 1980 compared to 1976: For both high and low educated, cohort 1978
and 1980 are associated with lower wages than cohort 1976. This is explained by the sam-
ple selection, in particular by the fact that labor market outcomes are observed from 1998
onwards, while for cohort 1976 and 1978 graduation can occur earlier, i.e. as from 1994 and
1996 respectively (at age 18, i.e. the end of compulsory education). Consequently, cohort
1976 (1978) is under-represented at potential experience 1-4 (1-2) compared to cohort 1980,
since these years of experience are not observed for those born in 1976 (1978) who gradu-
13Parents with higher education levels have children with higher education level (Black et al., 2005). As a matter of
fact, the correlation between completed education and father education is larger for high (0.2054) than for low educated
(0.0768). The same correlation for mother education is similar - still positive, but slightly smaller: 0.1808 and 0.0665
for high and low educated, respectively.
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ated before age 23 (21).14 The tabulations below show that labor market outcomes of cohort
1976 and 1978 are under (over)-represented for first (last) years of experience. Given that
wages increase with tenure and seniority, this may explain the negative correlation between
wage and birth cohort.
In what calendar year is experience 1 observed?
all low educated high educated
year c1976 c1978 c1980 Total c1976 c1978 c1980 c1976 c1978 c1980
1998 154 240 0 394 71 216 0 83 24 0
1999 185 203 187 575 22 177 187 163 26 0
2000 191 137 242 570 13 61 225 178 76 17
2001 115 163 163 441 2 20 142 113 143 21
2002 0 153 154 307 0 5 75 0 148 79
2003 0 138 142 280 0 138 142
2004 0 0 172 172 0 0 172
2005 0 0 106 106 0 0 106
Total 645 1,034 1,166 2,845 108 479 629 537 555 537
In what calendar year is experience 10 observed?
all low educated high educated
year c1976 c1978 c1980 Total c1976 c1978 c1980 c1976 c1978 c1980
2004 143 0 0 143 143 0 0 83 24 0
2005 209 0 0 209 209 0 0 159 26 0
2006 168 148 0 316 168 148 0 173 76 17
2007 154 238 0 392 71 214 0 111 142 20
2008 181 198 186 565 22 172 186
2009 185 137 241 563 12 61 224
2010 113 161 159 433 2 19 139
Total 1,153 882 586 2,621 627 614 549 526 268 37
In addition, for low educated cohort 1978 and 1980 are associated with less hours worked
(and less hours worked in full-time jobs) than cohort 1976; cohort 1980 is also associated
with more hours worked in part-time jobs than cohort 1976. For high educated instead,
cohort 1980 has lower (higher) probability to be self- (salaried) employed than cohort 1976.
We do not have an explanation for these correlations.
14For someone born in 1976 (1978) who graduated at age 23 (21), graduation occurs in 1997 and the first year of
potential experience is observed, as it occurs in 1998.
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A.9 Tables of the Sensitivity Analysis
Table A.21: Individual Discrete Labor Market Outcomes: Low Educated.
sensitivity tests:
baseline education† national§ probit‡ 2nd-step OLS one-step
Imposed Restrictions:§§
Effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn yes yes - yes yes yes
Effect Current Urate over exp=0 yes yes yes yes yes yes
Spline for calendar year FE yes yes - yes yes yes
Effect prov-time trends=0 yes yes yes yes yes yes
Level of clustering†† no no no no g ∗ p g ∗ p
Salaried employment
potential exp (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 -0.017 -0.016 0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.006
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021)
2 -0.011 -0.008 -0.001 0.009 0.014 0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
3 -0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.017 0.027 0.017
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
4 -0.002 0.003 -0.011 0.018 0.024 0.014
(0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
5 0.000 0.006 -0.014 0.019 0.021 0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
6 0.002 0.009 -0.018 0.018 0.018 0.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
7 0.002 0.007 -0.010 0.018 0.015 0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
8 0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.016 0.013 0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
9 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.013 0.010 0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
10 0.003 0.005 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.007
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
11 0.004 0.007 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.011
(0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
12 0.006 0.009 0.027 0.019 0.021 0.015
(0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)
Self-employment
1 0.036 0.048 0.015 0.021 0.017 0.025
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019)
2 0.021 0.024 0.022 0.006 0.001 0.008
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.026) (0.016) (0.016)
3 0.007 0.001 0.028 -0.008 -0.015 -0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.015) (0.014)
4 0.001 -0.004 0.024 -0.016 -0.018 -0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014)
5 -0.005 -0.009 0.020 -0.024 -0.021 -0.013
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.015) (0.014)
6 -0.010 -0.013 0.015 -0.029 -0.024 -0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)
7 -0.009 -0.011 0.012 -0.026 -0.021 -0.014
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014)
8 -0.007 -0.009 0.008 -0.021 -0.019 -0.013
Continued on next page
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Table A.21 – continued from previous page
sensitivity tests:
baseline education† national§ probit‡ 2nd-step OLS one-step
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013)
9 -0.005 -0.006 0.004 -0.014 -0.017 -0.012
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012)
10 -0.009 -0.011 -0.002 -0.017 -0.020 -0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.009) (0.011)
11 -0.013 -0.015 -0.008 -0.024 -0.023 -0.017
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.021) (0.009) (0.010)
12 -0.017 -0.019 -0.014 -0.026 -0.026 -0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011)
Overall-employment
1 0.018 0.031 0.019 0.021 0.018 0.018
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.023) (0.008) (0.006)
2 0.010 0.017 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005)
3 0.002 0.002 0.021 0.009 0.012 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
4 -0.001 0.000 0.013 0.002 0.006 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
5 -0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
6 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 -0.011 -0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
7 -0.007 -0.004 0.001 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
8 -0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
9 -0.004 -0.003 0.009 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
10 -0.006 -0.006 0.011 -0.003 -0.006 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
11 -0.009 -0.008 0.012 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
12 -0.011 -0.010 0.013 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Standard errors between parentheses. Column 1 reports the point estimates of the benchmark model reported in Section 2.5. Columns
2-6 report the following sensitivity tests (in order): including completed education FE as individual control variables in the first step
of the two-step approach; national model; estimating the first step by Probit rather than by a Linear Probability Model; estimating the
second step by OLS rather than FGLS; estimating the model in a one-step rather than two-step approach. Results in Column 1-4 are
obtained from the second step FGLS of the two-step approach procedure explained in the text; Column 5 is obtained from the second
step OLS, i.e. neglecting the measurement error introduced by the two-step procedure. Column 6 is estimated in one step. For all
columns, salaried and self-employment are estimated jointly by means of a SUR, and the effects of interest on the overall
employment rate are obtained as a linear combination of the effects on the first two outcomes, exploiting the adding-up constraint:
overall employment=salaried employment+self-employment.
§ In the national model cells need not be dropped, since cells are always sufficiently large (see selection rule in Table 1.2 in Appendix
1.8). In contrast, all other sensitivity analyses (Column 2,4-6), which are all based on the provincial model, rely on the same
sub-sample retained for the benchmark and consider the same specification used in the benchmark; in the one-step approach (column
6), this specification is augmented by the individual control variables used in the first step.
† Completed education is measured as the number of years of education successfully attained from the beginning of secondary
education, i.e. from age 12. Therefore, repeated grades are counted only as soon as that grade is successfully passed.
‡ The table reports the partial effects on the probability of employment for each year of potential experience, where the other
aggregate regressors are evaluated at their sample mean.
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§§ The restrictions listed at the top of the table are imposed on both salaried and self-employment.
†† Clustered (conventional) standard errors are reported if the model is (not) rejected on the basis of the χ2 goodness-of-fit test at the
5% level. In contrast to all provincial models, in the national model the variance of unobserved cluster-time shocks, as calculated by
Equation (5) in the main text is strictly positive for salaried employment (see Section 2.4.4 for details). We therefore add the
estimated variance of the cluster-time shocks to the diagonal of the variance matrix of the measurement error, and use the inverse of
the resulting matrix as weight in the FGLS transformation.
Table A.22: Individual Continuous Labor Market Outcomes: Low Educated.
Sensitivity tests
baseline education† national§ 2nd-step OLS one-step
log hourly wage
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn yes yes yes yes yes
Effect Current Urate over exp=0 no no - no no
Spline for calendar year FE no no no no no
Effect prov-time trends=0 no no - no no
Level of clustering†† g ∗ p g ∗ p g g ∗ p g ∗ p
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 0.005 0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010)
2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.008)
3 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.008 -0.010
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008)
4 -0.008 -0.007 0.000 -0.009 -0.012
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007)
5 -0.009 -0.008 0.003 -0.011 -0.014
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.006)
6 -0.011 -0.010 0.005 -0.013 -0.016
(0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.006)
7 -0.008 -0.008 0.004 -0.014 -0.015
(0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.005)
8 -0.006 -0.005 0.003 -0.015 -0.014
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006)
9 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.017 -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006)
10 -0.006 -0.006 0.003 -0.017 -0.016
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.006) (0.005)
11 -0.009 -0.009 0.004 -0.017 -0.018
(0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.007) (0.005)
12 -0.012 -0.011 0.006 -0.018 -0.021
(0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.008) (0.006)
log hours worked
Imposed Restrictions:§§
Effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn no no yes no no
Effect Current Urate over exp=0 no no - no no
Spline for calendar year FE no no no no no
Effect prov-time trends=0 no no - no no
Level of clustering†† g ∗ p g ∗ p g g ∗ p g ∗ p
1 -0.044 -0.044 -0.067 -0.021 -0.024
(0.022) (0.022) (0.049) (0.029) (0.025)
2 -0.035 -0.036 -0.045 -0.031 -0.033
(0.020) (0.019) (0.043) (0.024) (0.022)
Continued on next page
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sensitivity tests:
baseline education† national§ 2nd-step OLS one-step
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
3 -0.026 -0.028 -0.023 -0.040 -0.041
(0.022) (0.021) (0.044) (0.032) (0.029)
4 -0.026 -0.027 -0.021 -0.040 -0.038
(0.019) (0.018) (0.040) (0.029) (0.026)
5 -0.026 -0.026 -0.019 -0.039 -0.035
(0.016) (0.015) (0.037) (0.026) (0.023)
6 -0.025 -0.025 -0.017 -0.039 -0.031
(0.014) (0.013) (0.035) (0.024) (0.021)
7 -0.025 -0.024 -0.014 -0.039 -0.028
(0.012) (0.012) (0.034) (0.022) (0.019)
8 -0.025 -0.023 -0.012 -0.039 -0.025
(0.012) (0.012) (0.035) (0.022) (0.019)
9 -0.025 -0.021 -0.010 -0.038 -0.022
(0.013) (0.013) (0.036) (0.022) (0.020)
10 -0.027 -0.023 -0.007 -0.037 -0.023
(0.010) (0.011) (0.039) (0.021) (0.020)
11 -0.030 -0.026 -0.004 -0.036 -0.023
(0.010) (0.010) (0.049) (0.022) (0.021)
12 -0.033 -0.028 -0.001 -0.035 -0.024
(0.012) (0.012) (0.063) (0.024) (0.023)
log earnings
1 -0.039 -0.040 -0.075 -0.029 -0.028
(0.026) (0.026) (0.052) (0.034) (0.029)
2 -0.036 -0.037 -0.050 -0.038 -0.040
(0.023) (0.021) (0.046) (0.028) (0.025)
3 -0.033 -0.034 -0.025 -0.048 -0.051
(0.022) (0.021) (0.048) (0.032) (0.030)
4 -0.034 -0.034 -0.021 -0.049 -0.050
(0.019) (0.019) (0.045) (0.029) (0.027)
5 -0.035 -0.034 -0.016 -0.050 -0.048
(0.017) (0.017) (0.043) (0.027) (0.024)
6 -0.036 -0.035 -0.011 -0.052 -0.047
(0.015) (0.015) (0.041) (0.025) (0.022)
7 -0.033 -0.031 -0.010 -0.053 -0.043
(0.014) (0.015) (0.040) (0.023) (0.021)
8 -0.031 -0.028 -0.009 -0.054 -0.039
(0.014) (0.016) (0.040) (0.023) (0.021)
9 -0.028 -0.024 -0.008 -0.055 -0.035
(0.016) (0.017) (0.042) (0.024) (0.022)
10 -0.033 -0.029 -0.004 -0.054 -0.039
(0.014) (0.016) (0.044) (0.022) (0.021)
11 -0.039 -0.034 0.000 -0.054 -0.042
(0.014) (0.016) (0.052) (0.023) (0.022)
12 -0.045 -0.039 0.004 -0.053 -0.045
(0.017) (0.018) (0.065) (0.024) (0.024)
Standard errors between parentheses. Column 1 reports the point estimates of the benchmark model reported in Section 2.5. Columns
2-5 report the following sensitivity tests (in order): including completed education FE as individual control variables in the first step
of the two-step approach; national model; estimating the second step by OLS rather than FGLS; estimating the model in a one-step
rather than two-step approach. Results in Column 1-3 are obtained from the second step FGLS of the two-step approach procedure
explained in the text; Column 4 is obtained from the second step OLS, i.e. neglecting the measurement error introduced by the
two-step procedure. Column 5 is estimated in one step. For all columns, log hourly wage and log hours worked are estimated jointly
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by means of a SUR, and the effects of interest on the log earnings are obtained as a linear combination of the effects on the first two
outcomes, exploiting the adding-up constraint: log earnings=log hourly wage+log hours worked.
§ In the national model cells need not be dropped, since cells are always sufficiently large (see selection rule in Table 1.2 in Appendix
1.8). In contrast, all other sensitivity analyses (Column 2,4-5), which are all based on the provincial model, rely on the same
sub-sample retained for the benchmark and consider the same specification used in the benchmark; in the one-step approach (column
5), this specification is augmented by the individual control variables used in the first step.
† Completed education is measured as the number of years of education successfully attained from the beginning of secondary
education, i.e. from age 12. Therefore, repeated grades are counted only as soon as that grade is successfully passed.
§§ For log hours worked the following additional restriction (not mentioned in the table) is also imposed: βg2 = 0, i.e. the slope of
the linear spline remains fixed after 6 years of experience. This restriction cannot be rejected.
†† Clustered (conventional) standard errors are reported if the model is (not) rejected on the basis of the χ2 test at the 5% level.
Table A.23: Individual Discrete Labor Market Outcomes: High Educated.
sensitivity tests:
baseline education† national§ probit‡ 2nd-step OLS one-step
Imposed Restrictions:§§
Effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn yes yes yes yes yes yes
Effect Current Urate over exp=0 yes yes - yes yes yes
Spline for calendar year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Effect prov-time trends=0 yes yes - yes yes yes
Level of clustering†† no no no no g ∗ p g ∗ p
Salaried employment
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 -0.016 -0.021 -0.012 -0.011 -0.026 -0.021
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.023) (0.014) (0.013)
2 -0.006 -0.012 -0.010 0.001 -0.009 -0.007
(0.013 (0.013 (0.011 (0.022 (0.011 (0.011)
3 0.003 -0.004 -0.009 0.012 0.008 0.008
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011)
4 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.008 0.004 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.009) (0.011)
5 0.005 -0.002 0.003 0.005 0.000 -0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.009) (0.012)
6 0.005 -0.002 0.009 0.002 -0.004 -0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.011) (0.014)
7 0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013)
8 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009 -0.001 0.000 -0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013)
9 -0.005 -0.007 -0.018 -0.002 0.002 -0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015)
10 -0.008 -0.009 -0.027 -0.003 0.004 -0.002
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
self-employment
1 0.001 0.007 0.007 -0.013 0.021 0.017
(0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015)
2 -0.007 -0.001 0.005 -0.020 0.006 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012)
3 -0.014 -0.008 0.003 -0.025 -0.008 -0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011)
4 -0.011 -0.005 0.002 -0.018 -0.003 0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011)
5 -0.009 -0.002 0.002 -0.014 0.003 0.006
Continued on next page
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Table A.23 – continued from previous page
sensitivity tests:
baseline education† national§ probit‡ 2nd-step OLS one-step
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) (0.012)
6 -0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.010 0.008 0.011
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.023) (0.010) (0.013)
7 -0.003 0.002 0.008 -0.006 0.005 0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.012)
8 0.000 0.003 0.016 -0.004 0.002 0.008
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.012)
9 0.002 0.004 0.023 -0.002 -0.001 0.006
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.013)
10 0.005 0.005 0.031 0.001 -0.004 0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015)
overall employment
1 -0.015 -0.014 -0.005 -0.025 -0.005 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
2 -0.013 -0.013 -0.005 -0.020 -0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
3 -0.011 -0.012 -0.005 -0.013 0.000 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
4 -0.007 -0.008 0.000 -0.010 0.002 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
5 -0.004 -0.004 0.005 -0.009 0.003 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
6 0.000 -0.001 0.010 -0.008 0.004 0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
7 -0.001 -0.002 0.008 -0.006 0.003 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
8 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 -0.005 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
9 -0.002 -0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
10 -0.003 -0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Standard errors between parentheses. Column 1 reports the point estimates of the benchmark model reported in Section 2.14.
Columns 2-6 report the following sensitivity tests (in order): including completed education FE as individual control variables in the
first step of the two-step approach; national model; estimating the first step by Probit rather than by a Linear Probability Model;
estimating the second step by OLS rather than FGLS; estimating the model in a one-step rather than two-step approach. Results in
Column 1-4 are obtained from the second step FGLS of the two-step approach procedure explained in the text; Column 5 is obtained
from the second step OLS, i.e. neglecting the measurement error introduced by the two-step procedure. Column 6 is estimated in one
step. For all columns, salaried and self-employment are estimated jointly by means of a SUR, and the effects of interest on the overall
employment rate are obtained as a linear combination of the effects on the first two outcomes, exploiting the adding-up constraint:
overall employment=salaried employment+self-employment. § In the national model cells need not be dropped, since cells are
always sufficiently large (see selection rule in Table 1.2 in Appendix 1.8). In contrast, all other sensitivity analyses (Column 2,4-6),
which are all based on the provincial model, rely on the same sub-sample retained for the benchmark and consider the same
specification used in the benchmark; in the one-step approach (column 6), this specification is augmented by the individual control
variables used in the first step. † Completed education is measured as the number of years of education successfully attained from the
beginning of secondary education, i.e. from age 12. Therefore, repeated grades are counted only as soon as that grade is successfully
passed. ‡ The table reports the partial effects on the probability of employment for each year of potential experience, where the other
aggregate regressors are evaluated at their sample mean. §§ The restrictions listed at the top of the table are imposed on both salaried
and self-employment. †† Clustered (conventional) standard errors are reported if the model is (not) rejected on the basis of the χ2
goodness-of-fit test at the 5% level. In contrast to all provincial models, in the national model the variance of unobserved cluster-time
shocks, as calculated by Equation (5) in the main text is strictly positive for salaried employment (see Section 2.4.4 for details). We
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therefore add the estimated variance of the cluster-time shocks to the diagonal of the variance matrix of the measurement error, and
use the inverse of the resulting matrix as weight in the FGLS transformation.
Table A.24: Individual Continuous Labor Market Outcomes: High educated.
Sensitivity tests
baseline education† national§ 2nd-step OLS one-step
log hourly wage
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn yes yes yes yes yes
Effect Current Urate over exp=0 yes yes - yes yes
Spline for calendar year FE no no no no no
Effect prov-time trends=0 no no - no no
Level of clustering†† g ∗ p g ∗ p g g ∗ p g ∗ p
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 -0.023 -0.019 -0.013 -0.011 -0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
2 -0.028 -0.023 -0.022 -0.014 -0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
3 -0.032 -0.027 -0.031 -0.017 -0.017
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
4 -0.033 -0.027 -0.023 -0.016 -0.016
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
5 -0.033 -0.026 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.008) (0.007)
6 -0.033 -0.026 -0.007 -0.013 -0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008)
7 -0.036 -0.028 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010
(0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009)
8 -0.039 -0.029 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010)
9 -0.042 -0.031 -0.012 -0.004 -0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012)
10 -0.044 -0.032 -0.013 -0.001 -0.001
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
log hours worked
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn no no yes no no
Effect Current Urate over exp=0 yes yes - yes yes
Spline for calendar year FE no no no no no
Effect prov-time trends=0 no no - no no
Level of clustering†† g ∗ p g ∗ p g g ∗ p g ∗ p
1 -0.035 -0.025 -0.120 -0.052 -0.055
(0.015) (0.014) (0.035) (0.039) (0.035)
2 -0.014 -0.007 -0.049 -0.021 -0.026
(0.011) (0.010) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024)
3 0.008 0.012 0.023 0.010 0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.027) (0.024) (0.020)
4 0.004 0.009 0.019 0.019 0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
5 0.001 0.005 0.014 0.028 0.025
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012)
6 -0.003 0.002 0.010 0.038 0.035
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013)
Continued on next page
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Table A.24 – continued from previous page
sensitivity tests:
baseline education† national§ 2nd-step OLS one-step
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
7 -0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.025 0.020
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
8 -0.001 0.005 -0.020 0.012 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
9 0.001 0.006 -0.035 -0.001 -0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
10 0.002 0.007 -0.050 -0.014 -0.027
(0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017)
log earnings
1 -0.058 -0.044 -0.133 -0.064 -0.065
(0.019) (0.018) (0.034) (0.038) (0.036)
2 -0.041 -0.029 -0.071 -0.035 -0.039
(0.015) (0.014) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025)
3 -0.025 -0.015 -0.008 -0.007 -0.013
(0.013) (0.014) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021)
4 -0.029 -0.018 -0.004 0.003 -0.001
(0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017)
5 -0.032 -0.021 -0.001 0.014 0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016)
6 -0.036 -0.024 0.003 0.025 0.023
(0.014) (0.014) (0.026) (0.018) (0.017)
7 -0.038 -0.024 -0.013 0.014 0.010
(0.012) (0.013) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017)
8 -0.040 -0.025 -0.030 0.004 -0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.024) (0.019) (0.018)
9 -0.041 -0.025 -0.047 -0.006 -0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021)
10 -0.043 -0.025 -0.064 -0.016 -0.028
(0.014) (0.013) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024)
Standard errors between parentheses. Column 1 reports the point estimates of the benchmark model reported in Section 2.14.
Columns 2-5 report the following sensitivity tests (in order): including completed education FE as individual control variables in the
first step of the two-step approach; national model; estimating the second step by OLS rather than FGLS; estimating the model in a
one-step rather than two-step approach. Results in Column 1-3 are obtained from the second step FGLS of the two-step approach
procedure explained in the text; Column 4 is obtained from the second step OLS, i.e. neglecting the measurement error introduced by
the two-step procedure. Column 5 is estimated in one step. For all columns, log hourly wage and log hours worked are estimated
jointly by means of a SUR, and the effects of interest on the log earnings are obtained as a linear combination of the effects on the
first two outcomes, exploiting the adding-up constraint: log earnings=log hourly wage+log hours worked.
§ In the national model cells need not be dropped, since cells are always sufficiently large (see selection rule in Table 1.2 in Appendix
1.8). In contrast, all other sensitivity analyses (Column 2,4-5), which are all based on the provincial model, rely on the same
sub-sample retained for the benchmark and consider the same specification used in the benchmark; in the one-step approach (column
5), this specification is augmented by the individual control variables used in the first step.
† Completed education is measured as the number of years of education successfully attained from the beginning of secondary
education, i.e. from age 12. Therefore, repeated grades are counted only as soon as that grade is successfully passed.
†† Clustered (conventional) standard errors are reported if the model is (not) rejected on the basis of the χ2 test at the 5% level.
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B
Supplementary Appendix to “Is it Socially
Efficient to Impose Job Search Requirements on
Unemployed Benefit Claimants with Hyperbolic
Preferences?”
The Solution and Discussion for the Naive Agent
In the main text we have only considered the case in which agents have sophisticated time prefer-
ences. In this Appendix we analyze the behavior of agents who have naive time preferences. The
literature contrasts two types of hyperbolic agents, a sophisticated and a naive one. They differ in
the perception of how their respective future selves will behave. A sophisticated agent correctly
realizes that her future selves will act exactly as the current self (discounting by βδ), while a naive
agent wrongly believes that her future selves will behave as an exponential agent (discounting
by δ). Using the terminology of (Gruber and Köszegi, 2000, 2001) they both have a self-control
problem, but only the naive agent has a misperception problem.
B.1 Perfect Monitoring
The optimization problem of the current self of a naive or a sophisticated agent coincides and
can be formally represented by (2)-(4) in the main text. By contrast, the optimization problem of
the future selves differs between the naive and sophisticated agent. While the sophisticated agent
knows that she will continue to set her search effort in the future to the current level, a naive agent
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believes that she will set her future search effort to the same level as an exponential discounter
would do. This means that the first-order condition for search effort, (12) in the main text, is not
affected, but in the first-order condition of the reservation wage (11) the optimal search effort of
the exponential agent σeu replaces σu of the hyperbolic agent:
yu +
δλ (σeu)
1− δ(1− q)
Q (xu) = c (σ
e
u) + xu, u ∈ {b, z} (B.1)
where σeu is determined by the first-order condition of search effort for the exponential agent,
which is equivalent to (12) in the main text, but where β = 1:
δλ′ (σeu)
1− δ(1− q)
Q (xu) + µ
e
u = c
′ (σeu) and µ
e
u (σ
e
u − σ¯) = 0, u ∈ {b, z} (B.2)
where µeb ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraint σ
e
b ≥ σ¯ and
where µez = 0, since job search is not constrained in the case of a sanction. Since search effort of
an exponential agent is higher than that of a hyperbolic agent, this constraint is less likely to bind
than the one in (12).
So, the solution for the naive agent is characterized by three first-order conditions instead of
two: (B.1), (B.2) and (12) jointly determine the optimal solution (σu, xu, σ
e
u) for u ∈ {b, z}. No-
tice that we use the same notations as in the main text, but σu and xu now designate the optimal
solution for a naive agent instead of a sophisticated one. This convention is maintained through-
out this Appendix. Observe that the naive agent sets her reservation wage at the level that the
exponential agent sets it: xu = x
e
u.
These first-order conditions can be represented by the following functions defined in the main
text: x = r(σ | b), x = s(σ | 1), and x = s(σ | β < 1). This allows to represent the solution
of the naive agent graphically. The reservation wage of the unconstrained unemployed benefit
claimant xb is determined, as for an exponential agent, by the intersection between x = r(σ | b),
x = s(σ | 1) at point A in Figure B.1 below. The level of search effort is then set at point point B,
the intersection of the horizontal line through xb and x = s(σ | β < 1). Similarly, the reservation
wage and search effort of the sanctioned or non-complying agent are determined respectively by
points C and D.
Let us now consider the behavior of the agent as the search requirement σ¯ is raised. As long
as σ¯ < σb, the agent does not change her behavior characterized by point B. If σ¯ is set at a higher
level than σb, she will at first comply and increase search effort accordingly. However, since a
naive agent believes that she will act as an exponential agent in the future, she will not adjust her
reservation wage as long as the requirement is set below the optimal search level of an exponential
agent σeb at point A. So, the optimal (σb, xb) pair first follows the straight line BA. The reservation
wage (and hence lifetime utility of the future selves) is lowered along the line passing through
AHF only if σ¯ > σeb .
The decision to comply or not depends on the lifetime utility of the current self. This utility
starts decreasing as soon as σ¯ is set at a higher level than σb to the right of point B, because, as
formally demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 6, the instantaneous cost of search increases
Appendix B 190
bs zs
ns
e
bs
e
zs
B
'B
D
E
A
C
F
max
n es s= s
x
e
b bx x=
(1 ) ( )f e ezB xd s- =
(1 ) cBd-
( | 1)s s b < ( | 1)s s b =
( | )br ys
'D
H
K
(1 ) ( )cZd s-
(1 ) ( )cBd s-
max
ss
J
(1 ) (1 ) ( )c c nZ Bd d s- = -
( | )zr ys
Figure B.1: The Solution for the Naive Agent in Case of Perfect Monitoring. x = reservation wage; σ =
realized search effort.
while the reservation wage remains unaffected. The naive agent will stop complying as soon as
the search requirement is raised above the effort level σ¯n at which the current self is indifferent be-
tween complying or being sanctioned. The maximum search requirement σ¯n verifies the following
equation:
Bc(σ¯n) = Zc (B.3)
In Figure B.1, this corresponds to the search intensity attained at point E.
Without being more precise about preferences and the search technology of the agent, we can
say little about the exact level of σ¯n. Nevertheless, in Proposition 6 it is demonstrated that this
level can be bracketed: σ¯n ∈ (σz, σ¯
n
max), where σ¯
n
max is equal to the maximum search requirement
σ¯e before an exponential agent stops complying. In Figure B.1, this corresponds to the search
intensity attained at point F, where the reservation wage of the complier r(σ¯ | yb) is equal to that
of a sanctioned exponential agent xez . This means that the imposition of a search requirement leads
to non-compliance at lower effort levels for naive hyperbolic agents than for exponential agents,
as considered by Manning (2009) and Petrongolo (2009), since σ¯n ∈ (σz, σ¯
n
max = σ¯
e) < σ¯e,
and than sophisticated hyperbolic agents, as considered in the main text. In the latter case the
maximum search requirement that can be attained before an agent stops complying is equal to
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σsmax located on the abscissa of point J.
Proposition 6.
(i) The lifetime utility of the naive current self is unaffected by the search requirement for σ¯
lower than her optimal free choice σb and is strictly decreasing in σ¯ if it is higher.
(ii) The maximum search requirement σ¯ at which a naive agent stops complying is not lower
than the optimal search effort σz of a sanctioned naive hyperbolic agent and is strictly
lower than the search effort σ¯e at which an exponential agent stops complying.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
B.2 The Consequences of an Imperfect Monitoring Technology
We will not develop the complete analysis for a naive agent in the case of an imperfect monitor-
ing technology, since the analysis is very similar to the case of a sophisticated agent. The main
difference is that the long-run utility of the naive agent is constantly at the level of an agent with
exponential time preferences because of her misperception problem. This means that the long-run
utility of a naive agent is either constant or decreasing in σ, and never strictly increasing. Conse-
quently, if in the benchmark case of an unbounded support of the measurement error the search
requirement and, hence, the sanction probability is raised above zero, the long-run utility immedi-
ately strictly decreases, while for a sophisticated agent it initially increases. Proposition 5 in the
main text differs therefore in this respect and we will provide a version of it, as well as its proof,
in Proposition 7 below.
Proposition 7.
Assume that the sanction probability is expressed by (28) in the main text and that the
support of measurement error is unbounded. Then, the optimal search effort for a naive
agent σp strictly increases (resp., decreases) in σ¯ for σ¯ → 0 and, hence, p(σ¯/σp) → 0
(resp., σ¯ → +∞ and, hence, p(σ¯/σp)→ 1). The reservation wage xp is always decreasing
in σ¯. The Pareto frontier cannot be reached.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Proof. Using (1), (2), (8) and (9) in the main text, and noting that the reservation wage of
the naive agent is only affected by σ¯ if σ¯ > σeb , we can write:
Bc(σ¯) = max
σ≥σ¯
yb − c(σ) + βδ
{
λ(σ)
1− δ(1− q)
Q [xeb(σ¯)] +
xeb(σ¯)
1− δ
}
(B.4)
where xeb(σ¯) ≡ 1{σ¯≤σeb}
xeb + 1{σ¯>σeb}
r(σ¯ | yb) and 1{A} = 1 if A is true and 1{A} = 0
otherwise. The search effort solving the maximization problem (B.4) is equal to σb if the
latter is strictly higher than σ¯ (with xeb(σ¯) = x
e
b) and σ¯ otherwise.
Partially differentiating Bc(σ¯) in (B.4) with respect to σ¯ is equal to zero if σb > σ¯. Other-
wise, using that Q′ [r(σ | yu)] = −F¯ [r(σ | yu)] r(σ | yu):
∂Bc(σ¯)
∂σ¯
= S (σ¯, xeb(σ¯) | β) + 1{σ¯>σeb}
βδ
[(1− δ) (1− h [σ¯, r(σ¯ | yb)] + δq)]
[1− δ(1− q)](1− δ)
∂r(σ¯ | yb)
∂σ¯
Since S (σ¯, xeb(σ¯) | β) ≦ 0 iff σ¯ ≧ σb and since, by Proposition 1 in the main text,
∂r(σ¯ | yb)/∂σ¯ < 0 iff σ¯ > σ
e
b , ∂B
c(σ¯)/∂σ¯ ≦ 0 iff σ¯ ≧ σb. In sum, ∂Bc(σ¯)/∂σ¯ = 0 iff
σ¯ ≤ σb and ∂B
c(σ¯)/∂σ¯ < 0 iff σ¯ > σb.
(ii) Proof. We prove (ii) by showing that for any σ¯ ≥ σb the difference between the expected
lifetime utility of a complying and a non-complying current self must always be strictly
greater for an agent discounting the future at an exponential rate (β = 1) than for an agent
discounting the future at a hyperbolic rate (β < 1). Consequently the hyperbolic agent will
always stop complying (when Bc(σ¯n) = Z˜c) at a lower level of search effort than that of an
exponential agent.
(1) Using (2), (8) and (9) of the main text, and restricting the analysis to the cases where
σ¯ ≥ σb, we obtain:
∀σ¯ < σeb : B
f (σ¯)−Bc(σ¯) = δ(1− β)
{
λ(σ¯)
[1− δ(1− q)]
Q(xeb) +
xeb
(1− δ)
}
(B.5)
and
∀σ¯ ≥ σeb : B
f (σ¯)−Bc(σ¯) = δ(1− β)
{
λ(σ¯)
[1− δ(1− q)]
Q(r(σ¯|yb)) +
r(σ¯|yb)
(1− δ)
}
(B.6)
Similarly, using (3), (8) and (9) in the main text, we find
Zf − Zc = δ(1− β)
{
λ(σz)
[1− δ(1− q)]
Q(xez) +
xez
(1− δ)
}
(B.7)
(2) Consider Definition (10) in the main text and assume that x1 < x2. Then we can
rewrite Q(x1) as follows:
Q(x1) =
∫ x2
x1
(w − x1) dF (w) +Q(x2) + F¯ (x2) (x2 − x1)
= Q(x2) + F¯ (x1) (x2 − x1)− {(x2 − x1)− E (w − x1|x1 ≤ w < x2)}
×
[
F¯ (x1)− F¯ (x2)
]
(B.8)
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(3) Since xez < x
e
b, we can use (10) in the main text and (B.8) to rewrite (B.7) as follows:
Zf − Zc =
δ(1− β)
[1− δ(1− q)]
{
λ(σz)Q(x
e
b) + h(σz, x
e
z)(x
e
b − x
e
z) + x
e
z
1− δ + δq
1− δ
− λ(σz)(x
e
b − x
e
z) + λ(σz)E(w − x
e
z|x
e
z ≤ w < x
e
b)
× [F¯ (xez)− F¯ (x
e
b)]
}
(B.9)
Subtracting (B.9) from (B.5) then yields for σ¯ ∈ [σz, σb] :
Bf (σ¯)−Bc(σ¯)− Zf + Zc =
δ(1− β)
[1− δ(1− q)]
{
Q(xeb)[λ(σ¯)− λ(σz)] + (x
e
b − x
e
z)
×
[(1− δ)(1− h(σz, x
e
z)) + δq]
(1− δ)
+ λ(σz) {(x
e
b − x
e
z)− E(w − x
e
z)|x
e
z ≤ w < x
e
b)}
×
[
F¯ (xez)− F¯ (x
e
b)
] }
> 0 (B.10)
Since ∀σ¯ ∈ [σeb , σ¯
n
max] : r(σ¯|yb) > x
e
z , we can derive using (B.6) a similar expression
as (B.10) in which xeb is replaced by r(σ¯|yb). Consequently,
∀σ¯ ∈ [σz, σ¯
n
max] : B
f (σ¯)− Zf > Bc(σ¯)− Zc (B.11)
Since Bf (σ¯nmax) = Z
f , (B.11) implies that Bc(σ¯nmax) < Z
c. Because Bc(σz) > Z
c
and Bc(·) is a continuous function, it must be that σz < σ¯
n < σ¯nmax. Finally, since the
reservation wage of a naive agent (and hence lifetime utility of the future selves Zf )
is equal to that of an exponential agent (xz = x
e
z), B
f (σ¯nmax) = Z
f implies that σ¯nmax
is equal to the maximum search requirement σ¯e at which an exponential agent stops
complying.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Following arguments that are similar as those for the sophisticated agent in the case of mea-
surement error, but adjusted, as in Section 1 of this Internet Appendix, the first-order conditions
define a system of three equations in three unknowns: x, σ and σe. σ denotes the search effort
of the naive agent, while σe refers to the effort of an exponential agent. Notice that because of
the misperception problem the reservation wage of the naive and the exponential agent are equal:
x = xe. The system is thus
Ey +
δλ(σe)Q(x)
1− δ(1− q)
− x− c(σe)− p
( σ¯
σe
) δ
(1− δ)
[1− h (σe, x)] (x− xz) = 0 (B.12)
βδλ′(σ)
1− δ(1− q)
Q(x)−
∂p(σ¯/σ)
∂σ
{
yb − yz +
βδ
(1− δ)
[1− h (σ, x)] (x− xz)
}
+p
( σ¯
σ
) βδ
(1− δ)
λ′(σ)F¯ (x)(x− xz)− c
′(σ) = 0 (B.13)
δλ′(σe)
1− δ(1− q)
Q(x)−
∂p(σ¯/σe)
∂σe
{
yb − yz +
δ
(1− δ)
[1− h (σe, x)] (x− xz)
}
+p
( σ¯
σe
) δ
(1− δ)
λ′(σe)F¯ (x)(x− xz)− c
′(σe) = 0 (B.14)
The first equation is the first-order condition of the reservation wage, Equation (31) in the main
text, in which σ is replaced by σe. The second is the first-order condition of search for the naive
agent, corresponding to (32) in the main text, but in which σ and x refer to the behavior of a
naive agent instead of a sophisticated one. Finally, the third equation is the first-order condition
of search effort for the exponential agent. This corresponds to equation (32) in the main text for
which β is set to one and σ is replaced by σe.
Totally differentiating this system yields:A1 A2 A3A4 A5 A6
A7 A8 A9

 dxdσ
dσe
 =
A10A11
A12
 dσ¯ (B.15)
where, without recalling the arguments of λ, c, p, f, F¯ , Q, h and their derivatives and without writ-
ing a subscript e to denote that a function is evaluated at σe
A1 = −
δλeF¯
1− δ(1− q)
− 1− pe
δ
1− δ
[λef(x− xz) + 1− he] < 0 (B.16)
A2 = 0 (B.17)
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A3 =
δλ′eQ
1− δ(1− q)
− c′e −
∂pe
∂σe
{
yb − yz +
δ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
+ pe
δλ′eF¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
= Sp(σ
e, x | 1, σ¯) (B.18)
A4 = −
βδλ′F¯
1− δ(1− q)
−
∂p
∂σ
βδ
1− δ
[λf(x− xz) + 1− h]
+ p
βδ
1− δ
λ′
[
F¯ − f(x− xz)
]
(B.19)
A5 =
βδλ′′Q
1− δ(1− q)
−
∂2p
[∂σ]2
{
yb − yz +
βδ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
+ 2
∂p
∂σ
βδλ′F¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
+ p
βδλ′′F¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
− c′′ (B.20)
A6 = 0 (B.21)
A7 = −
δλ′eF¯
1− δ(1− q)
−
∂pe
∂σe
δ [λef(x− xz) + 1− he]
1− δ
+ pe
δλ′e
[
F¯ − f(x− xz)
]
1− δ
(B.22)
A8 = 0 (B.23)
A9 =
δλ′′eQ
1− δ(1− q)
−
∂2pe
[∂σe]2
{
yb − yz +
δ(1− he)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
+ 2
∂pe
∂σe
δλ′eF¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
+ pe
δλ′′e F¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
− c′′e (B.24)
A10 =
∂pe
∂σ¯
{
yb − yz +
δ(1− he)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
(B.25)
A11 =
∂2p
∂σ∂σ¯
{
yb − yz +
βδ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
−
∂p
∂σ¯
βδλ′F¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
(B.26)
A12 =
∂2pe
∂σe∂σ¯
{
yb − yz +
δ(1− he)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
−
∂pe
∂σ¯
δλ′eF¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
(B.27)
Solving system (B.12)-(B.14) yields
∂x
∂σ¯
∂σ
∂σ¯
∂σe
∂σ¯
 = 1
Dn
 A5A9 0 −A3A5−A4A9 (A1A9 −A3A7) A3A4
−A5A7 0 A1A5

A10A11
A12
 (B.28)
where Dn = A5(A1A9 −A3A7).
In order to sign these partial derivatives, we use a couple of results of the proof of Proposition
5 in the Appendix of the main text. First, by substituting (A.25) into (B.25), we obtain that
A10 ≥ 0. Second, substituting (A.26) into (B.20) and (B.24) yields A5 < 0 and A9 < 0 if
g′
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
is positive or not too negative, an assumption we make throughout. Third, since
A3 = Sp(σ
e, x | 1, σ¯), we have that A3 = 0 if we evaluate it at the optimal choice (σ
e
b , xb), since
for a naive agent the reservation wage and search effort of the future selves are set at the optimum
of an exponential agent (xb = x
e
b). Observe that as a result, at the optimum, Dn = A1A5A9 < 0.
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Finally, we insert (A.25)-(A.27) in (B.19) and (B.26)1 to observe that these have ambiguous signs:
A4 = −
βδ
(1− δ)
{
λ′F¯
[(1− p)(1− δ)− pδq]
[1− δ(1− q)]
+ pλ′f(x− xz)−
g
σ
[λf(x− xz) + (1− h)]
}
(B.29)
A11 = −
g′
σσ¯
{
yb − yz +
βδ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
−
g
σ¯
βδλ′F¯ (x− xz)
1− δ
(B.30)
However, as in the proof of Proposition 5, we now show that these partial derivatives can be
unambiguously signed in the limiting cases where p tends to zero or to one. We only consider
the benchmark case in which the support of the measurement error is unbounded. This means
that the following properties are satisfied: ∀σ, σ¯ ∈ (0,+∞) : g
[
log
(
σ¯
σ
)]
> 0, lim
ε→−∞
g(ε) =
lim
ε→+∞
g(ε) = 0, lim
ε→−∞
g′(ε) > 0, and lim
ε→+∞
g′(ε) < 0.
Case 1: p→ 0
Substituting lim g(ε)
ε→−∞
= 0 and lim g′(ε)
ε→−∞
> 0 in (B.29) and (B.30) yields
A4 → −
βδλ′F¯
1− δ(1− q)
< 0 (B.31)
A11 → −
g′
σσ¯
{
yb − yz +
βδ(1− h)(x− xz)
1− δ
}
< 0 (B.32)
Case 2: p→ 1
Using lim g′(ε)
ε→+∞
< 0 and x− xz → 0 for p→ 1 allows to simplify equations (B.29) and (B.30) as
follows:
A4 →
βδ
(1− δ)
{
λ′F¯
pδq
[1− δ(1− q)]
+
g
σ
(1− h)
}
> 0 (B.33)
A11 → −
g′
σσ¯
{yb − yz} > 0 (B.34)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that lim g′(ε)
ε→+∞
< 0 in the benchmark when the
measurement error has an infinite support, and g′(ε) = 0 in the case of a finite support.
To sum up, we found that A1 < 0, A2 = 0, A3 = 0, A5 < 0, A6 = 0, A8 = 0, A9 < 0,
A10 ≥ 0 and Dn < 0, while A4 < 0 and A11 < 0 if p → 0 and A4 > 0 and A11 > 0 if p → 1.
By continuity, there exists at least one p˜n ∈ (0, 1) at which A4 = 0 and at least one pˆn ∈ (0, 1) at
which A11 = 0.
Inserting these results in (B.28) and evaluating these partial derivatives at the optimal solution
(σp, xp, σ
e
p) yields:
∂xp
∂σ¯
=
A5A9A10
Dn
=
A10
A1
(B.35)
∂σp
∂σ¯
=
A9(A1A11 −A4A10)
Dn
=
(A1A11 −A4A10)
A1A5
(B.36)
1We do not consider A7 and A12, because we are not interested in the behavior of the future selves of a naive agent.
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Consider first the case where p → 0. Observe that since lim
ε→−∞
g(ε) = 0, A10 → 0, so that in
the limit
∂xp
∂σ¯ tends to zero. However, for any finite ε, g(ε) > 0, so that A10 > 0, and, hence,
∂xp
∂σ¯ < 0. From (B.36) it is clear that
∂σp
∂σ¯ > 0 in the case where p → 0. Inserting the values of
the partial derivatives for the case that p → 1 yields again that
∂xp
∂σ¯ < 0 close to p = 1. Since
A10 → 0 if p → 1, while A11 remains strictly negative, we obtain that
∂σp
∂σ¯ < 0 sufficiently close
to p = 1.
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